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appear which might give rise to an articulable suspicion (less than probable cause, but greater than mere caprice) that the law has been violated, the act of following and detaining a vehicle and its occupants must be judged as an impermissible intrusion on the rights of the citizen.’ Brooks v. State, 129 Ga.App. 109, 111, 198 S.E.2d 892 (1973) (emphasis supplied). Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has emphasized that implicit in such cases is that ‘each case must turn on its own independent circumstances bearing on the issue of reasonableness of the seizure. ’ Brisbane v. State, 233 Ga. 339, 342, 211 S.E.2d 294 (1974) (emphasis supplied). In other words, as is clear from the holding in those cases themselves, the focus is on the ultimate stop of the individual, not on the ‘following’ that led to the seizure. See, e.g., Brooks, 129 Ga.App. at 111, 198 S.E.2d 892 (‘The stop effected by turning on the police light and driving up beside the car to halt it was coercive action which infringed upon the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.’ (emphasis supplied)).” Also quoting “ State v. Wright , 221 Ga.App. 202, 206(4), 470 S.E.2d 916 (1996) (noting that the cases cited by the defendant ‘were focused on the intrusion caused by the ultimate detention of the citizen and [were] not authority supporting the [defendant's] contention’ (emphasis supplied)).” “Here, the officer's act of following LeJeune was not a seizure. As in Wright, the only submission to officer authority occurred when LeJeune stopped his vehicle in response to the officer's flashing lights, and the officer only initiated his lights—and the stop itself— after LeJeune failed to maintain his lane,[fn] at which point the officer had probable cause justifying the stop. [FN: “ … To the extent that the trial court found that LeJeune's failure to maintain lane was caused by the officer's act of accelerating behind him, this finding was clearly erroneous because there was no evidence to support this conclusion, as any indication of same was solely made in an unanswered question by defense counsel. See, e.g., Bradley v. State, 322 Ga.App. 541, 544(1)(b), 745 S.E.2d 763 (2013) (‘[C]ounsel's questions and arguments are not evidence.’). And, nevertheless, this in no way undermines the officer's observation of a traffic violation.”] Accordingly, we agree with the State that the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress on grounds that the officer's stop was pretextual.” State v. Richards, 327 Ga.App. 58, 755 S.E.2d 367 (March 27, 2014). In prosecution for possession of ketamine (“a schedule 3 … horse tranquilizer”), trial court erred by granting motion to suppress; officer’s request to see defendant’s arms didn’t constitute a seizure. Officer encountered defendant sitting in a truck at a gas station “known for high drug traffic, particularly heroin.” Officer engaged defendant and his companion in conversation and “asked the men if they would mind showing him their arms.” Defendant subsequently consented to search of his truck, which revealed the ketamine. “Officer Whitfield was not threatening nor did he use a show of force, and he did not touch Richards or employ language that would have made Richards believe he was compelled to comply with the request to roll up his sleeves.” Citing State v. Dukes, 279 Ga.App. 247, 249, 630 S.E.2d 847 (2006) (request to empty pockets wasn’t a seizure); distinguishing Brown v. State, 301 Ga.App. 82, 686 S.E.2d 793 (2009) (“a first-tier encounter escalated to a second-tier encounter when the officer directed the defendant to remove his hands from his pockets.”). Miller and Barnes dissent, would find second-tier encounter based on presence of two “armed backup officers … with weapons in full view.” Hernandez-Espino v. State, 324 Ga.App. 849, 752 S.E.2d 10 (November 19, 2013). In prosecution for cocaine possession, trial court erred in denying motion to suppress. Defendant’s consent to search was coerced by officer’s unlawful escalation of first-tier encounter to second-tier without articulable suspicion. Officer encountered Hernandez in apartment complex parking lot. Suspecting he was there to buy drugs, officer told defendant, “man, just give me the drugs you just bought.” Defendant denied buying drugs, but gave officer consent to search his person, which yielded crack cocaine from his pocket. 1. “[T]he trial court found that the encounter remained first-tier because Hernandez–Espino himself did not consider the officer's statement to be a command, which the trial court concluded because Hernandez–Espino did not respond by handing over drugs. Whether an officer-citizen encounter is a first- or second-tier encounter, however, is not governed by the citizen's willingness to comply with the officer. See Walker v. State, 323 Ga.App. 558, 747 S.E.2d 51 (July 12, 2013) (officer's command that defendant remove hands from pockets turned first-tier encounter into second- tier stop requiring reasonable articulable suspicion, even though defendant did not comply with command).” Walker reversed, 295 Ga. 888, 764 S.E.2d 804 (October 20, 2014). 2. Officer’s command to “give me the drugs” created second-tier detention. “Asked on direct examination if he had, ‘testified that you asked him if he had just bought some drugs,’ the officer interjected a correction: ‘No I didn't ask him if he bought drugs. I told him to give me the drugs he just bought.’ [fn] On cross he agreed to defense counsel's characterization of those words as a demand. Defense counsel asked: ‘[T]hat's when you make the demand, [“]give me the drugs you just bought [“]; correct?’ The officer responded: ‘Correct.” We therefore conclude that the officer's words were not a request that Hernandez–Espino was free to ignore. The officer's conduct and statement ‘ould have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’ Cutter [ v. State, 274 Ga.App. 589, 592(1), 617 S.E.2d 588 (2005)] (citation omitted).” Three judges dissent, finding support for trial court’s determination that the encounter was first-tier, and thus defendant’s consent wasn’t coerced.