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marijuana smoke in Gay’s bedroom, but then he later testified that he had noted the scent of unburnt marijuana. During the search, the drug dog alerted on a book bag located inside a closet of the bedroom where Gay was sleeping. Awakened by the commotion, Gay identified the backpack as his property. The handler admitted that he did not open the bag until after Gay had said that it was his. Inside the backpack, in a blue plastic bag, officers found baggies, a green leafy substance, a scale, rolling paper, and a pipe.” Opinion indicates that Gay was “staying” at the apartment. Held, evidence supported trial court’s suppression of search results; “regardless of whether [female resident] gave her consent to a search of the apartment, we cannot agree that the permissible scope of that consent would have encompassed the contents of Gay’s closed backpack then located inside a closet of a bedroom where he was asleep at the time that the canine unit entered his room.” “‘A person does not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment by entering the apartment of another. The visitor has a substantial interest in the privacy of all of his possessions, wherever located.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Browning, 209 Ga.App. 197, 198(1) (433 S.E.2d 119) (1993). ‘Personal belongings brought by their owner on a visit to a friend’s house retain their constitutional protection until their owner meaningfully abdicates control or responsibility.’ Id .” Kinder v. State, 269 Ga.App. 99, 603 S.E.2d 496 (August 11, 2004). While executing a search warrant for drugs at a resident, deputy “patted-down Kinder, a visitor at the residence, for weapons to ensure the safety of the people in the residence and the officers conducting the search.” Deputy immediately recognized by plain feel the marijuana in a plastic bag in defendant’s pocket. Held, pat-down of visitor was justified: “‘[i]t is not unreasonable for officers to anticipate that those who are suspected of involvement in the drug trade might be armed.’ [Cit.]” Notwithstanding that defendant was not a target of the search warrant and was only “suspected of involvement in the drug trade” inasmuch as he happened to be present when the search was conducted. State v. McKinney, 268 Ga.App. 296, 601 S.E.2d 777 (July 1, 2004). Defendant’s ex-wife came to his residence to pick up their teenage son, who lived in his father’s residence. Defendant was not home. “Rambling” about the residence “looking for her son’s belongings,” the ex-wife found what appeared to be drugs in defendant’s bedroom. She called 911. “Even though the officer knew that McKinney’s ex-wife did not live at the residence, he still asked both the ex-wife and teenager for permission to go into the residence. According to the officer, the ex-wife consented and the teenager ‘never indicated [anything] other than sure.’” Trial court granted motion to suppress. “‘In Atkins [ v. State 173 Ga.App. 9 (325 S.E.2d 388) (1984), affirmed with opinion by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Atkins v. State, 254 Ga. 641 (331 S.E.2d 597) (1985)], the Court of Appeals set forth the following factors which have been examined by courts to determine if a minor’s consent to search was valid: whether the minor lived on the premises; whether the minor had a right of access to the premises and the right to invite others thereto; whether the minor was of an age at which he or she could be expected to exercise at least minimal discretion; and whether officers acted reasonably in believing that the minor had sufficient control over the premises to give a valid consent to search.... [Further, in] United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172, n. 7 (94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242) (1974), the United States Supreme Court stated that ‘common authority’ rests on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.’ (Citations, punctuation, and footnotes omitted.) Davis v. State, 262 Ga. [578 at 580(1), 422 S.E.2d 546 (1992)]. It is ‘important to examine a child’s mental maturity and his ability to understand the circumstances in which he is placed, and the consequences of his actions, when considering a child’s age in relation to the child’s ability to give valid consent.’ Id.” Remanded for consideration in light of this test. Pike v. State, 265 Ga.App. 575, 594 S.E.2d 753 (February 12, 2004). Defendant contends that police had no authority to enter his bedroom, over which he had sole control, but located in his brother’s house. Brother called police to the scene and invited them in to investigate his domestic argument with defendant, saying he wanted defendant out of his house. Defendant apparently had sole control over the deadbolt lock on the bedroom door. Defendant responded to officers’ knock on the door, but contends he did not authorize their entry into the room, where they found a large amount of drugs. “Under these circumstances, we find no illegal entry because ‘the evidence available to [the officers] at the time of the search justified one of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party [defendant’s brother] had authority of the premises.’ [cits.]” Land v. State, 265 Ga.App. 859, 595 S.E.2d 540 (February 12, 2004). “An officer may enter an apartment without a warrant if there are exigent circumstances which require the officer to act immediately. [cit.] A classic example of exigent circumstances is the likelihood that contraband is in danger of immediate destruction. [cit.] In reviewing police actions, a