☢ test - Í

Ga.App. 703, 719 S.E.2d 563 (November 18, 2011) (inventory search proper though defendant’s vehicle was legally parked in parking lot, where arrest was related to operation of vehicle with suspended license and without insurance). Jackson v. State, 258 Ga.App. 806, 575 S.E.2d 713 (December 11, 2002). Witnesses to a hit-and-run accident gave police a detailed description of the vehicle, including tag number, which allowed police to trace it to defendant’s residence. An officer spotted the vehicle in defendant’s driveway, and after observing damage from the street, went on defendant’s property for a closer inspection, then impounded the vehicle prior to seeking a search warrant. Held, entry onto defendant’s property and seizure of the vehicle before issuance of a warrant did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The officer “developed probable cause to search Jackson’s car from a public vantage point before he entered Jackson’s curtilage for a closer inspection. The Fourth Amendment ... has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude an officer’s observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible.” Further, the officer “‘had probable cause to seize the automobile as an instrumentality of the crime.... Moreover, ... [Detective Toney] had no way of determining who might have access to the vehicle and could remove and destroy the evidence.’” Stinson v. State, 254 Ga.App. 810, 564 S.E.2d 39 (March 15, 2002). Narcotics officer received a telephone call from defendant’s father, who identified himself as an informant who worked with another narcotics detective. He told the officer that at 5 p.m. that afternoon, a subject know as Mick would arrive at a Chevron station at a particular corner in a “red type Blazer type vehicle.” He also said the subject did not have a driver’s license and someone else would be driving and that the subject would have between 8 and 9 ounces of cocaine in his possession. The officer confirmed that the caller had worked previously as an informant and the officer, along with other detectives, set up surveillance at the Chevron station. Just after 5 p.m., a vehicle matching the description arrived and parked by the pay phones. The passenger exited, went into the store, and came out with a purchase. The vehicle remained parked, but no occupants used the phones. Satisfied the car and its occupants matched those identified by the caller and concerned that increasing evening traffic might make possible pursuit difficult, the narcotic detectives pulled their marked car in front of the vehicle, blocking its path. The officers approached the vehicle and order the occupants to put their hands up. The suspects failed to comply and the officers drew their weapons, opened the car doors and ordered the individuals out. The vehicle started rolling backward and a detective jumped in to apply the brakes and stop the car. He noticed a large paper bag on the floorboard and within the paper bag were smaller plastic bags filled with what looked like cocaine. The contents proved to indeed be cocaine. Held, the explicit and detailed information provided by the unknown informant, which was verified in part by the observations of the officer gave the officer articulable suspicion that Defendant possessed contraband and justified the Terry stop to obtain more information and investigate the circumstances. Further held, although generally searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, an exception arises where, as here, exigent circumstances arise (from Defendant’s vehicle rolling backwards) and an officer responds to the circumstance by jumping into a vehicle, bringing it to a stop, and then lawfully seizing cocaine that is in plain sight because the officer is in a place in which he is constitutionally entitled to be. State v. Duncan, 253 Ga.App. 830, 560 S.E.2d 720 (February 19, 2002). Trial court’s decision, granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in his car, reversed as officers had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of defendant’s vehicle after his arrest. The officers had arranged to buy a large amount of cocaine from defendant at the location of his arrest and they saw defendant throw away a small bag of cocaine. Defendant was arrested and the key to his car was taken from his pocket. After a drug dog alerted for the odor of narcotics outside of the car, police used the key to enter the car and conduct a search during which cocaine was found on the back seat. Held, both probable cause and exigent circumstances are not required before the State can conduct a warrantless search. Here, because the State had probable cause to suspect the car contained contraband, a warrantless search was reasonable even though defendant was arrested, handcuffed, and the keys secured, and there were no exigent circumstances. Soloman v. State, 252 Ga.App. 787, 556 S.E.2d 914 (December 5, 2001). Investigating suspicious activity in a high crime area, an officer observed defendant driving with an expired tag. As officer drove towards defendant, defendant pulled his vehicle to side of road and exited the vehicle. Defendant’s door being opened caused the vehicle’s interior light to come on and, from her patrol car, the officer could see within defendant’s vehicle an open glass bottle in a paper bag on the console. To investigate, the officer exited her vehicle and approached defendant, who was standing next to his vehicle. The officer smelled a strong odor of burnt marijuana in the area and could detect the odor of marijuana emanating from defendant. The officer questioned defendant about the smell and he pleaded ignorance; thus, the officer handcuffed defendant and looked in his vehicle with a flashlight, observing a large revolver on the driver’s seat and a large wine