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17–16–1 et seq. ‘If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that the state has failed to comply with the requirements of this article, the court may order the state to permit the discovery or inspection, interview of the witness, grant a continuance, or, upon a showing of prejudice and bad faith, prohibit the state from introducing the evidence not disclosed or presenting the witness not disclosed, or may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.’ OCGA § 17–16–6. ‘[T]o obtain the exclusion of evidence for the State's alleged discovery violation, [a defendant] must show both prejudice and bad faith.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Falay v. State, 320 Ga.App. 781, 785(2), 740 S.E.2d 738 (2013).” Vacated and remanded for the trial court to consider its options under OCGA § 17-16-6. Thompson v. State, 294 Ga.App. 768, 670 S.E.2d 226 (November 21, 2008). Recidivist sentence was proper despite “imperfect” notice of prior offense: “the indictment number of the prior conviction recited in the current recidivist count and notice was his co-defendant's, not his. But … the transcript of the sentencing hearing shows that Thompson neither objected to the trial court considering this prior conviction, nor contended that he was surprised or confused by the error on the notice. Under these circumstances, Thompson waived any objection he might have had to the trial court considering these convictions in aggravation of his punishment. Armstrong v. State, 264 Ga. 237, 239(3) (442 S.E.2d 759) (1994); Turner v. State, 259 Ga.App. 902, 903(1) (578 S.E.2d 570) (2003).” McClam v. State, 291 Ga.App. 697, 662 S.E.2d 790 (May 29, 2008). Notice of intent to use prior convictions in aggravation of sentence was sufficient where provided in writing five days before trial and “discussed … in detail during two separate pre-trial hearings held more than 60 days before trial.” Evans v. State, 290 Ga.App. 746, 660 S.E.2d 841 (April 3, 2008). State’s pre-trial notice of intent to present prior convictions in aggravation of sentence was adequate, where it attached GCIC report. “‘The important requirement is that the defendant be given an unmistakable advance warning that the prior convictions will be used against him at sentencing so that he will have enough time to rebut or explain any conviction record.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Ogle v. State, 256 Ga.App. 26, 28(3) (567 S.E.2d 700) (2002). See Cabell [ v. State , 250 Ga.App. 530, 531 (551 S.E.2d 386) (2001)] (notice is sufficient where the defense counsel was aware of the defendant’s prior convictions and was aware that the State intended to use those convictions in aggravation of punishment); Rielli v. State, 174 Ga.App. 220, 223(5) (330 S.E.2d 104) (1985) (‘the furnishing of defense counsel with a list of convictions upon which the State expects to rely is sufficient’). Accordingly, even plea negotiations, which identify the prior convictions as a basis for the State’s seeking enhanced punishment, suffice as notice. Ogle, supra, 256 Ga.App. at 28(3); Cabell, supra, 250 Ga.App. at 531.” Accord, McClam (May 29, 2008), above (discussions at pre-trial hearing which specified prior convictions were sufficient though convictions not specifically set forth in State’s written notice); Thomas v. State , 324 Ga.App. 898, 752 S.E.2d 67 (November 20, 2013) (written notice before first trial, plus oral notice before second trial, was sufficient, citing Evans ); Barstad v. State , 329 Ga.App. 214, 764 S.E.2d 453 (October 3, 2014) (Since State “informed Barstad that all of his convictions could be used for [recidivist sentencing],” State’s proof was not “strictly limited to those convictions it listed in its specific intent notice.”). Horne v. State, 286 Ga.App. 712, 649 S.E.2d 889 (July 20, 2007). “Horne argues that the trial court considered improper evidence in aggravation of punishment during the sentencing phase of the trial. Specifically, Horne claims that the court considered evidence from Horne’s GCIC record (read to the trial court by the State), which included an erroneous statement (corrected by Horne’s attorney) that Horne had a felony probation violation open on the record. Horne complains that he received no pre-trial notice of this evidence and that only certified copies of the convictions should have been admitted. Horne, however, failed to object to the admission of this evidence when it was presented by the State; this silence waived the issue. See Armstrong v. State, 264 Ga. 237, 239(3) (442 S.E.2d 759) (1994); Swain v. State, 268 Ga.App. 135, 138(2) (601 S.E.2d 491) (2004). Moreover, even if Horne had preserved the issue for review, the statute he cites for requiring a pre-trial notice of such evidence (former OCGA § 17-10-2(a)) applies to felonies only, not to misdemeanors as we have before us here. See Mattarochia v. State, 200 Ga.App. 681, 685(6) (409 S.E.2d 546) (1991). Even more significant is that the statute was amended (effective July 1, 2005) to eliminate the requirement that the State notify the defendant of aggravating evidence prior to trial. Ga. L.2005, p. 20, § 11 .” Blevins v. State, 283 Ga.App. 694, 642 S.E.2d 383 (February 22, 2007). Service of notice of prior convictions to be used in aggravation of sentence was proper when made on defense counsel, notwithstanding language of OCGA § 17-10-2(a) stating that “only such evidence in aggravation as the state has made known to the defendant prior to the defendant’s trial shall be admissible.” “Pursuant to OCGA § 17-1-1(b)(1), ‘[w]here service is required to be made, the service shall be made upon the party’s attorney unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court.’ (Emphasis supplied.) This