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nor where Savana might be hiding them.” This information “was enough to justify a search of Savana's backpack and outer clothing,” but not requiring her to “pull out her underwear,” which the majority characterizes as a “strip search.” “Here, the content of the suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion.” “Content of the suspicion” includes the nature of the drugs in question, lack of suspicion that this type of drug might be hidden in the underwear, lack of time specificity of the information, and lack of any corroboration of the information. Thomas dissents, would find the search justified and argues for a return to in loco parentis . Taylor v. State, 239 Ga.App. 858, 522 S.E.2d 266 (September 8, 1999). Strip search of defendant was justified to prevent destruction of contraband hidden in her pants. “Based upon the evidence then available, the investigators reasonably believed that Taylor had a large quantity of methamphetamine concealed in her pants, contraband she could discard or destroy at the first available opportunity. Police are authorized to use reasonable measures to prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence. See Merriweather v. State, 228 Ga.App. 246, 248(3), 491 S.E.2d 467 (1997). Because the methamphetamine was hidden in Taylor's pants, a search of her clothing and a visual inspection of her body were necessary. Consequently, the investigators took Taylor to the jail where she could be searched by a female jail employee in relative privacy. The strip search was conducted in a reasonable manner without abuse or intrusion into the body; therefore, we find it did not violate Taylor's Fourth Amendment rights. See United States v. Robinson, [414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973)]; United States v. Klein, 522 F.2d 296, 300 (1st Cir., 1975); Swain v. Spinney, 932 F.Supp. 25, 27(2) (D.Mass., 1996).” 31. STUDENTS Seminal case: New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). Ortiz v. State, 306 Ga.App. 598, 703 S.E.2d 598 (October 27, 2010). Conviction for carrying weapon on school property affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress based on search of defendant’s person conducted by school administrator while police officer watched. “While we recognize that police involvement need not be substantial to remove the case from the intermediate group of governmental actors described by [ State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488 (216 S.E.2d 586) (1975)] , see [ State v. K.L.M., 278 Ga.App. 219, 220-221 (628 S.E.2d 651) (2006)], an officer's mere presence in the room, without more evidence of his involvement, does not indicate police participation thereby implicating the exclusionary rule.” Safford Unified School District v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 174 L.Ed.2d 354 (June 25, 2009). Dismissal of student’s civil suit against school district reversed; search of 13-year old girl’s bra and underpants for prescription- strength pain relievers, conducted by school officials violated Fourth Amendment, “[b]ecause there were no reasons to suspect the drugs presented a danger or were concealed in her underwear.” Based on New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). “In T.L.O., we recognized that the school setting ‘requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search,’ 469 U.S., at 340, 105 S.Ct. 733, and held that for searches by school officials ‘a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause,’ id., at 341, 105 S.Ct. 733. We have thus applied a standard of reasonable suspicion to determine the legality of a school administrator's search of a student, id., at 342, 345, 105 S.Ct. 733, and have held that a school search ‘will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction,’ id., at 342, 105 S.Ct. 733.” Reasonable suspicion requires, among other things, “reliable knowledge,” a determination of which includes “the degree to which known facts imply prohibited conduct, see, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); id., at 160, n. 9, 92 S.Ct. 1921 (Marshall, J., dissenting), the specificity of the information received, see, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416-417, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), and the reliability of its source, see, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). At the end of the day, however, we have realized that these factors cannot rigidly control, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and we have come back to saying that the standards are ‘fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts’ in which they are being assessed. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Perhaps the best that can be said generally about the required knowledge component of probable cause for a law enforcement officer's evidence search is that it raise a ‘fair probability,’ Gates, 462 U.S., at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, or a ‘substantial chance,’ id., at 244, n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317, of discovering evidence of criminal activity. The lesser standard for school searches could as readily be described as a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing.” Evidence used to justify search here was statement from another student that a blue pill found on that student were supplied by Redding; but although Redding had a history of being suspected of association with alcohol and