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A Florida trial court no more has the assistance of a jury’s findings of fact with respect to sentencing issues than does a trial judge in Arizona.’ Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990); accord, State v. Steele, 921 So.2d 538, 546 (Fla., 2005) (‘[T]he trial court alone must make detailed findings about the existence and weight of aggravating circumstances; it has no jury findings on which to rely’). As with Timothy Ring, the maximum punishment Timothy Hurst could have received without any judge-made findings was life in prison without parole. As with Ring, a judge increased Hurst’s authorized punishment based on her own factfinding. In light of Ring, we hold that Hurst’s sentence violates the Sixth Amendment.” Breyer concurs in judgment only, would hold that the Eighth Amendment requires that a death penalty must be imposed by a jury, not a judge. Alito dissents, would reconsider Ring and its progeny. Babbage v. State, 296 Ga. 364, 768 S.E.2d 461 (January 20, 2015). Malice murder, armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; sentence of life without parole didn’t require special finding by jury. “Because life without parole falls within the statutory range, Apprendi simply does not apply to this sentencing scheme. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require jury determination as to facts that ‘increase [ ] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum’ or ‘increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed’).” Alleyne v. United States, 11-9335, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (June 17, 2013). Reversing Fourth Circuit, and Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002); defendant’s sentence for firearm offense violated Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Defendant was charged and convicted at jury trial under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) for using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, which carries a minimium five- year sentence. At sentencing, however, trial court found by preponderance of evidence that defendant brandished the gun during the crime, and thus applied the minimum seven-year sentence for brandishing required under subsection 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). 1. Held, defendant correctly argues that “brandishing” under the statute is an element of an aggravated offense, not just a sentencing factor. “Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. See id., at 483, n. 10, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime. It follows, then, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury. Accordingly, Harris is overruled.” Based on Apprendi (June 26, 2000), below. “The touchstone for determining whether a fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is whether the fact constitutes an ‘element’ or ‘ingredient’ of the charged offense. United States v. O'Brien, 560 U.S. 218 (II), 130 S.Ct. 2169, 176 L.Ed.2d 979 (2010); Apprendi, supra, at 483, n. 10, 120 S.Ct. 2348; J. Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases 52 (5 th Am. ed. 1846) (hereinafter Archbold). In Apprendi, we held that a fact is by definition an element of the offense and must be submitted to the jury if it increases the punishment above what is otherwise legally prescribed. 530 U.S., at 483, n. 10, 120 S.Ct. 2348. While Harris declined to extend this principle to facts increasing mandatory minimum sentences, Apprendi 's definition of ‘elements’ necessarily includes not only facts that increase the ceiling, but also those that increase the floor. Both kinds of facts alter the prescribed range of sentences to which a defendant is exposed and do so in a manner that aggravates the punishment. 530 U.S., at 483, n. 10, 120 S.Ct. 2348; Harris, supra, at 579, 122 S.Ct. 2406 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Facts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence are therefore elements and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” 2. Acknowledges the exception for prior convictions recognized in Almendarez–Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998).” 3. Distinguishes “factfinding used to guide judicial discretion in selecting a punishment ‘within limits fixed by law.’ Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949). While such findings of fact may lead judges to select sentences that are more severe than the ones they would have selected without those facts, the Sixth Amendment does not govern that element of sentencing. Infra, at 2162 – 2164, and n. 6.” 4. Fact that trial judge could have imposed the same sentence without finding the aggravated factor is “beside the point.” “[B]ecause the fact of brandishing aggravates the legally prescribed range of allowable sentences, it constitutes an element of a separate, aggravated offense that must be found by the jury, regardless of what sentence the defendant might have received if a different range had been applicable.” “Our ruling today does not mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion must be found by a jury. We have long recognized that broad sentencing discretion, informed by judicial factfinding, does not violate the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2692, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) (‘[W]ithin established limits[,] ... the exercise of [sentencing] discretion does not contravene the Sixth Amendment even if it is informed by judge-found facts’ (emphasis deleted and internal quotation marks omitted)); Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 481, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (‘[N]othing in this history suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion—taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender—in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute’).” Breyer concurs in most of the majority opinion, thinks Apprendi was wrong, but since it’s not going away, thinks Harris is inconsistent with Apprendi and therefore should be overruled. Sotomayor concurs, while Alito dissents; they have an interesting argument about stare