☢ test - Í

reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the use of weapons.’ Terry, 392 U.S. at 28(IV).” Daniels v. State, 307 Ga.App. 216, 704 S.E.2d 466 (December 1, 2010). Conviction for felon in possession of firearm reversed; trial court erred in denying motion to suppress. Pat-down was not justified. “ The mere fact that the officers believed Daniels might be the person that struck a woman with his hands, without more, does not establish that the officers had a reason to believe that Daniels was carrying a weapon when they undertook to frisk him. Because the record reveals no proof of other circumstances known to the officers when they commenced the frisk that would lead a reasonable officer to conclude that Daniels had a weapon or instrument capable of being used as a weapon on his person, [fn: For instance, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Daniels was hostile, belligerent or uncooperative when the officers stopped him, that the officers witnessed Daniels act in a suspicious or furtive manner, that Daniels appeared to be affiliated with a street gang, that the officers knew Daniels to have carried a weapon in the past, that someone had reported to the officers that the perpetrator for whom they were looking was armed, or that the officers were aware of facts about the assault they were investigating that would cause them to believe that a weapon was used in the assault ] . the State has not carried its burden of proving the propriety of the search.” Santos v. State, 306 Ga.App. 772, 703 S.E.2d 140 (November 10, 2010). Obstruction conviction affirmed; officer was justified in initiating second-tier detention and conducting pat-down search. “Santos contends that, just as a citizen in a first-tier encounter is free to decline an officer's request to stop and talk, a citizen is free to refuse any other request, including to keep his or her hands visible. This position is too extreme. Although a person is free to walk or run away from an officer during a first-tier encounter, a person who chooses instead to stop and talk to the officer may by menacing conduct during that first-tier encounter give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he or she poses a threat to personal safety. … We conclude that the evidence before the trial court authorized the court to find that, at the moment the consensual encounter escalated into a second-tier detention, the officer actually believed that Santos posed a threat to the officer's personal safety and that such belief was reasonable considering all of the circumstances, including Santos' repeated refusal to keep his hands away from the pockets of his baggy clothes, his nervous demeanor, the presence of his two companions, and the officer's knowledge of the pattern of violent crime in the apartment complex. [fn] It follows that a second-tier Terry frisk did not constitute an illegal detention. Sudduth v. State, 288 Ga.App. 541, 542(1) (654 S.E.2d 446) (2007) (An officer was justified in conducting a pat down during a traffic stop after he observed the driver, who was searching for her driver's license, reach into a bag, cup her hand, slide her hand into the pocket of her pants, and then repeatedly refuse to remove her hand from her pocket when requested, which caused the officer to become extremely concerned for his safety.).” Ramsey v. State, 306 Ga.App. 726, 703 S.E.2d 339 (November 5, 2010). In defendant’s prosecution for marijuana prosecution, trial court properly denied motion to suppress drugs found as a result of pat-down search; officer had reasonable belief that defendant might be armed. “ Ramsey was the front-seat passenger in a vehicle in which the driver admitted a weapon was contained in the glovebox. Moreover, Officer Smith had detected the scent of burning marijuana upon approaching the vehicle. [fn] Smith's credibility was for the trial court to determine, and taken together, those facts support the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress with regard to the issue of whether Officer Smith was authorized to conduct the pat-down search of Ramsey.” “See, e.g., Brown v. State, 283 Ga.App. 250, 253-254 (641 S.E.2d 551) (2006) (officer authorized to conduct pat-down when confronting ‘a group of individuals [after] undisputably detect[ing] the odor of burning marijuana’); Bailey v. State, 283 Ga.App. 365, 368-369(2) (641 S.E.2d 548) (2006) (credibility of officer's testimony that he was capable of smelling marijuana smoke emanating from a vehicle was a matter for the trial court); Cannon, 253 Ga.App. at 447-448 (admitted drug use and occupant known to be involved in the drug trade warrants pat-down search for safety).” Molina v. State, 304 Ga.App. 93, 695 S.E.2d 656 (May 14, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for cocaine trafficking reversed; trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant was a passenger in a truck stopped for a broken tail light; “the driver consented to the officer's request to search his truck.” “Because the officer had no particularized suspicion that Molina had a weapon or posed a safety threat, but only patted him down pursuant to his general pattern of frisking every person who got out of a car, we reverse.” State’s argument that a vehicle search with multiple occupants is inherently dangerous is unavailing. “The problem with the State's argument is that our law requires that the officer reasonably suspect that Molina himself posed a threat to the officer's safety. It is not sufficient to say the situation itself poses a danger to the officer and therefore he is justified in frisking a vehicle's occupant. As many courts have observed, traffic stops are inherently risky. [ Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S.Ct. 781, 787, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009)], but a pat-down must still be based on information specific to the person frisked and not to some general policy. The State here presented no evidence specific to Molina that gave the officer any reason to suspect that he