☢ test - Í

Pledger v. State, 257 Ga.App. 794, 572 S.E.2d 348 (October 9, 2002). Conviction reversed based on illegal entry into defendant’s residence. “There is no evidence in the record establishing Pledger’s relationship to the man who let the officers into the residence or the extent of his authority over the residence. There is no evidence that he was a tenant or a resident guest or otherwise a ‘co-inhabitant’ of the premises. We cannot even be sure from this record whether the man was an adult. Although the police speculated the man was a social guest who was left ‘sort of in charge,’ there are no facts establishing the man’s status or the extent of his authority. Under these circumstance [sic], the police could not reasonably assume the man had Pledger’s authority to allow them into her home in her absence. See Illinois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177, 185-186, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). Given the dearth of evidence on this point, we must conclude the State failed to carry its burden of showing the police had lawful consent to be in Pledger’s home.” Fact that search took place at night also causes Court of Appeals “some concern,” citing United States v. Ramirez Chilel , 289 F.3d 744, 751 (11 th Cir., April 25, 2002). Defendant’s consent to search in these circumstances was thus invalid. Accord, Black v. State , 281 Ga.App. 40, 635 S.E.2d 568 (August 10, 2006) (consent to search residence was invalid where it resulted from illegal arrest). Distinguished in Mobley v. State , 277 Ga.App. 267, 626 S.E.2d 248 (January 19, 2006) (apartment occupant’s boyfriend allowed officers in, in occupant’s presence; no evidence of threats or coercion, or other facts “to show that the police should have known that he had no authority to give them consent to enter the apartment.”). Kirk v. Lousiana, 536 U.S. 635, 122 S.Ct. 2458, 153 L.Ed.2d 599 (June 24, 2002). Reversing Louisiana Court of Appeal and defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute; trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, as probable cause to arrest was insufficient to justify warrantless, nonconsensual entry into defendant’s residence. “Police officers entered [defendant’s] home, where they arrested and searched him. The officers had neither an arrest warrant nor a search warrant. Without deciding whether exigent circumstances had been present, the Louisiana Court of Appeal concluded that the warrantless entry, arrest, and search did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution because there had been probable cause to arrest [defendant]. [Cit.] The court’s reasoning plainly violates our holding in Payton v. New York , 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), that ‘[a]bsent exigent circumstances,’ the ‘firm line at the entrance to the house ... may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.’ ” Remanded to determine whether exigent circumstances existed – a determination expressly not made in this decision. Welchel v. State, 255 Ga.App. 556, 565 S.E.2d 870 (May 28, 2002). Mere presence of controlled substances is not in itself an exigent circumstance authorizing warrantless entry into a residence, absent a showing of imminent danger of disposal of the evidence, i.e., occupant awareness of police presence. A motel room is equivalent to a residence in privacy expectation ( see also Charles, above ). Binkley v. State, 255 Ga.App. 313, 566 S.E.2d 31 (May 10, 2002). While investigating another matter, officers smelled burning marijuana coming from defendant’s home. Officers knocked and spoke to defendant, who had strong odor of marijuana and red, glassy, watery eyes. Defendant refused consent to search his home, but ultimately admitted he had been smoking marijuana, said he was going to retrieve it for the officers, and went into the home. Officers followed him into the home, where he showed them marijuana. Defendant moves to suppress the evidence, saying they illegally entered his home without consent or a warrant. Held, trial court properly denied motion to suppress: officers’ entry into home was justified by exigent circumstance of defendant’s entry into home, creating opportunity to destroy evidence. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (June 11, 2001). Reversing Ninth Circuit; District Court erred in denying motion to suppress evidence obtained by measuring heat loss from defendant’s residence. Suspecting that defendant was growing marijuana in his home, agents used a thermal imaging device to detect areas of the house from which greater heat was emanating than other other areas. “The scan of Kyllo’s home took only a few minutes and was performed from the passenger seat of [agent’s] vehicle across the street from the front of the house and also from the street in back of the house. The scan showed that the roof over the garage and a side wall of petitioner’s home were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and substantially warmer than neighboring homes in the triplex.” The information led to a search warrant which uncovered defendant’s marijuana-growing operation. Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. Held, the scan constitutes a search. “The question we confront today is what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy…. We think that obtaining by sense- enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ Silverman [ v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961)], constitutes a search -- at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use. This assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. On the basis of this criterion, the information obtained by the thermal