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the Fourth Amendment. Hence, the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to ask Mena for her name, date and place of birth, or immigration status.” Unanimous decision on this point. State v. Brown, 269 Ga.App. 875, 605 S.E.2d 628 (October 4, 2004). Alerted to possible drug sales from defendant’s apartment, two detectives went there without a warrant. Given entry by defendant’s roommate, they illegally entered defendant’s bedroom without consent and roused him from bed. After questioning about drugs and a subsequent Miranda warning, defendant gave them some marijuana, then signed a form consenting to a search of his room. The search revealed cocaine and other evidence. Held, trial court’s suppression of search results reversed and remanded for findings of fact as to “whether the evidence seized was the product of the illegal entry or was sufficiently distinguishable so as to be purged of the taint from the initial illegality. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). In making this determination, proof of voluntary consent alone is not sufficient. The relevant factors to be considered include the temporal proximity to the illegal entry, the intervening circumstances and the purpose and the flagrancy of the official misconduct. Pledger v. State, 257 Ga.App. 794, 797, 572 S.E.2d 348 (2002).” State v. Stevens, 269 Ga.App. 769, 605 S.E.2d 406 (September 29, 2004). Search of defendant’s backpack, at girlfriend’s apartment and with her consent, in his absence, was illegal, and trial court properly suppressed evidence found. “‘Where the police have notice, as admitted here, that they are searching the personal effects of a visitor, such a search is illegal absent independent justification for a personal search.’ State v. Browning, 209 Ga.App. 197, 198(1), 433 S.E.2d 119 (1993) (police illegally searched woman’s purse found on apartment floor). See also Childers v. State, 158 Ga.App. 613, 281 S.E.2d 349 (1981) (purse); State v. Brassell, 144 Ga.App. 279, 241 S.E.2d 57 (1977) (backpack and trunk); Hayes v. State, 141 Ga.App. 706, 234 S.E.2d 360 (1977) (suitcase). As the State’s sole justification for the search was the girlfriend’s consent to search her apartment, there is no independent basis to uphold the search.” Leon-Velazquez v. State, 269 Ga.App. 760, 605 S.E.2d 400 (September 28, 2004). Two deputies went to an apartment complex to serve an arrest warrant on a certain Hispanic male. After verifying that the apartment numbers given did not exist, they knocked on the doors in the building. Defendant, an Hispanic male, answered his door; he was not the man the deputies were looking for. Asked whether the man in question was present defendant “said that he no longer lived there.” Asked for his name, defendant “‘appeared extremely nervous and he took a step back as he said his name.’” Deputy likewise “took a step forward into the doorway of the apartment.” When defendant took a second step backwards, this time to read the warrant, deputy again took a step forward, into the apartment, thus enabling him to see the cocaine on defendant’s couch. Held, trial court should have granted defendant’s motion to suppress; deputy’s entry into apartment was illegal, as it was not based on consent or any exigent circumstance. “‘[E]ven when armed with an arrest warrant, police must have either a search warrant, exigent circumstances or consent to lawfully enter a third person’s home to arrest someone who does not reside there.’ (Citations omitted.) Brown v. State, 240 Ga.App. 321, 322(1) (523 S.E.2d 333) (1999).” Plain view doctrine only applies when officer “is in a place where he is constitutionally entitled to be.” Distinguishing Latimer v. State , 204 Ga.App. 639, 420 S.E.2d 91 (1992) (“It is not unlawful for officers to cross the threshold of a suspect’s residence if the officer is acting in the lawful discharge of his duties and he does not begin an exploratory search of the premises”) where defendant consented to officers’ entry. Accord, Looney v. State , 293 Ga.App. 639, 667 S.E.2d 893 (September 23, 2008) (arrest warrant for defendant’s sister-in-law didn’t justify officer’s non- consensual entry into defendant’s residence without a search warrant); Arp v. State , 327 Ga.App. 340, 759 S.E.2d 57 (May 21, 2014) (similar to Looney ). Bryan v. State, 271 Ga.App. 60, 608 S.E.2d 648 (September 23, 2004). “‘Knocking on the outer door of [a] residence for the purpose of investigating a reported crime is not violative of the Fourth Amendment.’ Goddard v. State, 244 Ga.App. 730, 733(1) (536 S.E.2d 160) (2000).” Accord, Sherrer (January 8, 2008), above; Able (April 24, 1013), above. Wilkes v. State, 269 Ga.App. 532, 604 S.E.2d 601 (September 10, 2004). Defendant’s sister had authority to consent to officers’ search of home they jointly owned and occupied. “Wilkes was barely conscious and unable to give or withhold consent, rendering him the functional equivalent of ‘being absent.’” State v. Gay, 269 Ga.App. 331, 604 S.E.2d 572 (August 30, 2004). While executing an arrest warrant at an apartment, officers “noticed the strong scent of marijuana.” They asked for and received consent to search the apartment from an adult female resident. “Before commencing a search, the officers requested assistance from a narcotics detection canine unit who arrived less than 15 minutes later. The door of bedroom where Gay was sleeping was closed. The drug dog had to ‘bust[ ]through the door’ to gain entry to the bedroom. The dog handler testified that the dog sniffed Gay, asleep on the floor, but did not alert on him. While on cross-examination, the handler conceded that he had not smelled the odor of