☢ test - Í

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (98 S.Ct. 330; 54 L.Ed.2d 331) (1977) (officer’s right to order driver from vehicle during routine traffic stop), Allison v. State, 188 Ga.App. 460 (373 S.E.2d 273) (1988) (physical precedent only) (‘The [defendant’s] voluntary admission of possession of a deadly weapon per se provided for a limited intrusion under the seat of [defendant’s] motorcycle. Such an intrusion at that point obviously was necessary for the protection of the officers.’).” Questioned, see Jones (January 11, 2008), above. Autry v. State, 277 Ga.App. 305, 626 S.E.2d 528 (January 20, 2006). “In the case at bar, the objective facts known to [officer] Mallek after he lawfully stopped the van gave him probable cause to believe that the van contained contraband. These facts included the evidence of drug usage and drug paraphernalia on the floor of the front seat [“bloodied cotton balls, a blackened spoon with crystalline residue, a cloth band approximately 18 inches long, and an empty folded piece of plastic, which appeared to have crystal residue in it”], the fresh ‘track’ marks on the arms of both men, including puncture wounds on Autry’s arm that had not yet coagulated, and the suspects’ exhibition of symptoms of recent drug use. The warrantless search of the vehicle was therefore lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. [Cits.]” Scott v. State, 277 Ga.App. 126, 625 S.E.2d 526 (January 4, 2006). Where police had probable cause to conduct search under automobile exception, no error in instead impounding vehicle and obtaining search warrant first. “‘For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’ Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970).” Probable cause supplied here by report of concerned citizen of apparent drug deal in apartment parking lot; officer’s observation of individuals huddled around open trunk of vehicle; their flight from scene; and discovery of $87,000 cash left in open, running vehicle. Wesley v. State, 275 Ga.App. 363, 620 S.E.2d 580 (September 1, 2005). During routine traffic stop, “[officer] asked Wesley why he was so nervous. When Wesley failed to respond, [officer] asked if he had any drugs in the car. Wesley acknowledged that there might be a ‘blunt’ (i.e., a partially smoked marijuana cigarette) somewhere in the car. [Officer], who was assigned to the police department’s canine unit, then returned to his patrol car, got his narcotic detection dog, and led the dog around Wesley’s vehicle. After the dog alerted on the driver’s side door, [officer] opened the door and had the dog sniff the interior of the car. After the dog alerted on the center arm rest, [officer] searched the arm rest and found the marijuana.” None of this unlawfully expanded the scope of the stop. “Having effected a valid traffic stop, [officer] could ask questions about drugs -- even without reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug activity -- because the questions did not prolong the detention beyond that necessary to investigate the traffic violation. [Cit.] After Wesley admitted that he might be in possession of marijuana, extending the traffic stop while the drug dog performed a walk-around of the vehicle was in no way unreasonable. [Cit.] The dog’s alert on the outside of the car authorized the [officer] to search the vehicle. [Cit.] Thus, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.” (Emphasis added.) Fernandez v. State, 275 Ga.App. 151, 619 S.E.2d 821 (August 17, 2005). After receiving consent to search defendants’ vehicle, deputy observed that the rear floorboard was raised, the molding cut, and the carpet glued down. Looking under the vehicle, “he saw a sealed compartment attached to the undercarriage. When he tapped the compartment, it made a heavy, thudding sound, not a metallic, hollow sound.” The deputy drilled a hole in the sealed compartment, revealing white powder which proved to be 33 kilos of cocaine. Held, “[T]he deputy was … authorized to use the drill to penetrate the compartment under the circumstances presented…. [W]hen an officer has probable cause to believe a sealed compartment in an automobile contains contraband, he may lawfully search it ‘including dismantling it or damaging it.’ U.S. v. Alvarez , 235 F.3d 1086, 1089 (II)(A) (8 th Cir., 2000) (Officer permitted to slash a spare tire that made a thudding sound when shaken, as if full of contraband); U.S. v. Martel-Martinez , 988 F.2d 855, 858-859(II) (8 th Cir., 1993) (Officers had probable cause to consider a warrantless search of a hidden compartment by punching a hole in it).” Accord, Medvar (May 25, 2007), above. Williams v. State, 273 Ga.App. 637, 615 S.E.2d 789 (June 14, 2005). “[W]e find no meaningful distinction between the odor of ‘burnt’ marijuana and ‘burning’ marijuana” in context of a vehicle search. Strong odor of burnt marijuana justified non-consensual search of defendant’s vehicle, originally stopped for a seat belt violation . Accord, Soilberry v. State , 282 Ga.App. 161, 637 S.E.2d 861 (October 31, 2006); Somesso v. State , 288 Ga.App. 291, 653 S.E.2d 855 (November 7, 2007). Howren v. State, 271 Ga.App. 55, 608 S.E.2d 653 (October 13, 2004). “[A]t the suppression hearing, the officer testified that while the car was coming to a stop, he saw the passenger, Howren, ‘trying to put something around the seat.’ The