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protects a defendant who can show that he or she had an expectation of privacy in the area searched which society recognizes as reasonable.’ (Citations omitted.) Floyd v. State, 237 Ga.App. 586, 587 (516 S.E.2d 96) (1999). ‘Whether the accused (1) had the right to possession of the seized item, (2) had the right to exclude others from the area searched, and (3) took normal precautions to maintain the privacy and security of the items seized, are important factors....’ (Citations omitted.) Robinson v. State, 226 Ga.App. 406, 408(2) (486 S.E.2d 667) (1997). Here, although Robinson possessed the bag for a few seconds before the officer requested to search it, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in it because just prior to the officer’s request, Robinson’s companion was eating out of and storing food in the bag. There is no evidence that Robinson expected his companion to keep the contents of the bag private or that he attempted to exclude others from it. Unlike a suitcase or other closed container, a fast-food bag is not traditionally a receptacle for private items. Id; see Floyd, supra at 587-588. Any expectation of privacy Robinson claims was not reasonable or legitimate. Therefore, he had no standing to challenge the search of the bag.” State v. McMichael, 276 Ga.App. 735, 624 S.E.2d 212 (November 23, 2005). Motor vehicle passenger “has standing to challenge his detention and to seek the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of his alleged illegal detention. See State v. Williams, 264 Ga.App. 199, 201 (590 S.E.2d 151) (2003); State v. Cooper, 260 Ga.App. 333, 334-335(1) (579 S.E.2d 754) (2003).” Lough v. State, 276 Ga.App. 495, 623 S.E.2d 688 (November 21, 2005). Searching the residence of defendant’s girlfriend and girlfriend’s parents, with their consent, officers found defendant’s mobile drug lab in his backpack. “Lough contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the contents of the backpack because the officers had no independent justification for searching the personal effects of a visitor. See State v. Browning, 209 Ga.App. 197, 198(1) (433 S.E.2d 119) (1993). However, the record shows that Lough has consistently maintained that the backpack does not belong to him. The fact that Lough denied any ownership interest in the backpack justified the trial court in concluding that Lough had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpack’s contents. See Osment v. State, 256 Ga.App. 591, 593 (569 S.E.2d 262) (2002). Lough argues that the officers knew that the backpack belonged to him when they searched it. However, the record shows that the only evidence that Lough had any possessory interest in the backpack was provided by [defendant’s girlfriend] after the search was conducted. The trial court did not err in denying Lough’s motion to suppress.” Todd v. State, 275 Ga.App. 459, 620 S.E.2d 666 (September 9, 2005). Defendant had no standing to object to search of friend’s mobile home, where he was only there visiting. “‘The burden is on the one claiming a violation of Fourth Amendment rights to demonstrate that he has standing to contest such violation, i.e., that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched.’ (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Atwater v. State, 233 Ga.App. 339, 340(2) (503 S.E.2d 919) (1998). See also Brown v. State, 240 Ga.App. 321, 322(1) (523 S.E.2d 333) (1999). Todd has conceded on appeal that the mobile home was owned by a friend. Furthermore, Todd failed to come forward with any evidence that would suggest that he otherwise had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the mobile home.” State v. Cooper, 260 Ga.App. 333, 579 S.E.2d 754 (February 27, 2003). Passenger had standing to challenge officer’s stop of vehicle, and continued detention. “A passenger does have standing to challenge the stop and detention of the car because, as other courts have recognized, ‘the interest in freedom of movement and the interest in being free from fear and surprise are personal to all occupants of the vehicle, and an individual’s interest is not diminished simply because he is a passenger as opposed to the driver when the stop occurred. United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1994). Because a passenger has standing to challenge his own detention, courts overwhelmingly have concluded that the passenger also may seek to suppress the fruits of his illegal detention. [Cits.] Following precedent from other jurisdictions, we hold that Cooper had standing to challenge his own detention and the subsequent search of Rawls’s car.” Accord, Brendlin v. California (June 18, 2007), above. National Viatical, Inc. v. State, 258 Ga.App. 408, 574 S.E.2d 337 (October 22, 2002). “[O]nly a person who has been arrested and charged with a crime as a defendant has a right to bring a motion [to suppress] under OCGA § 17-5-30.” Scandrett v. State , 244 Ga.App. 200, 534 S.E.2d 908 (May 25, 2000). Conviction for cocaine possession affirmed; defendant lacked standing to challenge seizure of bag of crack cocaine which he threw down upon approach of police. “Scandrett testified that the bag was not his and denied throwing it over the car.” Citing Wade v. State , 184 Ga.App. 97, 360 S.E.2d 647 (1987) (defendant lacked standing to challenge seizure of drug paraphernalia from his person where disavowed ownership of it), Deych v. State , 188 Ga.App. 901-902(2), 374 S.E.2d 753 (1988) (defendant lacked standing to challenge seizure of cocaine from “airport luggage for which the defendant had a claim check” but denied