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ownership of). State v. Jackson , 243 Ga.App. 330, 533 S.E.2d 433 (March 31, 2000). In defendant’s unspecified prosecution, trial court erred in granting his motion to suppress evidence found in search of co-defendant. “As the United States Supreme Court held in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature and may be enforced only at the instance of the person whose protection was infringed by the search and seizure. Id. at 138, 99 S.Ct. 421.” Also based on Robinson v. State, 226 Ga.App. 406, 486 S.E.2d 667 (1997) ( driver “had no standing to object to the search of the passenger” ). 29. STATE ACTORS Hobbs v. State, 272 Ga.App. 148, 611 S.E.2d 775 (March 11, 2005). Health club manager found what she suspected were illegal drugs in member’s locker, and notified police. “An officer told her that he could not tell her what to do, and could not tell her to cut the locks off the lockers. Then she did what she would normally do, which was cut the locks off the lockers and remove the contents. The officer did not tell her to cut the locks off the locker and hand over the things she found. The investigator also told her that if she brought the contents of the locker to him, he would tell her if it was an illegal substance, but that he could not tell her that until she brought the substances to him.” Held, manager was not acting as a state agent in opening the locker; opening the lockers thus was not a search subject to Fourth Amendment requirements. Accord, Hitchcock v. State , 291 Ga.App. 455, 662 S.E.2d 155 (April 21, 2008) (UPS employee was not state actor when he opened suspicious package on his own initiative, then alerted to police to drugs found therein). Phillips v. State, 269 Ga.App. 619, 604 S.E.2d 520 (June 22, 2004). Defendant rented a room from victim, who had free access to the room. “In May 1998, the homeowner learned that Phillips had pawned two pieces of her jewelry. She called the police to report the theft. While waiting for investigators to arrive, the homeowner went into Phillips’ room and looked for other missing jewelry in his dresser, where she discovered a bag of marijuana. She left the dresser drawer open and informed the first officer to arrive of her discovery. An investigator accompanied the homeowner to the threshold of Phillips’ bedroom and, without entering Phillips’ room, saw the marijuana. The investigator then left the house to get a warrant to search Phillips’ room for illegal drugs.” Homeowner’s entry into room did not implicate Fourth Amendment, as she was not a state agent nor acting at the behest of the state. Officer’s viewing of the marijuana was lawful, as he had a right to be where he was when he saw it, and it was in plain view. Joines v. State, 264 Ga.App. 558, 591 S.E.2d 454 (December 4, 2003). Exclusionary rule did not apply to search of teacher’s classroom computer by school official where no evidence suggests search was prompted by law enforcement personnel. Based on State v. Young , 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975). Pruitt v. State, 263 Ga.App. 814, 589 S.E.2d 591 (October 28, 2003). Trial court should have found that defendant’s dad, a sheriff’s deputy on the narcotics unit in another county, was a state actor (not just a private parent) when he searched son’s car for drugs. “Pruitt did not summon his father, and their exchange at the scene was hostile. There was no cooperation between parent and child. Rather, Lt. Pruitt announced his intention to search Pruitt’s vehicle, found the drugs, and promptly turned them over to the officers on the scene. His actions during the incident, and the manner in which the evidence was gathered, were more consistent with those of the commander of a narcotics unit than with those of a parent trying to assist his child.” Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (March 21, 2001). Reversing Fourth Circuit and District Court in patients’ civil suit alleging Fourth Amendment violation. A “search” occurred when state hospital performed urine tests on prenatal patients and, without patients’ consent, provided results to the police when the tests were positive for cocaine. Program was set up in conjunction with local law enforcement for express purpose of threatening, or actually initiating, criminal prosecution to coerce patients into drug treatment to deal with the problem of “crack babies.” 1. “Because MUSC [Medical University of South Carolina] is a state hospital, the members of its staff are government actors, subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335–337, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). Moreover, the urine tests conducted by those staff members were indisputably searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 617, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989).” And no contention here that probable cause existed to justify a search. 2. Distinguishing other cases where special needs were found to authorize searches without probable cause, Skinner, abive (drug tests for railway employees involved in train accidents); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) (“United States Customs Service employees seeking promotion to certain sensitive positions”), and Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564