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car. Defendant then “withdrew his consent to search his home.” At that point, victim “emerged from the woods near the house. She was bloody, disoriented, and crying.” Defendant was arrested and charged with battery. Other officers arrived to photograph the scene; they opened the car doors to take photos, and re-entered the home and took three photographs without touching anything. At the same time, a detective interviewed the victim, who had been taken to the hospital. He then prepared an application for a search warrant for the residence. After the warrant was obtained, additional photos were taken. Defendant contends on appeal that the photos taken before the search warrant was issued should have been suppressed, as he had withdrawn his consent to enter his house. Court of Appeals disagrees, holding that the police were entitled to re-enter the house to seize the evidence they had already seen in plain view, citing “ State v. McTaggart, 241 Ga.App. 852, 855 (528 S.E.2d 309) (2000) (‘A police officer who observes contraband in plain view is entitled to seize it, so long as he is at a place where he is entitled to be[.]’).” “‘ Additional investigators or officials may enter a citizen's property after one official has already intruded legally. Later arrivals may join their colleagues even though the exigent circumstances justifying the initial entry no longer exist.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Peterson, 273 Ga. 657, 659(1) (543 S.E.2d 691) (2001). In this case, the officers moved nothing, opened no drawers, removed nothing from the premises, and did not exceed the scope of their initial search for [victim]. Rather, they photographed only those items that were visible during the scope of the initial welfare search. … See id. at 657-660(1), (2). (A police officer was authorized to take pictures of and to seize items of evidence observed in plain view within the limited scope of the initial intrusion even though the exigency had expired).” Note that the opinion in part treats the initial entry as consensual, but the holding emphasizes the nature of the initial entry as a protective sweep or “welfare search.” Aguey-Zinsou v. State, 296 Ga.App. 319, 674 S.E.2d 366 (February 26, 2009). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress; circumstances authorized officers’ protective sweep of apartment: “the officers returned to Wood Terrace and found that the door of Apartment 2025 had been forced open (the door frame was damaged), and the officers also found bullet casings and blood in the hallway near the apartment. Because of the state of the apartment and because Aguey-Zinsou had not called 911 to report that he had been shot, the officers were afraid that additional individuals may have been ‘hurt or dead inside the apartment.’” Fact that officers “were able to identify a photograph of him, a credit card, and a letter addressed to him” did not mean that officers exceeded scope of protective sweep; “the officers here did not search locations in the apartment that could not have concealed a victim or perpetrators. [fn] The officers checked cabinets large enough to hide an individual, but did not check drawers or other smaller locations.” Celestin v. State, 296 Ga.App. 727, 675 S.E.2d 480 (February 18, 2009). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress; smell of burning marijuana justified protective sweep of hotel room, although defendant had been arrested at room door with lit marijuana cigarette. “Contrary to Celestin's argument, ‘[t]he fact that the sweep was not performed incident to an arrest does not render it invalid under the Fourth Amendment.’ Nelson v. State, 271 Ga.App. 658, 661(1)(a) (610 S.E.2d 627) (2005). Under the circumstances presented here, where the officer testified that he wanted to ensure that no one was hiding in the bathroom, a limited sweep was authorized to secure the room while a search warrant was obtained. Id.” Distinguishing State v. Charles , 264 Ga.App. 874 (592 S.E.2d 518) (2003) (protective sweep of hotel room not justified where the officers “had detected only the smell of marijuana smoke, as opposed to the odor of burning marijuana”). Charles disapproved “[t]o the extent that [it] could be interpreted as support for the premise that the odor of raw marijuana emanating from a particular location cannot be the sole basis for the issuance of a search warrant for that location,” State v. Kazmierczak , 331 Ga.App. 817, 771 S.E.2d 473 (March 30, 2015). Richards v. State, 290 Ga.App. 360, 659 S.E.2d 651 (March 4, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress; warrantless police entry into home was justified by exigent circumstances. Officer arrived at home containing a reported meth lab; through the open door, the experienced officer saw and smelled what appeared to be a meth lab in operation. Told there were children in the home, the officer searched the house for them, knowing “that a methamphetamine laboratory presents dangers of explosion and fire, and that inhalation of the chemicals associated with such a laboratory can be fatal.” “Fear for the safety of a young child believed to be in harm's way is an example of an exigent circumstance. See Burk v. State, 284 Ga.App. 843, 844 (644 S.E.2d 914) (2007) (officer’s reasonable belief that minors are consuming alcohol in a residence constitutes an exigent circumstance).” Moorer v. State, 286 Ga.App. 395, 649 S.E.2d 537 (July 6, 2007). In their search for two armed robbers, police were led to Moorer’s residence (by the completed employment application he left at the scene of the crime). After arresting Moorer, officers asked for consent to search the residence for the other robber, which was variously given or refused by defendant and his wife. Held, regardless of consent, “the search of his house was justified as a protective sweep and the trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress. The officers knew that there were two men involved in the robbery and that both men had guns when they committed the crime. Having located Moorer at the residence, it