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entry into defendant’s residence: “the patrol officer ‘credibly testified that Defendant admitted that juveniles were consuming alcohol inside Defendant’s home.’” “While no Georgia court has ever addressed whether a reasonable belief that minors are consuming alcohol in a residence constitutes an exigent circumstance , this issue has been answered in the affirmative by courts from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Robinson v. Commonwealth, 47 Va.App. 533, 559- 560(III)(B) (624 S.E.2d 651) (2006), aff'd, 639 S.E.2d 217 (2007); Radloff v. City of Oelwein, 380 F.3d 344, 348(II) (8th Cir., 2004). In Robinson, supra, the Virginia Court of Appeals reasoned that the police officer ‘could reasonably have believed that multiple, underage individuals had gathered at a party in the country and consumed significant quantities of alcohol. Many of these individuals had driven to the residence and, if left to their own devices pending the issuance of a search warrant, may have attempted to drive home, placing both themselves and the general public at risk of significant harm. ’ 47 Va.App. at 559(III)(B). In addition to the risk to public safety, the court also noted that evidence of the crime of furnishing alcohol to minors is easily destroyed when the minors leave the scene of the crime. Id. at 560(III)(B). We are persuaded by this reasoning and conclude that exigent circumstances justified the officers’ warrantless entry into Burk’s home.” Facts here similar to those stated in Robinson . State v. Pando, 284 Ga.App. 70, 643 S.E.2d 342 (March 8, 2007). In prosecution for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, trial court properly granted motion to suppress. Trial court properly granted defendants’ motion to suppress drugs found in their home; State failed to establish that entry into the home was justified by either consent or any exigent circumstance. “[T]he fact that there was an odor of fresh marijuana emanating from the home did not give rise to exigent circumstances that would justify a warrantless entry. Davis v. State, 262 Ga. 578, 582(3) (422 S.E.2d 546) (1992).” There was no evidence of attempts to destroy evidence “or that either defendant attempted to retreat back into the house after being confronted by the officers. In addition, it is undisputed that the officers were not in ‘hot pursuit’ of the defendants prior to entering Pando’s home.” Officers here told defendants “we need to go inside” when they smelled strong odor of fresh marijuana. Pando first refused entry, but allowed officers in on second demand. Overruled to the extent that it “holds that the presence of odors can never be the sole basis for the issuance of a search warrant,” State v. Kazmierczak , 331 Ga.App. 817, 771 S.E.2d 473 (March 30, 2015). Rhone v. State, 283 Ga.App. 553, 642 S.E.2d 185 (February 12, 2007). Investigating an armed robbery, police arrested defendant, age 17, at “Rhone’s grandparents’ home, where Rhone lived with his father and grandparents.” Officers then searched defendant’s room with the consent of defendant’s father and grandfather. Defendant moves to suppress evidence of the robbery found in the search of his room, contending that he had a “legitimate expectation of privacy” therein and was at least an equal occupant who was not asked for consent to search, citing Randolph (March 22, 2006), below. Held, trial court properly denied motion to suppress. “ The general rule is that the voluntary consent of the head of household to the search of premises owned or controlled by him is sufficient to authorize a search of the premises without a warrant. State v. West, 237 Ga.App. 185, 186 (514 S.E.2d 257) (1999).” “In this case, the grandfather was a resident homeowner granting consent to a search of his own home, including his minor grandson’s rent-free bedroom. Rhone’s grandfather possessed a sufficient relationship to the premises sought to be inspected to consent to a search. See id. Here there was neither a landlord-tenant relationship, See Howard v. State, 207 Ga.App. 125, 126(1) (427 S.E.2d 96) (1993), nor a situation in which two persons clearly had shared common authority or equal rights in the place,” citing Randolph . Distinguishing Wilson v. State , 254 Ga. 473, 477-478(3) (330 S.E.2d 364) (1985), where “court found defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in grandmother’ house”: here, “[t]he evidence shows that the grandparents had authority and control over the entire house. The grandfather had the right to enter the bedroom and could assign that right, as he did in this case.” Accord, Warner (June 12, 2009). Stinski v. State, 281 Ga. 783, 642 S.E.2d 1 (February 2, 2007). Residents of home where Stinksi was staying temporarily found red tote bag belonging to one of murder victims. Residents removed it from the home and called police and told them what they had heard Stinski say. Held, trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in search of a bag. “The evidence before the trial court supported the constitutionality of the State’s seizure of the red tote bag, in that the removal of the bag from the residence by private citizens means there is no constitutional or statutory search and seizure concern regarding the privacy of the home. See State v. Young , 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975).” Boldin v. State, 282 Ga.App. 492, 639 S.E.2d 522 (November 20, 2006). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found as a result of officer’s warrantless entry into defendant’s home based on exigent circumstances. “[T]he facts found by the trial court – that [officer] White could smell burning marijuana emanating from the garage; that Boldin dropped a zip-lock bag as he fled with the garbage bag; and that White could tell that this zip-lock bag contained contraband – ” supported trial court’s finding that officer “had probable cause to believe that contraband