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officer testified that Howren appeared to be trying to put something ‘between his legs.’ From his vantage point the officer recalled that he ‘could see a hump between [Howren’s] feet that ... appeared to me ... that something ... was under the mat of the floorboard.’ He noticed that Howren kept ‘dropping his hands down’ as though trying to conceal something under the floor mat or around the seat. Having observed such behavior, the officer had reasonable suspicion to investigate whether Howren was trying to hide a weapon or contraband . See State v. Cooper, 260 Ga.App. 333, 335(2) (579 S.E.2d 754) (2003).” Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 124 S.Ct. 2127, 158 L.Ed.2d 905 (May 24, 2004). “In New York v. Belton , 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), we held that when a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile, the Fourth Amendment allows the officer to search the passenger compartment of that vehicle as a contemporaneous incident of arrest…. We now conclude that Belton governs even when an officer does not make contact until the person arrested has left the vehicle.” Here, officer encountered defendant while driving, thought he was acting suspiciously, confirmed that his tag did not match his vehicle, and was going to pull him over when defendant pulled into a parking lot and exited his vehicle. “[Officer] saw [defendant] leave his vehicle as he pulled in behind him. He parked the patrol car, accosted petitioner, and asked him for his driver’s license.” A consensual search of his person revealed drugs; upon arresting defendant and placing him in the patrol vehicle, officer found a gun under the driver’s seat. The trial court properly did not suppress the gun, as the search incident to arrest was valid. Rationale for search pursuant to Belton is officer safety and need to prevent destruction of evidence. “In all relevant respects, the arrest of a suspect who is next to a vehicle presents identical concerns regarding officer safety and the destruction of evidence as the arrest of one who is inside the vehicle.” Recognizing that “[i]t is unlikely in this case that [defendant] could have reached under the driver’s seat for his gun once he was outside of his automobile …. [t]he need for a clear rule, readily understood by police officers and not depending on differing estimates of what items were or were not within reach of an arrestee at any particular moment, justifies the sort of generalization which Belton enunciated. [Cit.] …. So long as an arrestee is the sort of ‘recent occupant’ of a vehicle such as [defendant] was here, officers may search that vehicle incident to the arrest. [Cit.]” Two justices concur in judgment only; two dissent. Scalia argues in concurrence that rationale should be based, not on officer safety, since suspect is almost always already in custody in patrol car, perhaps not even on scene by time search occurs; rather, rationale should be “simply because the car might contain evidence relevant to the crime for which he was arrested.” Not clear how close in time and space the arrestee must be to the car to invoke this doctrine. See Bell (January 29, 2003), below. King v. State, 267 Ga.App. 546, 600 S.E.2d 647 (May 21, 2004). Officer had probable cause to search defendant’s vehicle after stopping it for traffic violations and then smelling “unburned marijuana” inside, and on defendant, since trial court found that officer’s testimony was credible, and trial court’s credibility determination was not clearly erroneous. Special concurrence by Barnes, however, stresses that “[t]his case ... illustrates the very furthest that credibility can possibly be stretched and almost does not pass the ‘smell test’ itself,” since the only marijuana found was “wrapped in plastic inside a bag in the closed trunk, over the competing odor of a baby powder-scented air freshener and a Black & Mild cigar.” Barnes cautions against citing this case as precedent: “Police officers may not open people’s trunks merely because they say they smell something suspicious, which would be a ludicrous result.” State v. Silva, 263 Ga.App. 371, 587 S.E.2d 762 (September 3, 2003). 4-3 decision reverses grant of motion to suppress, finding lawful Terry search of vehicle. While pulling defendant over for speeding, officer noticed him “leaning at approximately a 45 degree angle toward the passenger’s seat with his right arm extended into the area beneath the passenger’s seat.” Defendant denied putting anything under the seat, saying he was trying to get his cell phone. Officer had defendant exit his car, “then went to the passenger side to check what he had placed underneath the front passenger seat concerning maybe a weapon or something of that nature.... As he knelt down to look under the seat, [officer] smelled the odor of marijuana. He saw a six or eight-inch by three or four-inch rag folded into a square lump.” (Emphasis in Court of Appeals opinion) Opening the rag, the officer found a brick of marijuana. Held, initial search of vehicle was justified by officer’s reasonable concern that defendant had placed a weapon under the seat. “‘The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.’ That Silva offered an innocent explanation of the lean does not preclude [officer’s] checking out the car before allowing Silva to get back in it.... ‘We certainly know of no constitutional provision which would require that the officer stake his life on [Silva’s] explanation rather than upon the officer’s own determination of whether [he] was armed.’” Dissent argues that trial court could find that officer had no “particular reason to think that the defendant may be dangerous,” noting that “[l]aw enforcement authorities have no general authority to search automobiles just because they have made a traffic stop.” Affirmed, Silva v. State , 278 Ga. 506, 604 S.E.2d 171 (October 12, 2004): “The officer’s belief that Silva was potentially dangerous was objectively