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used credit cards and identifying information from the mail to purchase items), this evidence was double hearsay and thus was not probative to establish the fact as to how these losses arose, even in the absence of an objection by Davis.” “The recidivist statute ‘imposes maximum sentences for any person convicted of a felony who was previously convicted under the laws of any other state [or of the United States] of a crime which if committed within this state would be a felony.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Woodson v. State, 242 Ga.App. 67, 70(4) (530 S.E.2d 2) (2000).” Sentence – ten years to serve on each of fifteen counts, consecutive, without parole – vacated and remanded for re-sentencing. McFadden concurs, suggesting the sentence is so disproportionate as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Elliot v. State, 274 Ga.App. 73, 616 S.E.2d 844 (June 28, 2005). Trial court erred in sentencing, taking into consideration an uncertified out-of-state conviction and another out-of-state felony conviction that might have been a misdemeanor under Georgia law, thus not qualifying as a prior felony in Georgia for purposes of the recidivist statute. Woodson v. State, 242 Ga.App. 67, 530 S.E.2d 2 (January 25, 2000). Burglary, aggravated assault, and related convictions affirmed, but recidivist sentences vacated and remanded. “Woodson urges that [OCGA § 17-10-7(c)] required the trial court to determine whether the underlying facts and circumstances of the Alabama convictions would have constituted felonies in the State of Georgia. We agree. … The State bears the burden of showing that the foreign convictions were ‘for conduct which would be considered felonious under the laws of this state....’ Wallace v. State, 175 Ga.App. 685, 687(6), 333 S.E.2d 874 (1985).” Accord, Davis v. State , 319 Ga.App. 501, 736 S.E.2d 160 (December 14, 2012) (federal conviction for mail theft not shown to be for conduct deemed felonious under Georgia law). 5. PRIOR CONVICTIONS – NOLO PLEAS McIntosh v. State, 287 Ga.App. 293, 651 S.E.2d 207 (August 17, 2007). “[T]he trial court may consider a plea of nolo contendere in aggravation of punishment. OCGA § 17-10-2(a)(1). See Blackmon v. State, 266 Ga.App. 877, 878, 598 S.E.2d 542 (2004); Sailor v. State, 265 Ga.App. 645, 650(4), 595 S.E.2d 335 (2004) (‘There is no dispute that the trial judge is permitted to consider nolo contender[e] pleas of a defendant as evidence in aggravation of punishment’) (footnote omitted). But see Gilbert v. State, 245 Ga.App. 544, 545(2), 538 S.E.2d 104 (2000) (OCGA § 17-10-2 does not apply to sentencing following a guilty plea).” 6. PRIOR CONVICTIONS – NOTICE/PLEADING Williams v. State, 326 Ga.App. 784, 757 S.E.2d 448 (April 2, 2014). Trial court properly denied motion to withdraw defendant’s guilty pleas to burglary; no ineffective assistance in failing to challenge State’s notice of recidivist sentencing. “As Williams contends, the record shows that the State's notice itself did not identify any previous convictions by indictment or case number, by date, by offense, or otherwise. Instead, the notice stated that ‘[e]vidence of Defendant's felony convictions are provided in Defendant's GCIC [Georgia Crime Information Center] criminal history in the State's discovery and will be provided, if necessary, in certified form at sentencing.’ Announcing that the State intends to use as aggravation evidence in sentencing convictions listed in an attached GCIC report can satisfy the prior notice requirement. Parks v. State, 294 Ga.App. 646, 652(11), 669 S.E.2d 684 (2008).” Accord, Barstad v. State , 329 Ga.App. 214, 764 S.E.2d 453 (October 3, 2014). Kiser v. State, 327 Ga.App. 17, 755 S.E.2d 505 (March 7, 2014). Evidence supported conviction for false imprisonment, but not the related theft by taking charge; sentence vacated and remanded for trial court’s potential consideration of defendant’s criminal history. Trial court “ruled that it would ‘not take into consideration the criminal history of the defendants in this sentencing proceeding,’” but later reversed this ruling based on Kiser’s wife’s plea for leniency. Trial court improperly considered this plea as good character evidence. However, trial court failed to consider its options based on the State’s discovery violation. “OCGA § 17–10–2(a)(1) provides that in a presentence hearing, ‘the judge shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or nolo contendere of the accused, or the absence of any prior conviction and pleas.’ While this Code section once provided that the State must give notice of its intent before using a prior conviction in aggravation of sentencing, ‘the notice requirement was deleted from the statute effective July 1, 2005.’ McIntosh v. State, 287 Ga.App. 293, 295–296, 651 S.E.2d 207 (2007). Under the current statutory scheme, the State is not required to provide notice of its intent to use a prior conviction in aggravation of sentencing under OCGA § 17–16–4(a)(5) unless written notice of a defendant’s election to participate in reciprocal discovery under OCGA § 17–16–2(a) is provided to the State. See Miller v. State, 235 Ga.App. 724, 725, 510 S.E.2d 560 (1998).” One of Kiser’s co-defendants did opt in to reciprocal discovery, so State’s failure to give notice was a discovery violation; but this does not demand that the histories always be ruled out, as the trial court apparently believed. “OCGA § 17–16–6 outlines the possible consequences resulting from the State's failure to comply with the discovery provisions of OCGA §