☢ test - Í

status without competent evidence of prior convictions. 1. Proof of prior convictions . “‘The burden is on the state to produce competent evidence of a prior conviction for purposes of sentencing.’ Brinkley v. State, 301 Ga.App. 827, 830(2), 689 S.E.2d 116 (2009). Although the State is not necessarily confined to proving the prior conviction by introduction of a certified copy of the prior conviction, id., it is also true that ‘a trial court cannot rely upon the hearsay statement of a prosecutor to establish a fact for purposes of sentencing.’ Id. at 831, 689 S.E.2d 116. And, we have previously held that ‘the prosecutor's statement concerning a prior conviction was not admissible to prove the prior conviction.’ Ramsey v. State, 218 Ga.App. 692, 693(4), 462 S.E.2d 806 (1995).” 2. Trial court’s reliance. “Moreover, although the fact that Thomas was sentenced as a recidivist does not appear on the face of the sentencing sheet, the trial judge did indicate that he was following the State's recommendation in sentencing Thomas, and that recommendation included that Thomas be sentenced as a recidivist. Id. (trial court's comments show that prosecutor's comments on prior conviction were considered in arriving at defendant's sentence). Thus, the sentence must be vacated, and the case remanded for re-sentencing. We note, however, that the State is not prohibited on double jeopardy grounds from introducing competent evidence of the prior convictions on remand. Brinkley, 301 Ga.App. at 831(2), 689 S.E.2d 116.” Sheppard v. State, 300 Ga.App. 631, 686 S.E.2d 295 (October 27, 2009). No error in sentencing defendant as recidivist; State met its burden of proving that prior conviction was defendant’s by tendering certified copy bearing defendant’s name, though defendant denied any knowledge of the offense. Defendant admitted knowing the victim therein and admitted having been represented by defense counsel therein. “See Mincey v. State, 186 Ga.App. 839, 841(4) (368 S.E.2d 796) (1988) (‘“[c]oncordance of name alone is some evidence of identity”’).” Johnson v. State, 298 Ga.App. 639, 680 S.E.2d 675 (July 1, 2009). Trial court properly considered prior conviction for recidivist sentencing purposes although sentence on prior was suspended some time after entry. “Johnson concedes that he was sentenced to ten years confinement for the Alabama conviction, and we find nothing under OCGA § 17-10-7 that requires a defendant so sentenced to actually serve any part of that sentence.” Thomas v. State, 291 Ga.App. 795, 662 S.E.2d 849 (June 4, 2008). Trial court properly sentenced defendant as a recidivist, using two guilty pleas to cocaine possession entered the same day on two separate accusations, not consolidated for trial. Prosector’s representation at time of pleas “that those pleas would only count as one offense for purposes of recidivism … is unavailing. It is the law as provided in the applicable statutes rather than local practices that governs.” Duncan v. State, 281 Ga.App. 270, 635 S.E.2d 875 (August 24, 2006). As clearly stated in Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the State is not required to prove prior convictions used in aggravation of sentence to a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt. Accord, Brown v. State , 284 Ga. 727, 670 S.E.2d 400 (November 3, 2008). Gore v. State, 277 Ga.App. 635, 627 S.E.2d 198 (February 15, 2006). Defendant’s signature on prior conviction not required for admissibility during sentencing : “To the contrary, Morrison v. State, 272 Ga.App. 34, 44, fn. 25 (611 S.E.2d 720) (2005) [ affirmed on different issue, 280 Ga. 222, 626 S.E.2d 500 (February 13, 2006); overruled on different issue, State v. Slaughter , 289 Ga. 344, 711 S.E.2d 651 (June 13, 2011)], citing Ingram v. State, 240 Ga.App. 172, 173(2) (523 S.E.2d 31) (1999), noted that a ‘certified copy of sentence showing that defendant pled guilty and was represented by counsel was sufficient to support conviction.’” Accord, Rucker v. State , 304 Ga.App. 184, 695 S.E.2d 711 (May 25, 2010). Arnold v. State, 276 Ga.App. 680, 624 S.E.2d 258 (December 6, 2005). “State and federal constitutional principles do not demand that prior felony convictions be set forth in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury in order to be used as a sentencing enhancement.” Citing Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington , and others. Elliot v. State, 274 Ga.App. 73, 616 S.E.2d 844 (June 28, 2005). Trial court erred in sentencing, taking into consideration an uncertified out-of-state conviction and another out-of-state felony conviction that might have been a misdemeanor under Georgia law, thus not qualifying as a prior felony in Georgia for purposes of the recidivist statute. 4. PRIOR CONVICTIONS – NATURE OF OFFENSE/PROOF OF FELONY Davis v. State, 319 Ga.App. 501, 736 S.E.2d 160 (December 14, 2012). In prosecution for theft by taking and financial identity fraud, sentence vacated and remanded; trial court erred in considering federal conviction for mail theft as a felony for recidivist sentencing purposes. “Although Davis's probation officer testified from her recollection of reading a federal pre-sentencing report that the federal charge involved actions apparently similar to those in this case (i.e., that Davis had