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was reasonable for police to ascertain if the other man involved with the robbery was in the residence as well. ‘Police officers are authorized to make a protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when they possess “articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276) (1990). It would thus appear that the officers in this case had the grounds needed to justify a protective sweep. And even if they did not, exigent circumstances did permit a cursory search of the house in order to prevent the escape of unknown individuals. See United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268-269 (3, 4) (3rd Cir.1973).’ Inglett v. State, 239 Ga.App. 524, 525(1) (521 S.E.2d 241) (1999).” State v. Gray, 285 Ga.App. 124, 645 S.E.2d 598 (April 16, 2007). Protective sweep of residence was not justified where there was no evidence of other occupants of residence. “‘A protective sweep is a limited search of the premises primarily to ensure officer safety by detecting the presence of other occupants.’ (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Charles, 264 Ga.App. 874, 875(1) (592 S.E.2d 518) (2003), citing State v. Mixon, 251 Ga.App. 168 (554 S.E.2d 196) (2001). ‘The seminal United States Supreme Court case authorizing this type of warrantless entry, Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276) (1990), held that officers are authorized to perform a protective sweep in connection with an in-home arrest when they possess articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.’ (Footnote omitted.) Nelson v. State, 271 Ga.App. 658, 660(1) (610 S.E.2d 627) (2005), citing Maryland v. Buie, supra at 334(III). See also Elliot v. State, 274 Ga.App. 73, 76(2) (616 S.E.2d 844) (2005); Charles, supra. The trial court correctly ruled that the sweep in this case did not comply with these rules. We note at the outset that there was no ‘in-home’ arrest, which would have justified the sweep, as no one had been arrested at the time the sweep occurred. [fn] Furthermore, whether the officers possessed a reasonable belief, based on articulable facts, that the home harbored a dangerous person was a judgment to be made by the trial court and not by us on appeal. Hunter testified that Cobb told him that Gray was not home and that there was no one else in the house. Moorhead acknowledged that the officers had no other indication that any other persons, armed or not, were in the house, or that there was any other kind of emergency in the house. Moorhead reasoned that the sweep was necessary because ‘there may or may not have been a working meth lab in the home.’ However, the ‘presence of contraband without more does not give rise to exigent circumstances[,]’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Davis v. State, 262 Ga. 578, 582(3) (422 S.E.2d 546) (1992), sufficient to authorize a warrantless entry into a home. A fortiori, the trial court’s finding that Hunter’s protective sweep of the home was a warrantless, illegal search was not clearly erroneous, and the trial court appropriately granted Gray’s motion to suppress.” Compare Richards (March 4, 2008), above (search of meth lab premises justified where children reported to be present). State v. Pando, 284 Ga.App. 70, 643 S.E.2d 342 (March 8, 2007). In prosecution for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, trial court properly granted motion to suppress. Entry into home was not justified by need to conduct protective sweep where defendants were not under arrest, nor was there any evidence that home contained weapons or anyone other than defendants. “‘A “protective sweep” is a limited search of the premises primarily to ensure officer safety by detecting the presence of other occupants.... Officers may conduct a protective sweep in connection with an in-home arrest when they possess articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Charles, 264 Ga.App. 874, 875(1) (592 S.E.2d 518) (2003). See also State v. Mixon, 251 Ga.App. 168, 170 (554 S.E.2d 196) (2001) (accord).” “See Davis v. State, [262 Ga. 578, 582-583(3) (422 S.E.2d 546) (1992)] (warrantless entry was not justified when there was no evidence that someone was inside the house or that officers and others standing outside the house were in danger); Kirsche v. State, [(February 21, 2005), below] 271 Ga.App. at 732-733 (officers were not authorized to make a warrantless entry or take self-protective measures absent evidence that the defendant was armed or that others inside posed a danger to the officers); State v. Charles, 264 Ga.App. at 875-876(1) (a protective sweep of a motel room was not authorized when the defendants were outside the room, were not under arrest, and did not appear threatening in any way, and there was no indication that anyone else was in the room); State v. Mixon, 251 Ga.App. at 170-171 (a protective sweep was not authorized when the defendants had not been placed under arrest at the time of the sweep and the officer admitted that he did not know whether anyone was in the house prior to conducting the sweep); King v. State, 217 Ga.App. 889, 891 (459 S.E.2d 605) (1995) (after an officer went to a house to arrest a suspect, the defendant answered the door, said the suspect did not live there, and walked back inside; although the defendant was agitated when he answered the door, the officer was not justified in entering the house behind him without the defendant’s consent when there was no evidence that he posed a threat to the officer); cf. Inglett v. State, 239 Ga.App. 524, 525(1) (521 S.E.2d 241) (1999) (warrantless entry and protective sweep was authorized when, immediately prior to the defendant’s arrest outside the