☢ test - Í

assuming that the school police officer's taking this student to wait in the SRO office until Macon police officers arrived to question him did not result in Appellant being detained, leaving him there in handcuffs did. Appellant may have been free to move about the SRO office, but a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, even through an open door, to walk through his school when he was marked by handcuffs that signify an escaped detainee and that cannot easily be removed.” Distinguishing “cases where we held that the use of handcuffs did not convert a first-tier encounter into a seizure when a defendant who voluntarily consented to be interviewed was handcuffed during transportation to the police station in the back of a police car, because such a measure was reasonable to protect officer safety and the handcuffs were removed before the evidence as to which the defendant sought suppression was obtained. See Bolden v. State, 278 Ga. 459, 462–463, 604 S.E.2d 133 (2004). See also Smith v. State, 281 Ga. 185, 187, 640 S.E.2d 1 (2006) (finding no unlawful seizure even assuming the appellant had been handcuffed for transport). … Moreover, unlike the situation in cases like Bolden, by leaving Appellant behind in the office, the officer prevented Appellant from being in a position to ask for the handcuffs to be removed so that he could leave. See Bolden, 278 Ga. at 463, 604 S.E.2d 133. Put simply, a reasonable person would not ‘feel free to “disregard the police and go about his business”’ when left in a room in a school wearing handcuffs that the police had locked onto him. … Because Appellant was unlawfully detained at the time he apparently discarded the marijuana, the marijuana was the product of an unlawful seizure. See Edwards v. State, 239 Ga.App. 44, 45, 518 S.E.2d 426 (1999) (‘“There is nothing unlawful in the government's appropriation of abandoned property, which does not constitute a search or seizure in the legal sense.” ... However, if unlawful police conduct coerces the defendant into abandoning the property, then suppression of the evidence may be warranted.’ (citation omitted)). Thus, the marijuana could not be the basis for a legal arrest. See Jones v. State, 126 Ga.App. 841, 845, 192 S.E.2d 171 (1972) (explaining that the fruits of an illegal search cannot be used as the basis of an arrest).” Harmless, however, because the fact that defendant obtained a large amount of money from his uncle wasn’t in dispute; rather, defendant contended that his uncle had given him the money. State v. Walker, 295 Ga. 888, 764 S.E.2d 804 (October 20, 2014). Reversing 323 Ga.App. 558, 747 S.E.2d 51 (July 12, 2013); trial court properly denied motion to suppress, as defendant wasn’t seized by officer’s order to take his hands out of his pockets, given that defendant then turned and ran instead of complying with the officer’s order. Defendant sought suppression of items he threw down as he ran. Court of Appeals “went astray” in finding that the officer’s order constituted a seizure. “[I]t a seizure of a person that must be supported by articulable suspicion. And, it is clear from the facts of this case, that Walker was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment by Officer Adriance's direction that he remove his hands from his pockets; a command from a law enforcement officer, alone, is not sufficient to constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Rather, under the Fourth Amendment, a seizure occurs ‘[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’ Terry, supra at 19 (n. 16). And, it is unquestioned that Officer Adriance did not apply any physical force to restrain Walker's liberty until after Walker discarded the items he sought to suppress; he did not touch Walker or display a weapon, nor were other officers there such as might constitute a ‘threatening presence.’ See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). Accordingly, whether Walker was seized before he abandoned the items depends upon whether he had been seized through a show of authority on Officer Adriance's part; if he was not thus seized, his abandonment of the property was not the fruit of a seizure, and the motion to suppress the evidence was properly denied. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). See also Brown v. State, 239 Ga.App. 674, 676(1), 522 S.E.2d 41 (1999) (‘[D]efendant was not “seized” when the cocaine was abandoned. He had not been touched by the officers; he did not submit to the officers' “show of authority”—the flashing blue lights. Simply put, defendant was in a state of flight when the cocaine was discarded and it cannot be said that it was the fruit of an illegal arrest.’). … [A]bsent physical force, for an encounter with a police officer to be considered a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, there must be ‘ submission to the assertion of authority.’ Id. at 675, 522 S.E.2d 41 (Emphasis in original.) See also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254(II)(A), 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (‘A police officer may make a seizure by a show of authority and without the use of physical force, but there is no seizure without actual submission; otherwise, there is at most an attempted seizure, so far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned.’) (Emphasis added.) And, instead of submitting to Officer Adriance's direction and removing his hands from his pockets, Walker ran. Although Walker describes the command to take his hands out of his pockets as a ‘second-tier’ encounter, it was not; without his submission to the command, it was at most an attempted seizure, and ‘[a]ttempted seizures of a person are beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment. [Cit.]’ County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (n. 7) (1998).” Benham dissents. State v. LeJeune, 327 Ga.App. 327, 759 S.E.2d 53 (May 20, 2014). In prosecution for DUI and related offenses, trial court erred by granting motion to suppress; contrary to trial court’s ruling, officers needed no articulable suspicion to follow defendant’s vehicle as it traveled on public road. “LeJeune is correct that, ‘[when] no circumstances at all