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posed a physical hazard .” Accord, Rogue v. State , 311 Ga.App. 421, 715 S.E.2d 814 (August 16, 2011) (pat-down based solely on general policy, not particularized suspicion, was improper). Arnold v. State, 304 Ga.App. 90, 695 S.E.2d 402 (May 13, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for cocaine possession affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. Police detained several men, including defendant, after one fled a first-tier encounter, dropping a pill bottle containing crack cocaine. “The officers were authorized to detain the men after Tolliver fled and was found to be in possession of drugs. This Court has held that, under certain circumstances, the flight of a companion may provide probable cause for arrest. See Brown v. State, 190 Ga.App. 38, 40 (378 S.E.2d 357) (1989); Scott v. State, 193 Ga.App. 74, 75 (387 S.E.2d 31 (1989) (physical precedent only). Here, Tolliver had not only fled, but had thrown down a bottle containing what appeared to be crack cocaine. The officers were authorized to handcuff the men and pat them down for weapons. When the officers were trying to arrest Tolliver, Arnold and the other men started protesting and walking toward the officers in a threatening manner. The officers did not know whether the men were armed and therefore were justified in handcuffing them for officer safety reasons.” O’Quinn v. State, 303 Ga.App. 657, 695 S.E.2d 60 (April 12, 2010). In defendant’s prosecution for marijuana possession, trial court properly denied motion to suppress evidence found in pat-down of defendant; officer had reasonable concern for his safety. During traffic stop for a tag light violation, officer saw O’Quinn, a passenger in the vehicle, “moving and reaching around the inside of the vehicle. O'Quinn appeared very nervous; his hands and voice were shaking, he was breathing quickly, and his heart was beating so hard that it was visible to the officer through his shirt. The officer asked O'Quinn for identification and to step out of the vehicle. Based on O'Quinn's demeanor, the officer asked him whether he had any weapons, and he said no. The officer then conducted a patdown search of O'Quinn.” “[T]he evidence of the reaching movements authorized the trial court to conclude that the officer was warranted in his belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Accord, State v. Cleveland , 319 Ga.App. 225, 738 S.E.2d 273 (October 5, 2012) (reaching movements during traffic stop, plus defendant’s prior drug history, justified pat-down search for weapons). State v. Jones, 303 Ga.App. 337, 693 S.E.2d 583 (April 1, 2010). Trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to suppress drug evidence seized when police stopped and searched him without probable cause. “[T]wo policemen on bicycle patrol each approached the driver's and passenger's sides of a vehicle respectively, where a female was leaning into the driver's side window and a male (later identified as Jones) was sitting in the passenger seat. Neither officer observed the violation of any laws. After speaking briefly with the female and determining that she was fine, the officer on the driver's side observed Jones remove a ‘Crown Royal’ bag from the cupholder and hold it in his hand, while a pizza box lay in his lap. Jones began to exit the vehicle but was prevented from doing so by the presence of the second officer on the passenger's side. He replaced the bag in the cupholder. The first officer asked what was in the bag, but Jones did not reply. The officer repeated his question several times, but Jones again declined to answer, at one point attempting to place the pizza box over the bag. The officer leaned into the vehicle and opened the bag so he could see its contents, which appeared to be cocaine. The officer seized the bag and determined that it contained cocaine, the drug ‘ecstasy,’ and marijuana.” 1. “[O]nce the second officer prevented Jones from exercising this right [to leave the encounter] and exiting the vehicle, the encounter escalated to a second-tier encounter. Thomas v. State, 301 Ga.App. 198, 201(1), 687 S.E.2d 203 (2009).” 2. “Thus, the State's attempt to justify the search of the bag as a search for a weapon so as to protect the officers' safety fails. A limited search for a weapon for an officer's safety only arises during a legally-justified second-tier encounter (see Silva v. State, 278 Ga. 506, 508, 604 S.E.2d 171 (2004)), which was not present here.” State v. Cosby, 302 Ga.App. 204, 690 S.E.2d 519 (February 3, 2010). Trial court erred in granting motion to suppress; pat-down of burglary suspect was justified where “[t]he officer testified that he believed that Cosby might be carrying burglary tools that could be used as weapons.” Thomas v. State, 301 Ga.App. 198, 687 S.E.2d 203 (November 19, 2009). Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress; officer lacked articulable suspicion for stop or grounds for pat-down: “The officer testified that his detention of Thomas was based on the fact that he had seen Thomas standing in a parking lot known for drug activity, had observed him reaching into the passenger side of a vehicle located in that parking lot, and had seen the vehicle driving away. According to the officer, this activity was indicative of a drug transaction. The officer admitted, however, that he saw no drugs and that he did not see Thomas engaging in any illegal activity. Nor did the officer indicate that ‘there were [any] complaints that day of drug activity or of [Thomas's] involvement in such activity’ and the officer acknowledged that he ‘did not know [Thomas] or know if he had been involved in drug activity in the past,’ Walker [ v. State, 299 Ga.App. 788, 683 S.E.2d 867 (August 20, 2009)].” Stop and ensuing pat-down were thus both improper: “because ‘there is nothing in this record from which one could reasonably [infer that Thomas] was armed and dangerous,’ the officer had no right to