☢ test - Í

Souter and Ginsburg, dissents. Accord, Shell v. State , 315 Ga.App. 628, 727 S.E.2d 243 (April 12, 2012) (probable cause to search car for drugs extended to opening plastic bag on front seat). Singleton v. State, 236 Ga.App. 438, 511 S.E.2d 541 (January 27, 1999). Officer’s warrantless stop of defendants’ vehicle based on known reliable informant’s tip, and resultant search, were justified. “The passage of approximately three hours from the time [officer] Tison received the informant’s tip until he effectuated the stop does not demand a conclusion that a warrant was required. The informant stated that the individuals would leave early in the morning of July 1. It was therefore reasonable, as testified to by Tison, to believe that he did not have time to leave the scene he had placed under surveillance to obtain a search warrant. [fn] Once the car began moving, obtaining a warrant would have been impractical, and exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search were therefore created. See generally Hall v. State, 176 Ga.App. 428, 429-431(2), 336 S.E.2d 291 (1985).” Williams v. State, 236 Ga.App. 102, 511 S.E.2d 216 (January 26, 1999). Stopping a vehicle suspected of involvement in an armed robbery, officer “noticed that the Pontiac’s trunk was bouncing up and down.” The trunk continued to bounce after the car stopped, so one officer opened it out of a concern for officer safety, thinking someone might be hiding in the trunk. No one was in the trunk, but a sawed-off shotgun and some drugs were found therein in plain view. Held, trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the shotgun and drugs. “ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) ‘together establish that in appropriate circumstances the Fourth Amendment allows a properly limited “search” or “seizure” on facts that do not constitute probable cause to arrest or to search for contraband or evidence of crime.’ United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). For example, ‘a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer [is permitted] where he has reason to believe he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.’ Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868.” “ Officer McCarthy was authorized to open the trunk to insure that no one was in the trunk who might pose a threat to the safety of the officers. The Pontiac matched an armed robbery BOLO and its unlocked trunk was moving after the Pontiac had stopped. Since the protective measures taken by Officer McCarthy were reasonable under the circumstances, the trial court did not err when it denied Williams’ motion to suppress. See Chaney v. State, 207 Ga.App. 72, 73, 427 S.E.2d 63 (1993).” 34. VEHICLES – GPS TRACKING Green v. State, 331 Ga.App. 801, 771 S.E.2d 518 (March 30, 2015). Burglary conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Defendant lacked standing to challenge police GPS monitoring of his friend’s truck, in which he lacked any ownership or possessory interest. Defendant’s temporary status as a passenger in the vehicle conferred upon him no standing. “[W]hile a passenger has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a traffic stop generally, a passenger cannot challenge his detainment based upon an independent violation of another person's Fourth Amendment rights,” citing United States v. Davis, 750 F.3d 1186, 1191(A) (10 th Cir., 2014), cert. denied, Davis v. United States, U.S. (135 S.Ct. 989, 190 L.Ed.2d 868) (2015).” “‘The warrantless attachment and use of the GPS device was the Fourth Amendment violation—the poisonous tree—that allowed agents to locate, stop, and seize evidence from the car in which [the defendant] was riding—the tainted fruit.... Because the poisonous tree was planted in someone else's orchard, [the defendant] lacks standing to challenge its fruits....’ (Citations, punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Davis, supra, 750 F.3d at 1190–1191(A).” United States v. Jones, 10-1259, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911, 2012 WL 171117 (January 23, 2012). Affirming D.C. Circuit Court, defendant’s District Court drug trafficking conviction reversed. Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress; “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, [fn] and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search’” for Fourth Amendment purposes. Government had obtained a search warrant for use of the device, to be attached while the vehicle was in DC, and within ten days of issuance of the warrant. Instead, government agents attached it eleven days later, in Maryland. Agents then monitored the vehicle’s travels for 28 days. Government contends that defendant had no “reasonable expectation of privacy” as to his travels on the public roadway, citing Katz v. United States , 389 U. S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Scalia, writing for the majority, hearkens back to an older Fourth Amendment analysis, based on property rights and the government’s intrusion on private property: “It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the