☢ test - Í

decisis as it applies here. Roberts dissents, writing for Scalia and Kennedy; thinks Harris was right. Southern Union Co. v. United States, 11-94, ___ U.S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 2344, 183 L.Ed.2d 318 (June 21, 2012). Reversing First Circuit; Apprendi applies to the imposition of criminal fines. Defendant corporation was convicted at jury trial of improperly storing hazardous materials (liquid mercury) without a permit, a federal offense punishable by fines up to $50,000 per day of violation. The indictment alleged that the offense occurred on dates over a two-year span, but the jury made no specific finding of the period during which the violation continued. The trial court assessed a $6 million fine, plus $12 million “community service obligation.” Defendant correctly notes that “the only violation the jury necessarily found was for one day;” the trial court’s finding that the violation stretched over 762 thus violates Apprendi because it relies on a fact not found beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury. “[W]e see no principled basis under Apprendi for treating criminal fines differently. Apprendi 's ‘core concern’ is to reserve to the jury ‘the determination of facts that warrant punishment for a specific statutory offense.’ [ Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 170, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (2009)]. That concern applies whether the sentence is a criminal fine or imprisonment or death. … [T]he amount of a fine, like the maximum term of imprisonment or eligibility for the death penalty, is often calculated by reference to particular facts. Sometimes, as here, the fact is the duration of a statutory violation; [fn] under other statutes it is the amount of the defendant's gain or the victim's loss, or some other factor.[fn] In all such cases, requiring juries to find beyond a reasonable doubt facts that determine the fine's maximum amount is necessary to implement Apprendi 's ‘animating principle’: the ‘preservation of the jury's historic role as a bulwark between the State and the accused at the trial for an alleged offense.’ Ice, 555 U.S., at 168, 129 S.Ct. 711. In stating Apprendi 's rule, we have never distinguished one form of punishment from another. Instead, our decisions broadly prohibit judicial factfinding that increases maximum criminal ‘sentence[s],’ ‘penalties,’ or ‘punishment[s]’—terms that each undeniably embrace fines. [Cits.]” Apprendi wouldn’t apply to any fine small enough to constitute a petty offense, and thus not implicate the right to jury trial, but it would apply to any fine substantial enough to invoke that right. Breyer, writing for Kennedy and Alito, dissents, finds the Court’s analysis “ahistorical.” Rooney v. State, 287 Ga. 1, 690 S.E.2d 804 (March 1, 2010). OCGA § 17-10-10, authorizing consecutive sentences for separate offenses, does not violate Apprendi . “Citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435) (2000) and its progeny, Rooney urges that OCGA § 17-10-10(a) violates the Sixth Amendment requirement that any fact exposing a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury and not by a judge. ‘These decisions do not, however, speak to a trial court's authority to cumulate sentences when that authority is provided by statute and is not based upon discrete fact-finding, but is wholly discretionary.’ Barrow v. State, [207 S.W.3d 377, 379 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006)]. Apprendi does not apply here because ‘[t]he imposition of consecutive sentences did not depend on the finding of a statutorily prescribed fact. [Cit.]’ State v. Jacobs, [644 N.W.2d 695, 699(IV) (Iowa 2001)]. Moreover, even if OCGA § 17-10-10(a) did require such factfinding, the Sixth Amendment would not ‘mandate jury determination of any fact declared necessary to the imposition of consecutive, in lieu of concurrent, sentences[.]’ Oregon v. Ice, [555 U.S. 160, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (January 14, 2009)].” Hernandez v. State, 300 Ga.App. 792, 686 S.E.2d 373 (November 5, 2009). Trial court properly sentenced defendant for felony sexual battery based on five-year old victim’s age; defendant’s Apprendi argument fails. “‘[W]hen a defendant claims that the jury did not consider an essential element of the crime, a reviewing court may find the error harmless where it concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence. ’ (Footnotes and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Kolar v. State, 292 Ga.App. 623, 630(2) (665 S.E.2d 719) (2008). Here, Hernandez did not contest the age of the victim at trial. There was unchallenged evidence from the victim's mother as to the date of the offense, the victim's age, and the victim's birth date. Further, the jury was allowed to view a videotaped interview of the victim made after the offense. Therefore, because the victim's age was uncontested and overwhelming evidence demonstrated that the victim was under the age of 16, any error was harmless.” Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (January 14, 2009). Reversing Oregon Supreme Court, 5-4 majority finds no application of Apprendi where state law requires trial court to make specific findings of fact before sentencing to consecutive (rather than concurrent) terms. “[T]win considerations – historical practice and respect for state sovereignty – counsel against extending Apprendi 's rule to the imposition of sentences for discrete crimes. The decision to impose sentences consecutively is not within the jury function that ‘extends down centuries into the common law.’ Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 477, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Instead, specification of the regime for administering multiple sentences has long been considered the prerogative of state legislatures. The historical record demonstrates that the jury played no role in the decision to impose sentences consecutively or concurrently. Rather, the choice rested exclusively with the judge.” “There is no encroachment here by the judge upon facts historically found by the jury, nor