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containing five rocks of cocaine. Gray v. State, 296 Ga.App. 878, 676 S.E.2d 36 (March 24, 2009). Trial court properly denied motion to suppress; as part of Terry search, officers were allowed to “search the area in the immediate presence of a detainee for weapons, if the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the detainee is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon. See Newby v. State, 178 Ga.App. 891, 892(2) (345 S.E.2d 102) (1986). See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-1052(III) (103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201) (1983).” Here, officers followed footprints leading from armed robbery at neighbor’s home to defendant’s door. Permitted to enter by defendant’s mother, the officers ordered defendant off the sofa, handcuffed him, and searched the sofa cushions for the gun used in the robbery. Instead, they found the cash taken from victims. “[A]s part of the protective search of Gray for weapons, the officer was entitled to lift the cushion of the couch to search for weapons potentially hidden there.” Eaton v. State, 294 Ga.App. 124, 668 S.E.2d 770 (October 20, 2008). During routine traffic stop for suspended registration, “the officer became concerned for his safety when he observed Eaton's extremely nervous manner and he saw an object partially sticking out of the fanny pack she was wearing which looked like it could have been the handle of a gun or knife. When the officer pointed at the fanny pack and asked Eaton if she had any weapons in the pack, Eaton immediately grabbed the fanny pack with her hands. The officer immediately grabbed Eaton's hands to pull them away from the pack, and as he did so he saw a small bag of suspected methamphetamine in one of her hands.” “The officer did nothing which violated the limits of a Terry -type search by simply pointing at the pack and asking Eaton if she had any weapons in the pack. When Eaton reacted to the question by grabbing the pack with her hands, the officer acted within Terry limits to protect himself by pulling Eaton's hands away from the pack to prevent her from gaining access to the object inside that he reasonably suspected could have been a weapon. ” State v. Kipple, 294 Ga.App. 420, 669 S.E.2d 185 (October 20, 2008). Pat-down was justified where defendant, a passenger at a traffic stop, had already given officer a knife in response to officer’s inquiry. “[B]ecause the record shows that Kipple was armed with a knife that he gave to the officer, we find there were specific and articulable facts taken together with rational inferences from those facts which provided the officer with a reasonable basis to believe or suspect that Kipple might be armed with another weapon on his person. Clark v. State, 235 Ga.App. 569, 574 (510 S.E.2d 319) (1998).” Hicks v. State, 293 Ga.App. 745, 667 S.E.2d 715 (September 30, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. During traffic stop for speeding, officer “asked whether Hicks had any weapons. Hicks' statement that he had a knife, as well as his overly-nervous demeanor, made Adamson concerned for his own safety. Despite Hicks' argument to the contrary, nervousness was not the only basis for the frisk; Hicks admitted that he possessed a weapon, an admission that clearly factored into Adamson's decision to pat him down. Given the circumstances, the trial court was authorized to find the pat-down reasonable for officer safety. [Cits.] Moreover, we find nothing improper about the subsequent seizure of contraband. Under the ‘plain feel’ doctrine, Adamson was permitted to confiscate the glass methamphetamine pipe that he detected during the pat-down. [Cit.] Adamson also testified, and the trial court found, that Hicks consented to a search of his pockets. Hicks does not dispute on appeal that he freely consented to the search. And based on that consent, Adamson was authorized to reach into Hicks' pockets and seize any contraband – such as methamphetamine – found inside. [Cit.] Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Hicks' motion to suppress.” Brown v. State, 293 Ga.App. 564, 667 S.E.2d 410 (September 16, 2008). Conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute reversed; trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. “The record shows that Bohannon lacked authority to intrude into Brown's pocket. We recognize that, while patting down the outside of that pocket, [Officer] Bohannon detected the corner of a hard object. Nothing indicates, however, that the object felt like a gun or other weapon. On the contrary, Bohannon did not know what it was and decided to investigate further based only on the broad assumption that ‘anything can house a weapon.’ Moreover, when questioned at the suppression hearing, Bohannon pointed to no particularized facts that reasonably led him to believe that Brown might have a weapon. Although Bohannon was suspicious that no one knew Brown, he did not believe that Brown had committed a crime and was prepared to let Brown walk away from the scene. Simply put, the state offered no evidence that Bohannon thought the ‘hard object’ was a weapon or had any particularized basis for believing that it contained a weapon. Bohannon's general belief that ‘anything can house a weapon’ did not – without more – authorize the intrusion. [Cits.] To hold otherwise would eviscerate the legal limitations on a weapons frisk. Accordingly, the trial court erred in refusing to suppress evidence of the cocaine seized from Brown's pocket. [Cits.]” Compare Shoemaker (June 19, 2008), below.Accord, Kelley v. State , 320 Ga.App. 462, 740 S.E.2d 201 (March 18, 2013) (Physical precedent only) (no evidence that officer thought