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(1995) (for high school students participating in interscholastic sports). “In the fourth case, we struck down such testing for candidates for designated [Georgia] state offices as unreasonable. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997).” “In each of those cases, we employed a balancing test that weighed the intrusion on the individual's interest in privacy against the “special needs” that supported the program. As an initial matter, we note that the invasion of privacy in this case is far more substantial than in those cases. In the previous four cases, there was no misunderstanding about the purpose of the test or the potential use of the test results, and there were protections against the dissemination of the results to third parties. [Cits.] The use of an adverse test result to disqualify one from eligibility for a particular benefit, such as a promotion or an opportunity to participate in an extracurricular activity, involves a less serious intrusion on privacy than the unauthorized dissemination of such results to third parties. The reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent. … The critical difference between those four drug-testing cases and this one, however, lies in the nature of the ‘special need’ asserted as justification for the warrantless searches. In each of those earlier cases, the ‘special need’ that was advanced as a justification for the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion was one divorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement. [Cits.] … In this case, however, the central and indispensable feature of the policy from its inception was the use of law enforcement to coerce the patients into substance abuse treatment. This fact distinguishes this case from circumstances in which physicians or psychologists, in the course of ordinary medical procedures aimed at helping the patient herself, come across information that under rules of law or ethics is subject to reporting requirements, which no one has challenged here.” “While the ultimate goal of the program may well have been to get the women in question into substance abuse treatment and off of drugs, the immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes [fn] in order to reach that goal. [fn] The threat of law enforcement may ultimately have been intended as a means to an end, but the direct and primary purpose of MUSC's policy was to ensure the use of those means. In our opinion, this distinction is critical. Because law enforcement involvement always serves some broader social purpose or objective, under respondents' view, virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its ultimate, rather than immediate, purpose.” Remanded to determine whether the patients in fact consented. Scalia, writing for Rehnquist and Thomas, dissents. 30. STRIP SEARCH Safford Unified School District v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 174 L.Ed.2d 354 (June 25, 2009). Dismissal of student’s civil suit against school district reversed; search of 13-year old girl’s bra and underpants for prescription- strength pain relievers, conducted by school officials violated Fourth Amendment, “[b]ecause there were no reasons to suspect the drugs presented a danger or were concealed in her underwear.” Based on New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). “In T.L.O., we recognized that the school setting ‘requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search,’ 469 U.S., at 340, 105 S.Ct. 733, and held that for searches by school officials ‘a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause,’ id., at 341, 105 S.Ct. 733. We have thus applied a standard of reasonable suspicion to determine the legality of a school administrator's search of a student, id., at 342, 345, 105 S.Ct. 733, and have held that a school search ‘will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction,’ id., at 342, 105 S.Ct. 733.” Reasonable suspicion requires, among other things, “reliable knowledge,” a determination of which includes “the degree to which known facts imply prohibited conduct, see, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); id., at 160, n. 9, 92 S.Ct. 1921 (Marshall, J., dissenting), the specificity of the information received, see, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416-417, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), and the reliability of its source, see, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). At the end of the day, however, we have realized that these factors cannot rigidly control, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and we have come back to saying that the standards are ‘fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts’ in which they are being assessed. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Perhaps the best that can be said generally about the required knowledge component of probable cause for a law enforcement officer's evidence search is that it raise a ‘fair probability,’ Gates, 462 U.S., at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, or a ‘substantial chance,’ id., at 244, n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317, of discovering evidence of criminal activity. The lesser standard for school searches could as readily be described as a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing.” Evidence used to justify search here was statement from another student that a blue pill found on that student were supplied by Redding; but although Redding had a history of being suspected of association with alcohol and drugs, the school administrator “did not ask [the other student] Marissa any followup questions to determine whether there was any likelihood that [plaintiff] Savana presently had pills: neither asking when Marissa received the pills from Savana