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bottle on the console. The officer placed defendant in her patrol car and conducted a further search of the vehicle, finding over 30 grams of cocaine. Held, the officer was authorized to approach defendant’s vehicle to investigate the expired tag and the open container. Detection of the odor of burnt marijuana in the vicinity of the car provided probable cause for its search. Brannon v. State, 243 Ga.App. 28, 530 S.E.2d 761 (March 9, 2000). Known informant’s information was sufficient basis for stop and search: “‘[w]here the details of a tip are corroborated by the personal observation of the investigating officers, a reliable informant’s tip is sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless search.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Singleton v. State, 236 Ga.App. 438, 439(1), 511 S.E.2d 541 (1999). Here, the evidence showed that, by April 27 (the date of the search), Kenneth had proven to be a reliable informant. Although Kenneth had not previously served as an informant, nearly all of the information he gave police over a three-week period concerning the scheme in question turned out to be accurate. He predicted that Stamps would drive to a house in Cobb County on three different days (April 6, 13, and 21) to pick up marijuana, return to his Douglas County residence, and distribute marijuana to mid-level dealers. On two of those dates, police confirmed that Stamps drove to Cobb County, and on one of those dates, they watched a procession of buyers arrive at Stamps’ residence and leave with bags of marijuana in hand. On all three dates, Kenneth himself received ‘fronted’ marijuana from Stamps and turned it over to police. In addition to his accurate descriptions of the enterprise, police were able to verify many of the details provided by Kenneth. For example, Kenneth gave information about Stamps’ criminal record, which police checked and found to be correct. He gave accurate descriptions of Brannon’s physical appearance and vehicle, and he correctly stated that Stamps and Brannon spoke on the telephone. Although Kenneth directed police to a house in Cobb County that turned out not to be Davitte’s residence, the house was similar in appearance to Davitte’s and only one mile away.” Traffic stop and search based solely on this information upheld as based on probable cause. State v. Folk, 238 Ga.App. 206, 521 S.E.2d 194 (May 24, 1999). En banc decision holds that “a trained police officer’s perception of the odor of burning marijuana, provided his ability to identify that odor is placed into evidence, constitutes sufficient probable cause to support the warrantless search of a vehicle.” But not someone’s person (see Patman v. State , 244 Ga.App. 833, 537 S.E.2d 118 (July 7, 2000), or someone’s home (see Clare v. State , 135 Ga.App. 281, 283(2), 217 S.E.2d 638 (1975)). Accord, State v. Long , 239 Ga.App. 463, 521 S.E.2d 401 (July 29, 1999). See also King (May 21, 2004), above. Patman disapproved “[t]o the extent that [it] could be interpreted as support for the premise that the odor of raw marijuana emanating from a particular location cannot be the sole basis for the issuance of a search warrant for that location,” State v. Kazmierczak , 331 Ga.App. 817, 771 S.E.2d 473 (March 30, 2015). Edwards v. State, 239 Ga.App. 44, 518 S.E.2d 426 (May 12, 1999). Trial court properly denied motion to suppress. “Edwards … argues that a traffic stop for failure to wear a seat belt cannot form the basis of a search for narcotics. Pursuant to OCGA § 40-8-76.1(f), failure to wear a seat belt ‘shall not constitute probable cause for violation of any other Code section.’ Thus, Edwards contends that Whitwell was permitted to question him only regarding the seat belt violation. This contention lacks merit. … [N]othing in OCGA § 40-8-76.1(f) prevents an officer who stops a motorist for failing to wear a seat belt from conducting a reasonable investigation to ensure his safety. Davis v. State, 232 Ga.App. 320, 321(1), 501 S.E.2d 836 (1998). If, during that investigation, the officer sees evidence of an unrelated crime, the officer may arrest the motorist for the unrelated crime notwithstanding the fact that the motorist originally was stopped for failing to wear a seat belt. Id. at 322(1), 501 S.E.2d 836.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (April 5, 1999). Reversing Wyoming Supreme Court; in Houghton’s felony drug prosecution, trial court properly denied motion to suppress based on search of defendant’s purse as part of search of car. During a traffic stop, an officer observed a hypodermic syringe sticking out of the male driver’s shirt pocket. The officer searched the car and its contents, included a female passenger’s purse. The purse contained methamphetamine, and the passenger, Houghton, was charged with felony possession. At trial, the passenger moved the court to suppress the drugs, arguing that the officer either knew or should have known that the purse did not belong to the syringe-carrying driver and thus, by searching its contents, the officer exceeded the scope of the search. Held: “ When there is probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers…to examine packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for each one. A passenger’s personal belongings, just like the driver’s belongings or containers attached to the car like a glove compartment, are ‘in’ the car, and the officer has probable cause to search for contraband ‘in’ the car .” Houghton upholds the cases following United States v. Ross , 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed. 572 (1982), that characterized Ross as “applying broadly to all containers within a car, without qualification as to ownership.” Stevens, writing for