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273 Ga. 14 (537 S.E.2d 663) (2000) (conviction not final where defendant given first offender status, not revoked); Redden v. State , 294 Ga.App. 879, 670 S.E.2d 552 (November 26, 2008) (prior convictions were admissible in aggravation of sentence where notice of intent to use them was given to defense counsel, even though the notice was not filed with the trial court). 3. PRIOR CONVICTIONS – EVIDENCE/PROOF Grimes v. State, 293 Ga. 559, 748 S.E.2d 441 (September 9, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; for purposes of recidivist sentencing under OCGA § 17-10-7(a), absent objection from defendant, prosecutor’s statements can establish prior convictions. Moret v. State, 246 Ga. 5, 5–6(3) (268 S.E.2d 635) (1980). Brinkley v. State, 301 Ga.App. 827, 689 S.E.2d 116 (December 31, 2009). Trial court erred in considering secondary evidence of defendant’s prior conviction in aggravation of sentence, absent showing of unavailability of certified copy of original under best evidence rule. State here sought to prove defendant’s prior guilty plea to second degree murder in Maryland through the testimony of the ADA who handled the prosecution and through “three exhibits allegedly relating to the Maryland case: an uncertified copy of the indictment; a document entitled ‘State's Version of Offense that had been prepared by the Maryland district attorney's office ‘primarily for parole purposes so that ... the parole authority would have information concerning the offense rather than just the title of the offense’; and a computer print-out of the purported case procedural history.” The Georgia prosecutor explained that no certified copy of the Maryland conviction was available because “the actual records were destroyed by a private records retention company;” but no evidence was presented to substantiate that contention. “[T]he state can introduce secondary documentary evidence or parol testimony to prove the prior conviction, if the state shows that the original record of the conviction was lost, destroyed, or inaccessible and cannot be produced despite the state's exercise of due diligence. See, e. g., Lumley v. State, 280 Ga.App. 82, 82-83 (633 S.E.2d 413) (2006); Summerour v. State, 211 Ga.App. 65, 66(1) (438 S.E.2d 176) (1993). See also OCGA §§ 24-5-2 (‘In order to admit secondary evidence, it shall appear that the primary evidence for some sufficient cause is not accessible to the diligence of the party.’); 24-5-4(a) (‘The best evidence which exists of a writing sought to be proved shall be produced, unless its absence shall be satisfactorily accounted for.’).” Here, however, “the state failed to present any competent evidence that the original record of the prior conviction had been destroyed and that a certified copy of it could not be obtained despite the due diligence of the state. Compare Roberts v. State, 282 Ga. 548, 553(11) (651 S.E.2d 689) (2007); Summerour, 211 Ga.App. at 66(1). The trial court therefore erred in ruling that the state could use secondary documentary evidence to prove the prior conviction in lieu of a certified copy of the original record.” Accord, Tanksley v. State , 323 Ga.App. 299, 743 S.E.2d 585 (May 29, 2013) (recidivist sentence vacated and remanded where prior convictions never tendered). Wells v. State, 313 Ga.App. 528, 722 S.E.2d 133 (January 12, 2012). False name and controlled substance convictions affirmed; evidence supported recidivist sentencing though State failed to “introduce copies of the prior convictions into evidence during the trial or at the sentencing hearing.” Copies were attached, however to the State’s pre-trial notice of intent to seek recidivist sentencing, and defendant raised no objection to the trial court’s consideration of the documents at sentencing. “‘No requirement exists under Georgia law which would limit the state to a single means of proving prior convictions of a criminal defendant in order to have the recidivism statute applied to the sentencing of the defendant.’ State v. Cain, 253 Ga.App. 100, 101 (558 S.E.2d 75) (2001) (citation and punctuation omitted) (recidivist treatment authorized where state served defendant with list of evidence in aggravation, even though copies of prior convictions were not introduced). Concerning the conduct of a pre-sentence hearing in felony cases, OCGA § 17–10– 2(a)(1) pertinently provides that ‘the judge shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or nolo contendere of the accused, or the absence of any prior conviction and pleas.’ We have held that when no objection to the form of the evidence of the prior conviction was made at the pre-sentence hearing, the issue was not preserved for review on appeal. Id.; Walker v. State, 204 Ga.App. 269 (419 S.E.2d 542) (1992) (defendant properly sentenced as a recidivist where at pre-sentence hearing the prosecution stated that the defendant had previously been convicted of burglary but did not tender a certified copy of the prior conviction, and defendant failed to object).” Citing “ Thompson v. State, 266 Ga.App. 29, 33–34(3) (596 S.E.2d 205) (2004) (defendant was properly sentenced under the recidivist statute, even though a certified copy of the prior conviction was not entered into evidence); compare State v. Slaton, 294 Ga.App. 507 (669 S.E.2d 481) (2008) (trial court's refusal to sentence defendant as a recidivist affirmed where the state claimed during the hearing that it had certified copies of prior convictions, but failed to tender them, and they were not contained in the appellate record).” Thomas v. State, 310 Ga.App. 404, 714 S.E.2d 37 (July 1, 2011). Physical precedent only; sentence for aggravated assault and related offenses vacated where trial court improperly relied on prosecutor’s hearsay statements alleging recidivist