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conduct such a pat down, much less demand that Thomas submit to one. [ State v. Banks, 223 Ga.App. 838, 840-841 (479 S.E.2d 168) (1996) (physical precedent only)]. ‘Consequently, even if we were inclined to credit the State's argument that [the][o]fficer ... could have reasonably suspected [Thomas] of [illegal drug activity],’ we would still be constrained to find that the drugs should have been suppressed.” “The officer testified that he wished to frisk Thomas before even speaking with him merely because he considered that standard police procedure. As the foregoing demonstrates, this testimony represents a complete misunderstanding of basic Fourth Amendment law. … See also State v. King, 227 Ga.App. 466, 469 (489 S.E.2d 361) (1997) (an officer's ‘mere hunch that [a suspect] was involved with drugs and that drugs were usually linked to violence did not justify the pat-down’ of that suspect).” Boyd v. State, 300 Ga.App. 455, 685 S.E.2d 319 (September 23, 2009). Although first pat-down revealed no weapons, defendant consented to turn out his pockets, which uncovered a knife. “Considering the officer's knowledge of Boyd's involvement with and recent use of methamphetamine, along with Boyd's false denial that he had a weapon on his person, the officer had a reasonable basis to suspect that Boyd may be armed with another weapon on his person. Under these circumstances, ‘[i]t was reasonably prudent after taking control of the knife for the officer to conduct a pat-down for his own safety to determine if [Boyd] was still armed with another weapon.’ State v. Kipple, 294 Ga.App. 420, 421-422 (669 S.E.2d 185) (2008).” Accord, State v. Cleveland , 319 Ga.App. 225, 738 S.E.2d 273 (October 5, 2012) (reaching movements during traffic stop, plus defendant’s prior drug history, justified pat-down search for weapons). Johnson v. State, 285 Ga. 571, 679 S.E.2d 340 (June 1, 2009). Affirms in part and reverses in part Court of Appeals decision at 292 Ga.App. 752 (665 S.E.2d 431) (2008). Officers were authorized to enter hotel room at clerk’s direction when occupant’s tenancy was terminated for cause; search of jacket pocket was justified by concerns for officer safety/plain feel doctrine. Hotel decided to evict occupant for cause based on illegal drug sales from hotel room. Officers accompanied clerk to room, entered at her request. In the room, they found drugs in plain view. “As one of the officers was walking to the bathroom to open the door to determine if anyone was hiding there, he saw a camouflage jacket hanging outside the bathroom door. The jacket had a large bulge in a pocket on the upper sleeve area, and the officer worried that it might be a weapon. Before opening the bathroom door, he felt the bulge. Because it felt like a baggie filled with marijuana, similar to the type they had already found, he took the baggie out of the pocket.” Entry into hotel room: “ Johnson lost his expectation of privacy in the hotel room when he was properly evicted due to inappropriate activities in the room.” “In the present case, the hotel manager had the authority to terminate Johnson's rental agreement without prior notice. See OCGA § 43-21-3.1(b), which provides that a hotel need not provide notice of a ‘termination of occupancy for cause, such as failure to pay sums due, failure to abide by rules of occupancy, failure to have or maintain reservations, or other action by a guest.’” Note, “[w]e express no opinion regarding a hotel guest's expectation of privacy if the guest has a long-term occupancy and is, in effect, living in the hotel.” Pat-down of jacket pocket: “ Johnson's loss of the expectation of privacy in the room does not mean that he had lost his expectation of privacy with regard to personal items in the room. See 1 LaFave, Search & Seizure, § 2.3(a) at p. 563 (4 th ed., 2004).” “The jacket was hanging just outside the bathroom door, and the officer who needed to enter the closed bathroom was justifiably concerned for his safety and was worried whether the bulge in the jacket was a gun. We conclude that the officer was permitted, under these circumstances, to take reasonable steps to ensure his safety and that conducting a pat-down of the jacket pocket was a reasonable step. Mohamed v. State, 276 Ga. 706, 710 (583 S.E.2d 9) (2003). In addition, when the officer felt the object in the pocket, he recognized it as a baggie filled with marijuana. Based on this recognition, he was authorized to seize the baggie. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-376 (113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334) (1993); Hicks v. State, 293 Ga.App. 745, 746-747 (667 S.E.2d 715) (2008); Mason v. State, 285 Ga.App. 596, 597 (647 S.E.2d 308) (2007); United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943-944 (8 th Cir., 2005) (under ‘plain feel’ doctrine, if officer conducting pat-down search feels something he recognizes as contraband, its warrantless seizure is justified).” Stagg v. State, 297 Ga.App. 640, 678 S.E.2d 108 (April 29, 2009). During a consent pat-down in a traffic stop, “an officer in such a circumstance is authorized to reach into a suspect's pocket upon feeling a bulge such as that made by the package of cigarettes in Stagg's pocket. [ Springsteen v. State, 206 Ga.App. 150, 152-153 (424 S.E.2d 832) (1992).] Moreover, a limited protective search of the person is permissible where, as here, a reasonable belief exists that the officer's safety or that the safety of others is at risk based upon the possible presence of weapons in close proximity to or on the person of the suspect. State v. McKinney, 265 Ga.App. 322, 324-325 (593 S.E.2d 865) (2004).” Carter v. State, 297 Ga.App. 608, 677 S.E.2d 792 (April 23, 2009). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress; officer had reasonable fear for his safety when defendant, a passenger in a car to be impounded, exited the vehicle with his hand in his pants pocket. Officer thus was justified in ordering defendant “to take his hand out of his pocket and put both hands on the hood of the patrol car.” When defendant did so, he dropped his purple cigar tube