☢ test - Í

possession of marijuana reversed; trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. Officer’s suspicion that defendant had been breaking into cars in parking lot didn’t justify search of defendant’s vehicle. “[T]he officer conceded that this general belief was based solely on the dispatch report that Holsey had allegedly been seen pulling on the door handles of parked vehicles. In fact, the officer acknowledged that there was no other evidence that Holsey had been breaking into vehicles, such as broken automobile glass near any vehicles, reports from victims, or any tools or stolen goods on Holsey's person. ‘Mere suspicion does not amount to probable cause.’ Shivers v. State. 258 Ga.App. 253, 256 (573 S.E.2d 494) (2002).” State v. Sarden, 305 Ga.App. 587, 699 S.E.2d 880 (August 17, 2010). Trial court erroneously granted defendant’s motion to suppress drugs found in his car. Defendant was arrested on outstanding felony warrants when spotted at a convenience store; his car was lawfully parked at the store. After the arrest, officer looked in car and saw what his experience told him was powder cocaine in a clear baggy in plain view on the center console. “After seeing the suspected crack cocaine, the … officer reached through the partially opened window, unlocked the passenger door, and retrieved the baggy from the car.” Held, after seeing the cocaine, officer was entitled to seize it based on the automobile exception. 1. “Under the ‘automobile exception’ to the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment, ‘a police officer may search a car without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car contains contraband, even if there is no exigency preventing the officer from getting a search warrant.’ Benton v. State, 240 Ga.App. 243 (522 S.E.2d 726) (1999). See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-467 (119 S.Ct. 2013, 144 L.Ed.2d 442) (1999); Martinez v. State, 303 Ga.App. 166, 170(2) (692 S.E.2d 766) (2010); McKinney v. State, 184 Ga.App. 607, 609-610(2) (362 S.E.2d 65) (1987). Because there is no exigency requirement in this context, the warrantless search of an automobile will be upheld so long as there was probable cause to suspect it contained contraband, even if ‘the driver was arrested and handcuffed and the keys were taken from him before the car was searched.’ [fn] McKinney, 184 Ga.App. at 609(2). See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 801(I), 825(V) (102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572) (1982); State v. Duncan, 253 Ga.App. 830, 831 (560 S.E.2d 720) (2002).” Accord, O’Neal v. State , 311 Ga.App. 102, 714 S.E.2d 744 (July 21, 2011); Horne (October 25, 2012), above; Blitch v. State , 323 Ga.App. 677, 747 S.E.2d 863 (August 8, 2013). 2. Automobile exception applies even though vehicle was lawfully parked on commercial premises. “[T]he automobile exception applies even if the car is not stopped along a highway, but is stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes, as in the present case, where Sarden's car was in a parking space outside a commercial establishment. See Martinez, 303 Ga.App. at 170-171(2) (upholding search under automobile exception where car was parked in parking lot across the street from a gasoline station to which the defendant had walked); Duncan, 253 Ga.App. at 831 (upholding search under automobile exception where car was parked at convenience store); State v. Folk, 238 Ga.App. 206, 209 (521 S.E.2d 194) (1999) (upholding search under automobile exception where car was in convenience store parking lot). Compare State v. Lejeune, 276 Ga. 179, 183(2) (576 S.E.2d 888) (2003) (automobile exception inapplicable where ‘the suspect's car was legally parked in his residential parking space, the suspect and his only alleged cohort were not in the vehicle or near it and did not have access to it, and the police seized the automobile without a warrant, placed it on a wrecker and hauled it away to be searched at a later date’) (citations omitted); State v. Massa, 273 Ga.App. 596, 596-598 (615 S.E.2d 652) (2005) (affirming trial court's finding that automobile exception was inapplicable where suspect's unoccupied vehicle was parked 300 yards from the road on a dirt driveway).” Warner v. State, 299 Ga.App. 56, 681 S.E.2d 624 (June 12, 2009). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed. Officers were authorized to seize defendant’s vehicle to secure it pending issuance of search warrant, although it was legally parked in an apartment complex parking lot. “[E]vidence supported the trial court's implicit finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless seizure. The vehicle, registered to Warner's mother, was parked in an unprotected parking lot of the compatriot's apartment complex in the wee hours of the morning. Warner and his compatriot had just been arrested for the attempted robbery, but the third man involved in the earlier armed robbery had not. The parents of Warner had told the police that Warner kept a long rifle in the trunk of the vehicle. Concerned that, in light of Warner's arrest, this third man might now seek out the vehicle to destroy the evidence contained therein, police sought to secure the vehicle by having it towed to a secure police parking lot until they could obtain a search warrant some hours later. Similar circumstances have been found sufficiently exigent to allow a warrantless seizure of a vehicle. See United States v. Alexander, 835 F.2d 1406, 1410(II) (11th Cir., 1988) ; Wright v. State, 276 Ga. 454, 460-462(5) (579 S.E.2d 214) (2003).” Billingsley v. State, 294 Ga.App. 661, 669 S.E.2d 699 (November 18, 2008). Search of car was justified by circumstances. “A protective sweep of a vehicle's passenger compartment is merely an extension of the investigatory stop, the scope of which ‘is determined in each case by balancing the extent of the intrusion against the immediacy and importance of the interest in crime prevention or law enforcement which is sought to be advanced.’ (Citation and