☢ test - Í

court must consider the actions from the standpoint of a hypothetical reasonable officer acting in a quickly developing situation. [cit.]” United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 124 S.Ct. 521, 157 L.Ed.2d 343 (December 2, 2003). “With information that Banks was selling cocaine at home, North Las Vegas Police Department officers and Federal Bureau of Investigation agents got a warrant to search his two-bedroom apartment. As soon as they arrived there, about 2 o’clock on a Wednesday afternoon, officers posted in front called out ‘police search warrant’ and rapped hard enough on the door to be heard by officers at the back door. … There was no indication whether anyone was home, and after waiting for 15 to 20 seconds with no answer, the officers broke open the front door with a battering ram. Banks was in the shower and testified that he heard nothing until the crash of the door, which brought him out dripping to confront the police. The search produced weapons, crack cocaine, and other evidence of drug dealing.” Held, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress; the officers’ forced entry was justified given the totality of the circumstances. “[P]olice in exigent circumstances may damage premises so far as necessary for a no-knock entrance without demonstrating the suspected risk in any more detail than the law demands for an unannounced intrusion simply by lifting the latch. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 70-71, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998). Either way, it is enough that the officers had a reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances. [Cit.]” “[T]he facts known to the police are what count in judging reasonable waiting time, cf., e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (‘The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’),” not the fact that defendant was in the shower and didn’t hear the knock, or the length of time it might have taken him to answer the door in the particular residence. “[T]he crucial fact in examining their actions is not time to reach the door but the particular exigency claimed. On the record here, what matters is the opportunity to get rid of cocaine, which a prudent dealer will keep near a commode or kitchen sink. The significant circumstances include the arrival of the police during the day, when anyone inside would probably have been up and around, and the sufficiency of 15 to 20 seconds for getting to the bathroom or the kitchen to start flushing cocaine down the drain. That is, when circumstances are exigent because a pusher may be near the point of putting his drugs beyond reach, it is imminent disposal, not travel time to the entrance, that governs when the police may reasonably enter.” A different exigency, or different circumstances, might necessitate a longer or shorter wait. Not addressed in this case: “In a different context governed by the Fourth Amendment, we have held that the risk of losing evidence of a minor offense is insufficient to make it reasonable to enter a dwelling to make a warrantless arrest. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984). Courts of Appeals have applied Welsh to warrantless entries simply to search for evidence, considering the gravity of the offense in determining whether exigent circumstances exist. See, e.g., United States v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268, 1271-1273 (C.A.10 1988); United States v. Clement, 854 F.2d 1116, 1120 (C.A.8 1988). We intimate nothing here about such warrantless entry cases. Nor do we express a view on the significance of the existence of a warrant in evaluating whether exigency justifies action in knock-and-announce cases when the reason for the search is a minor offense.” State v. Merit, 262 Ga.App. 687, 586 S.E.2d 393 (August 12, 2003). Responding to “a residential alarm call at an apartment located in a ‘high-crime area,’” officer first investigated a pick-up truck parked outside, taking time to investigate its two occupants, search them and the vehicle, and arrest them on charges unrelated to the call. He then encountered persons leaving the building and detained the man while the woman and children returned to the building. The officer then approached the apartment. There were no signs of distress. Officer knocked on the door; defendant, who said he did not live there, answered the door, and the officer immediately entered. Upon entering, the officer saw marijuana on a table and frisked defendant. A rock of crack cocaine was found in his pocket; defendant also claimed the marijuana. Held, all evidence resulting from officer’s warrantless, non-consensual search was suppressed. The alarm call (apparently accidental) did not create exigent circumstances justifying officer’s unbidden entry into the residence. Although state argues officer “reasonably believed ‘that violent criminal activity was occurring given the area, his experience and the nature of the [alarm] call,’” this is belied by the officer’s own course of action, conducting other investigations outside the building before proceeding there. “In addition, the evidence shows that he allowed a woman and two children to enter an apartment the State describes as a possible scene of violent criminal activity. Finally, when [officer] approached the apartment, he did not hear screams, shouts, or an alarm.” Schroeder v. State, 261 Ga.App. 879, 583 S.E.2d 922 (June 24, 2003). Deputy responded to a complaint about a noisy party at defendant’s residence. “‘Upon arriving at the party, the music was so loud that he could not communicate with anyone.” He therefore “approached the rear deck of the house and told the band to stop playing.” Defendant contends that the deputy had no “legal authority to be on the premises,” thus defendant could not be convicted of obstruction. “[T]he Fourth Amendment… does not extend so far as to prevent the police from making any contact with the citizenry