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imager in this case was the product of a search.” “‘The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.’ Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.” Rejects other tests based on the nature of the information obtained, because the government agent would not be able to know before using the technology what information might be obtained. The approach adopted here, the 5-4 majority says, is preferred because it provides a bright, firm line that is easy to apply by police and courts. Distinguished in Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (January 24, 2005) (see SEARCHES – DRUG DOGS, above). Note, Georgia law doesn’t authorize search warrants for non-“tangible” evidence such as heat loss, Brundige v. State , 291 Ga. 677, 735 S.E.2d 583 (October 15, 2012). Goddard v. State, 244 Ga.App. 730, 536 S.E.2d 160 (June 13, 2000). DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. “Knocking on the outer door of the residence for the purpose of investigating a reported crime is not violative of the Fourth Amendment. Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 819(1), 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981); Pickens v. State, 225 Ga.App. 792, 793(1), 484 S.E.2d 731 (1997).” State v. McTaggart, 241 Ga.App. 852, 528 S.E.2d 309 (January 19, 2000). In his prosecution for involuntary manslaughter, grant of motion to suppress drugs seized from defendant’s bedroom affirmed; officers who arrived to investigate attack by defendant’s dogs in yard had no authority to conduct search, since trial court could find that defendant did not consent to search of entire residence by telling officers to “do what you have to do and lock the gate when you’re done” as he rushed to hospital to be with the child victim. “Even assuming that McTaggart told police to close the gate behind them after they finished their business, any ambiguity in such a directive cannot reasonably be construed as having authorized a general search of the entire premises including the bedrooms. Furthermore, as the determiner of witness credibility, the trial court was free to disregard the officer's assertion that he had been looking for appliances left on or for other possible victims.” Plain view exception doesn’t apply, as officer wasn’t authorized to be in defendant’s bedroom when he observed the marijuana cigarettes in the ashtray. Downey v. State, 241 Ga.App. 821, 527 S.E.2d 909 (January 13, 2000). Burglary convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. Pursuant to warrant for defendant’s arrest, it was reasonable for officers to look for him in the attic of his mother’s house. (Mom consented to search.)And “[w]ith the reasonable possibility that a fugitive was present in the home, the officers were entitled to make safe any weapon discovered during their legitimate execution of Downey's arrest warrant ‘to eliminate the possibility that it could be used against them.’ Latimer v. State, 204 Ga.App. 639, 641(1), 420 S.E.2d 91 (1992); Dennis v. State, 166 Ga.App. 715, 717, 305 S.E.2d 443 (1983).” Threatt v. State, 240 Ga.App. 592, 524 S.E.2d 276 (November 1, 1999). Defendant’s DUI conviction reversed; trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained when officer entered defendant’s home without warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. Concerned citizen called police while following defendant’s vehicle as it weaved over the roadway, running other vehicles off the road. Police arrived at defendant’s residence, where caller indicated that a man had entered the apartment from the car, less than 15 minutes earlier. Hood of car was still warm. “Based on this information, the police officer, along with another officer who arrived at about the same time, knocked on the door of the apartment no more than 15 minutes after receiving the radio report that [witness] Colleado was following the car. When a woman answered the door, one of the officers saw a man inside the apartment who matched the description given to him by Colleado and her daughter. Without a warrant and without obtaining consent to enter, the officer stepped a short distance – about two feet – inside the apartment. The officer testified that he did so for the purpose of investigating his suspicion that the man had been driving under the influence of alcohol. The officer also stated that, because evidence of alcohol in a suspect's blood diminishes with the passage of time, he entered the apartment to investigate his suspicion and to prevent destruction of evidence.” 1. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) requires “that to justify a nonconsensual, warrantless intrusion into a person's home, there must exist probable cause for the arrest or search inside the home and a showing of exigent circumstances. [cit.]; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981); Carranza v. State, 266 Ga. 263, 264-266, 467 S.E.2d 315 (1996); Griffith v. State, 172 Ga.App. 255, 256-257, 322 S.E.2d 921 (1984) (physical precedent). Furthermore, the underlying offense supporting the intrusion must be of sufficient gravity to justify the exception to the warrant requirement. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750-753, 104 S.Ct. 2091. For example, when an arrest in a home is at issue, even if exigent circumstances are present, warrantless, nonconsensual entry is unreasonable where the suspected activity is a minor,