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punctuation omitted.) State v. Brown, 178 Ga.App. 307, 308(1) (342 S.E.2d 779) (1986). The search, like the investigative stop, must be ‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga.App. 853, 855(1) (363 S.E.2d 63) (1987). “Dispatch had warned Officer Donnelly that he was looking for a vehicle in which there were three potentially armed men. Only Billingsley and Hogan had exited the vehicle on Officer Donnelly's order after the stop; Billingsley, however, was slow to comply with Donnelly's order to exit the vehicle and to face away; and the backseat of the vehicle was cluttered with what Officer Donnelly described as duffle bags and other things which may have concealed a weapon or a third individual. Thus, we find that the trial court did not err in denying Billingsley's motion to suppress.” Alford v. State, 293 Ga.App. 512, 667 S.E.2d 680 (September 11, 2008). Known reliable confidential informant’s tip, plus officer’s observation, provided probable cause for search of vehicle: “the known, reliable CI reported that Alford would be driving one of three vehicles, which the CI accurately described, in a specific subdivision near a particular street, carrying a specific quantity of cocaine. The police conducted surveillance and observed a vehicle matching a description given by the CI with a driver who also matched the CI's description. These circumstances were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity so as to authorize the investigatory stop,” citing State v. Jones, 287 Ga.App. 259, 260, 651 S.E.2d 186 (2007), and others. “Thereafter, [Officer] Hopkins's observation of the digital scale, which he described as the type used to weigh drugs, in plain view on the front seat of the vehicle, ‘[gave] the [officer] ... probable cause to search the car, as did the fact that the drug dog alerted to the passenger door after [he] arrived.’ (Citation omitted.) Tanner v. State, 281 Ga.App. 101, 104(1), 635 S.E.2d 388 (2006).” Hight v. State, 293 Ga.App. 254, 666 S.E.2d 678 (July 10, 2008). “[B]ecause Officers Howard and Entrekin searched Hight's vehicle immediately following his arrest, that search was … legal. See State v. Hopkins, 163 Ga.App. 141, 143(2) (293 S.E.2d 529) (1982) (holding that ‘a search of the passenger compartment of an automobile recently occupied by an arrestee is a valid search incident to an arrest, even if the arrestee had no “immediate control” of the area at the time the search was conducted’). (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence discovered during the search of Hight's car.” Oldfield v. State, 291 Ga.App. 432, 662 S.E.2d 243 (May 7, 2008). Officer properly entered defendant’s vehicle to confiscate what appeared to be an open container of alcoholic beverage; his discovery of drugs in plain view in the vehicle was thus admissible under the plain view doctrine. State v. Jones, 289 Ga.App. 176, 657 S.E.2d 253 (January 11, 2008). Trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to suppress: during traffic stop for broken tag light, officer saw defendant’s hunting rifle in the cab of the pickup truck. Officer asked defendant to step out of the truck, then, “[a]lthough he did not need to do so to reach the firearm, the officer entered the truck and moved some clothes partially covering the rifle, exposing the contraband that forms the basis of Jones’s motion to suppress. The officer did not testify to any suspicious conduct or furtive movement on the part of Jones at any time, and he testified repeatedly that he was not in fear of any aggressive action. The officer candidly stated that he had a ‘standard procedure’ of securing any firearm he saw in a vehicle during a traffic stop, because ‘several times’ he had found a stolen gun in a vehicle. He had, however, no reason to believe that this particular hunting rifle was stolen.” Defendant did not consent to the seizure. Held, officer’s entry into defendant’s vehicle and seizure of the gun was not justified absent some evidence of threat to the officer. Questions Megesi v. State, 277 Ga.App. 855 (627 S.E.2d 814) (2006) (physical precedent only), which authorizes seizure of all weapons in all traffic stops. “‘[T]he search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on ‘ specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons. ’ (Citations and footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201) (1983). [fn: Megesi, while citing Michigan v. Long, does not follow this clear direction. ] Georgia decisions agree that in order to justify a search of a vehicle for weapons, some conduct on the part of the occupants such as furtive movements or other indications of danger to the officer must be shown, and the officer must have an ‘objectively reasonable’ belief that the occupants of a vehicle are ‘potentially dangerous.’ Silva v. State, 278 Ga. 506, 508 (604 S.E.2d 171) (2004) (driver leaned under seat as if to conceal weapon and drove recklessly while in that position, then offered implausible explanation for his conduct.) Here, no evidence was presented of furtive movements or danger; in fact, the officer candidly acknowledged that the search was merely his standard procedure because any firearm might be stolen. On its face, as noted by Jones, this policy justifies the search of any vehicle occupied by hunters or sport shooters with their firearms, or any pickup truck with a rifle or shotgun on the rear window rack. This is precisely the danger of ‘carte blanche authority to “secure” all weapons during a routine