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circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the encounter did not de-escalate.” Butler v. State, 303 Ga.App. 564, 694 S.E.2d 168 (April 7, 2010). DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress, as no Terry stop occurred. Deputy responding to 911 call about a domestic disturbance at a specific address saw a car pulling out of that driveway. Deputy “rolled down his window, stuck his arm out, and waved at the car. The car stopped, and [Deputy] asked the driver, Butler, if she had just pulled out of the driveway of 921 Napiers Post. She replied that she had.” Driver admitted she had been involved in a domestic dispute and agreed to go back to the residence with deputy.” Trial court properly found no coercion in the encounter: “There was no evidence that Harper created the impression that Butler could not leave. There was no evidence that his lights were flashing or that his weapon was drawn. There was no evidence that Harper yelled at her, that he forcibly opened her car door, or that he prevented her from leaving the area. Indeed, the record reflects that she was given the choice to leave or to return to the house; thus, she ‘was free to refuse the request and leave the scene.’ She voluntarily chose to return.” (Footnotes omitted). Harper v. State, 300 Ga.App. 757, 686 S.E.2d 375 (November 5, 2009). In defendants’ trial for armed robbery and related charges, trial court properly denied motion to suppress evidence obtained in search of get-away car. Car was stopped on suspicion of involvement in jewelry store robbery and occupants “were ordered out of the vehicle. Such an order was authorized because ‘when stopping individuals for questioning, law enforcement officers are entitled to take reasonable steps to protect their own safety. It is not unreasonable for officers stopping a car reportedly involved in numerous violent crimes to temporarily, and separately, detain the occupants.’ Brown [ v. State, 278 Ga. 724, 727(2) (609 S.E.2d 312) (2004)] (citation omitted).” Brown v. State, 301 Ga.App. 82, 686 S.E.2d 793 (October 23, 2009). Defendant’s encounter with officer who spoke to him in apartment complex parking lot “escalated into a second-tier stop when the officer told him to remove his hands from his pockets.” When defendant failed to comply, the officer drew his weapon and ordered defendant to comply. Distinguished, Richards (March 27, 2014), above. Walker v. State, 299 Ga.App. 788, 683 S.E.2d 867 (August 20, 2009). “It is undisputed that the stop here, in which Walker was told to ‘hold on ... come here,’ and sit on the pavement, and was then asked questions pursuant to a ‘field investigation,’ was a second-tier, investigative detention that required the officer to have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that Walker was or was about to be involved in criminal activity.” No such basis existed here. Accord, Durden v. State , 320 Ga.App. 218, 739 S.E.2d 676 (March 8, 2013) (encounter was second-tier where defendant stopped in response to verbal command from officer; but stop was justified by probable cause). Johnson v. State, 299 Ga.App. 474, 682 S.E.2d 601 (July 2, 2009). Driver of day care center van was encountered by officer in parking lot, investigating domestic incident at day care center. “The officer allowed Johnson to unload the children from the bus and take them inside, but told her to return when she was finished. After waiting for approximately five minutes, the officer viewed Johnson through an office window and motioned for her to return outside. She complied.” Held, defendant’s “encounter with the officer elevated to a second tier encounter once the officer made it clear that she was not authorized to disregard his request that she return outside. See, e.g., Ward [ v. State, 277 Ga.App. 790, 792 (627 S.E.2d 862) (2006)]; Davidson v. State, 257 Ga.App. 260, 263(1)(b) (570 S.E.2d 698) (2002).” Lewis v. State, 294 Ga.App. 607, 669 S.E.2d 558 (November 17, 2008). Trial court could find that encounter was second-tier, despite officer’s pointing gun at defendant and ordering him to the ground. “Here, the officer, upon seeing Lewis notice him and reach into his waistband, unholstered his weapon and ordered Lewis to stop what he was doing and get on the ground. Though the encounter was brief, the officer did not tell Lewis that he was under arrest, he did not order Lewis to put his hands behind his back, and he did not order Lewis into the back of his patrol car. The officer's order was given in the context of his investigation of a potentially-armed drug suspect and in light of Lewis's observed hand motions. Based on this factual scenario, we cannot say that the trial court erred in concluding that the encounter was a second-tier investigatory detention rather than a full-scale arrest, as the forcible nature of the stop arose from the officer's primary concern at that point for his safety, and as the nature of the detention did not unambiguously convey a prolonged custodial arrest. A second-tier ‘investigatory stop is not automatically an arrest simply because an officer is armed[;] ... it is often necessary for the police to approach a person with a drawn weapon in a suspiciously dangerous situation in order to protect the physical well-being of both police officers and the public.’ (Punctuation and citation omitted.) State v. Burks, 240 Ga.App. 425, 426-427(1) (523 S.E.2d 648) (1999).” Satterfield v. State, 289 Ga.App. 886, 658 S.E.2d 379 (February 13, 2008). Evidence supported trial court’s finding that