☢ test - Í

Dryer v. State, 323 Ga.App. 734, 747 S.E.2d 895 (August 21, 2013). Conviction for felony marijuana possession reversed; trial court erred in denying motion to suppress. Officer approached defendant’s vehicle when he saw it at 11:00 p.m. backed into deserted golf course parking lot; defendant then began heading toward the parking lot exit, prompting officer to activate his blue lights. Held, Contrary to trial court’s ruling, encounter between defendant and officer began as a second-tier stop, not a first-tier encounter. “When the officer first observed Dryer's vehicle it was parked, but a few moments later, as Dryer pulled out of the parking space and began driving toward the parking lot exit, the officer activated his patrol vehicle's blue lights. Not surprisingly, Dryer immediately stopped. And indeed, while testifying during the motion-to-suppress hearing, the officer characterized his own actions as initiating ‘a stop’ when Dryer's vehicle attempted to drive past him. Thus, not only did the officer create the impression that Dryer could not leave, he clearly was not going to allow Dryer to do so.” Durrance v. State, 319 Ga.App. 866, 738 S.E.2d 692 (February 22, 2013). DUI per se conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Contrary to defendant’s argument, his statements to police didn’t require Miranda , as encounter with police was second-tier, not formal arrest: “Durrance was asked to exit the vehicle, keep his hands visible, and allow himself to be patted down for weapons after he identified himself as a suspect in the domestic violence investigation. These actions did not amount to a formal arrest. See State v. Kipple, 294 Ga.App. 420, 421– 422(1), 669 S.E.2d 185 (2008) (second-tier stop notwithstanding fact that officer ordered defendant out of the vehicle and conducted a pat-down search for personal safety). While Durrance correctly notes that he was not free to leave the scene at this point, he was not handcuffed or placed in the patrol car when questioned about the domestic disturbance or his consumption of alcohol.” Jones v. State, 291 Ga. 35, 727 S.E.2d 456 (May 7, 2012). Reversing unpublished opinion from Court of Appeals, trial court erred by denying motion to suppress. Contrary to trial court’s finding, encounter between defendant driver and trooper was a Terry stop, not a first-tier encounter. Trooper was participating in roadblock when he saw a vehicle turn into a shopping center parking lot approaching the roadblock. Trooper blocked the only exit to the shopping center and activated his blue lights to investigate. While he was doing so, defendant also entered the shopping center parking lot, and thus was also blocked from exiting by the trooper. The trooper spoke to the first driver, then the defendant, who smelled strongly of alcohol and marijuana. Defendant was ultimately charged and convicted of DUI. Held, the encounter was a Terry stop. Even though the trooper initially only intended to stop the first driver, after speaking with her “[h]e then ‘stepped back to [Jones] to see what had persuaded him to turn into the parking lot.’ These actions show that the trooper intended to detain Jones at least momentarily to discover his reasons for avoiding the highway roadblock and a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave under these circumstances without the trooper’s permission. Therefore, we hold that a seizure occurred when the trooper walked back to question Jones while blocking the exit from the parking lot with the patrol car.” State v. Woods, 311 Ga.App. 577, 716 S.E.2d 622 (September 1, 2011). In cocaine possession prosecution, trial court properly granted motion to suppress. Contrary to State’s argument, no evidence that second-tier encounter had de- escalated to first-tier encounter. Police had entered hotel room with an arrest warrant for Lee; after holding Woods at gun point, they received information that Lee was in a different room. Most of the officers left the room with Woods; those who remained holstered their guns. Cocaine was substequently found in the safe, and Woods was charged with possessing it. “To determine whether the encounter de-escalated, we ‘must look to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a reasonable person would have felt free’ to end the interaction with police. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. McMichael, 276 Ga.App. 735, 737(1) (624 S.E.2d 212) (2005). Some of the factors a court may consider to determine whether a police-citizen encounter has de-escalated from a second- or third-tier encounter into a first-tier encounter include ‘whether there was a clear and expressed endpoint to any such prior detention; the character of police presence and conduct in the encounter under review (for example—the number of officers, whether they were uniformed, whether police isolated subjects, physically touched them or directed their movement, the content or manner of interrogatories or statements, and “excesses” factors stressed by the United States Supreme Court); geographic, temporal and environmental elements associated with the encounter; and the presence or absence of express advice that the citizen-subject was free to decline the request for consent to search. In general, a full examination must be undertaken of all coercive aspects of the police-citizen interaction.’ (Citation omitted.) Id. at 737–738. There is no evidence indicating that the detention of Woods de-escalated to a first-tier encounter once the police had arrested Lee, as the state contends. There was no clear endpoint to the initial detention that would indicate to Woods that he was free to end the interaction with the police; once Lee was arrested, nothing changed except that more officers entered the motel room and began questioning Woods. Further, the encounter continued in the place it began, Woods's motel room. Finally, there is no evidence that the police advised Woods that he was free to decline the request for consent to search. Under these