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traffic stop,’ noted by the special concurrence in Megesi, supra, 277 Ga.App. at 860.” Accord, Bell v. State , 295 Ga.App. 607, 672 S.E.2d 675 (January 21, 2009) (officers couldn’t justify search of entire vehicle based merely on presence of asp baton in car, absent some “furtive movements or other indications of danger to the officer”). State v. Menezes, 286 Ga.App. 280, 648 S.E.2d 741 (July 3, 2007). “Under the ‘automobile exception’ to the search warrant requirement, when a vehicle is being used on the highways and police officers have probable cause to search the vehicle for evidence of a crime, they may search the vehicle without first obtaining a warrant. State v. Lejeune, 276 Ga. 179, 182-183 (576 S.E.2d 888) (2003). [fn] See generally, Jack Goger, Daniel’s Georgia Criminal Trial Practice, § 4-49 (2007 ed.). ‘Probable cause to search an automobile exists when the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the contents of the vehicle offend the law.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. State, 269 Ga. 830, 831(2) (504 S.E.2d 443) (1998). ‘Probable cause need not be defined in relation to any one particular element, but may exist because of the totality of circumstances surrounding a transaction.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Maldonado v. State, 284 Ga.App. 26, 28(2) (643 S.E.2d 316) (2007). ‘Observation of what reasonably appear to be furtive gestures is a factor which may properly be taken into account in determining whether probable cause exists.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted .) Brown v. State, 269 Ga. at 831(2).” Medvar v. State, 286 Ga.App. 177, 648 S.E.2d 406 (May 25, 2007). Officer was justified in prying open glove box: “In searching the vehicle after Medvar gave his consent, the deputy noticed that of the four screws securing the glove compartment to the dashboard of the vehicle, two were scratched and two were missing. Given this fact and his observations before the search, the deputy used a screwdriver to lift the glove compartment enough to allow him to see behind the dashboard. As he did so, the deputy noticed the strong smell of marijuana, saw the contraband, and removed it from the vehicle. Notwithstanding any damage caused thereby, the deputy was authorized to open the glove compartment as he did. In this regard, we conclude that the deputy had probable cause to believe that contraband was in the area behind the dashboard based on his observations before and during his search of the vehicle.” See also Fernandez (August 17, 2005), below. Valle v. State, 282 Ga.App. 223, 638 S.E.2d 394 (November 2, 2006). Defendant lacked standing to challenge search of garbage bag he placed in someone else’s car trunk. Defendant was passenger in vehicle; driver/owner consented to search. “Valle chose to put the garbage bag in the trunk of a car that he did not own and over which he exercised no control. Furthermore, the container involved-a garbage bag, rather than a suitcase or a briefcase – ‘is not traditionally a receptacle for private items.’ [ State v. Robinson, 278 Ga.App. 511, 512 (629 S.E.2d 509) (2006).] Under these circumstances, Valle has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage bag he placed in the trunk. See Mecale v. State, 186 Ga.App. 276, 277-278 (367 S.E.2d 52) (1988). It follows that the trial court did not err in finding Valle lacked standing to challenge the search.” Compare with Selph (June 5, 2003), below. Soilberry v. State, 282 Ga.App. 161, 637 S.E.2d 861 (October 31, 2006). “The ‘automobile exception’ to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies to the search of a vehicle when probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband. Wells v. State, 212 Ga.App. 60, 63(2) (441 S.E.2d 460) (1994). In State v. Folk, 238 Ga.App. 206, 209 (521 S.E.2d 194) (1999), this Court held that the odor of burning marijuana constitutes sufficient probable cause to support the warrantless search of a vehicle, provided that the police officer’s ability to identify that odor is placed into evidence. Here, the police officer testified to his training and experience, which qualified him to detect the odor of marijuana. See Williams v. State, 273 Ga.App. 637, 639(1) (615 S.E.2d 789) (2005) (finding no meaningful distinction between an officer’s ability to detect the odor of ‘burnt’ marijuana and ‘burning’ marijuana). Therefore, even had the officer not identified the particles of marijuana on Soilberry’s clothing, the officer was authorized to search Soilberry’s vehicle based solely on his detection of the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle. As a result, the trial court properly denied Soilberry’s motion to suppress.” Accord, Bailey v. State , 283 Ga.App. 365, 641 S.E.2d 548 (November 30, 2006), citing Soloman v. State , 252 Ga.App. 787, 556 S.E.2d 914 (December 5, 2001); Somesso v. State , 288 Ga.App. 291, 653 S.E.2d 855 (November 7, 2007); Warren v. State , 314 Ga.App. 477, 724 S.E.2d 404 (February 16, 2012); Jones v. State , 319 Ga.App. 678, 738 S.E.2d 130 (February 5, 2013). Fleming v. State, 281 Ga.App. 207, 635 S.E.2d 823 (August 18, 2006). Trial court properly denied motion to suppress; defendant’s flight from stop gave police both probable cause for arrest and grounds to search his vehicle. “When the officers had … corroborated the information given to them [by a concerned citizen], if not earlier, they gained the reasonable and articulable suspicion that the occupants of the Yukon were involved in criminal activity, and thus the authority to detain any or all of them in a brief investigative stop. [ Hudson v. State, 253 Ga.App. 210, 211-212, 558 S.E.2d 420 (2001).] When Fleming fled this detention, the officers obtained probable cause not only to arrest him,