☢ test - Í

Tukes v. State, 236 Ga.App. 77, 511 S.E.2d 534 (January 25, 1999). “‘[A] law enforcement officer, for his own protection and safety, may conduct a patdown to find weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are then in the possession of the person he has accosted.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hodges v. State, 217 Ga.App. 806, 808(2), 460 S.E.2d 89 (1995). We find that the officer’s initial observation of the bulky object so obviously concealed in Tukes’ pants while Tukes was still behind the wheel, together with Tukes’ nervous demeanor, provided a sufficient basis for the officer to remove him from the vehicle and conduct a patdown of his person for the officer’s safety. Thompson v. State, 230 Ga.App. 131, 132-133, 495 S.E.2d 607 (1998).” 33. VEHICLES/“AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION” Ross v. State, 323 Ga.App. 28, 747 S.E.2d 81 (July 15, 2013). Conviction for manufacturing marijuana affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Helicopter spotted marijuana plants growing behind defendant’s residence in a car tire; defendant was seen going back and forth between his residence and car, and was in the car when officers arrived. “After his arrest, Ross's car was searched, and an officer found a pack of rolling papers and a device that could be used to roll marijuana cigarettes in the glove box. Additionally, two containers of fertilizer and a book entitled The Healing Magic of Cannabis were found in the trunk.” Held, search was proper under the automobile exception. “Ross was stopped in his vehicle, and a responding officer subsequently noted that one of the tires on the vehicle did not match the others and that the tire had the same make, model and serial number as the tire in which the marijuana plants were being grown. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find that a reasonable and prudent officer could believe that Ross was manufacturing marijuana and using his vehicle to transport the contraband. Thus, there was probable cause to believe that Ross's vehicle contained marijuana, and the search of the passenger compartment and trunk was justified pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343(III) (129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485) (2009), limiting searches incident to arrest, “clearly did not disturb other established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, including our ‘automobile exception.’ See Gant, 556 U.S. at 347(IV).” But see cases cited under Sarden (August 17, 2010), below (automobile exception doesn’t apply where vehicle lawfully parked in residential area). Horne v. State, 318 Ga.App. 484, 733 S.E.2d 487 (October 25, 2012). Conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. “After the officer observed Horne's furtive movements of reaching into his pants pocket, retrieving the plastic bag, and efforts to conceal the bag in the doorjamb, the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle for suspected drug contraband. See, e.g., id.; see also [ State v. Sarden, 305 Ga.App. 587, 589-590 (699 S.E.2d 880) (2010)] (‘The officer's observation of what he suspected, based upon his law enforcement experience, to be crack cocaine, would have led a reasonably discrete and prudent person to believe that drug contraband was in the car.’) (citations and footnote omitted); Martinez v. State, 303 Ga.App. 166, 171(2) (2010) (based upon their observations, the officers had probable cause to believe that drug contraband was in the truck and authorized the search of the truck under the automobile exception).” “FN5. Horne's reliance upon the ruling of Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (129 S.Ct.1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485) (2009), is misplaced. Gant applies in the context of a search incident to arrest, ‘[b]ut the automobile exception is a separate and distinct rationale for upholding the search of a vehicle under the Fourth Amendment.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Sarden, supra, 305 Ga.App. at 589, n. 1. Gant otherwise reaffirmed the automobile exception, providing that if there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, an officer is authorized to search any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found. Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at 347(IV); Sarden, supra, 305 Ga.App. at 589, n. 1.” Shell v. State, 315 Ga.App. 628, 727 S.E.2d 243 (April 12, 2012). Cocaine trafficking conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress, as officer had articulable suspicion for stop and probable cause to search car, including plastic bag on front seat. Probable cause to search was based on “the amount of cash in his pocket, the fact that he was driving a rental car without paperwork, his possession of two to three cellular telephones, and the presence of marijuana debris in the car” as well as the fact “that he displayed an extremely nervous demeanor.” Brown v. State, 311 Ga.App. 405, 716 S.E.2d 802 (August 16, 2011). Cocaine possession conviction affirmed; odor of burnt marijuana and flakes found in car authorized search of entire vehicle, including trunk, pursuant to automobile exception. “[T]he automobile exception allows the entire vehicle to be searched, ‘including all containers and packages that may contain such contraband.’ (Citation and footnote omitted.) Autry v. State, 277 Ga.App. 305, 308, 626 S.E.2d 528 (2006).” Holsey v. State, 306 Ga.App. 75, 701 S.E.2d 538 (September 14, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for misdemeanor