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holds true for notice of the State’s intent to use prior convictions in aggravation of sentencing. See Cabell v. State, 250 Ga.App. 530, 531 (551 S.E.2d 386) (2001).” Maddox v. State, 278 Ga.App. 191, 628 S.E.2d 625 (March 13, 2006). “Clear notice” of intent to introduce prior convictions in aggravation of sentence, as required by OCGA § 17-10-2, need not be in writing . “In this case, defense counsel acknowledged that she received oral notice months before trial and that she reviewed the convictions As a result, the trial court did not err by sentencing Maddox as a recidivist. See Mullinax v. State, 242 Ga.App. 561, 563(2) (530 S.E.2d 255) (2000) (defense counsel conceded during sentencing that State provided oral notice).” Arnold v. State, 276 Ga.App. 680, 624 S.E.2d 258 (December 6, 2005). “State and federal constitutional principles do not demand that prior felony convictions be set forth in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury in order to be used as a sentencing enhancement.” Citing Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington , and others. Wright v. State, 271 Ga.App. 157, 609 S.E.2d 114 (December 27, 2004). OCGA § 17-10-2(a), requiring pre-trial notice of prior convictions the State intends to introduce in aggravation of sentence, does not apply to sentences entered pursuant to guilty pleas. Pate v. State, 269 Ga.App. 684, 605 S.E.2d 90 (September 22, 2004). “OCGA § 17-10-2(a) provides that in pre- sentencing hearings, ‘the judge shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or nolo contendere of the defendant, or the absence of any prior conviction and pleas, provided that only such evidence in aggravation as the state has made known to the defendant prior to the defendant’s trial shall be admissible.’ Therefore, the state must give a defendant affirmative notice that his prior felony offenses will be used against him for recidivist purposes during sentencing. [Cit.] ‘The absence of proof of [such] affirmative notice ... is a defect fatal to maximum felony sentencing.’ (Citations omitted.) Ross v. State, 210 Ga.App. 455, 459(4), 436 S.E.2d 496 (1993). Here, the state failed to give notice of the armed robbery conviction until after the verdict was rendered, and the armed robbery conviction was the basis for the sentence of life without parole on the aggravated sexual battery convictions. Accordingly, we vacate Pate’s sentence on the aggravated sexual battery convictions and remand the case for proceedings not inconsistent with OCGA § § 17-10-7(c) and 17-10- 2(a).” Copeland v. State, 269 Ga.App. 424, 604 S.E.2d 223 (August 17, 2004). Notice of intent to use prior convictions to aggravate sentence, given on day trial commences, is adequate. Based on Corbett v. State , 233 Ga. 756, 213 S.E.2d 652 (1975). Miller v. State , 243 Ga.App. 764, 533 S.E.2d 787 (April 14, 2000). Convictions for habitual violator and related offenses affirmed. “Miller claims that the court erred in considering evidence presented by the state in aggravation of punishment that was not made known to him prior to trial. The claim is without merit because the state is not required to give pretrial notice of evidence in aggravation of punishment in misdemeanor cases such as this. See Williams v. State, 221 Ga.App. 291, 295(3), 470 S.E.2d 922 (1996) (physical precedent only).” Beecher v. State, 240 Ga.App. 457, 523 S.E.2d 54 (September 29, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for arson affirmed, but sentence vacated where State gave notice of prior convictions to be used in aggravation of sentence before first trial, which ended in mistrial, but not before re-trial. “A notice that previous convictions will be introduced at trial ‘given prior to a former trial would not be clear notice that the sentences would be introduced at a subsequent de novo trial.’ Hewell v. State, 238 Ga. 578, 580(2), 234 S.E.2d 497 (1977). See also Cline v. State, 178 Ga.App. 470, 473-474(3), 343 S.E.2d 506 (1986). Consequently, the judgment as to sentence must be vacated and this case remanded for resentencing.” Anthony v. State, 236 Ga.App. 257, 511 S.E.2d 612 (February 5, 1999). “‘Receipt by [defendant’s] counsel, prior to jury selection, of notice of the State’s intent to use the prior conviction[s] in aggravation of any sentences imposed in this case was timely notice pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-2’ (Punctuation omitted.) Godfrey v. State, 227 Ga.App. 576, 577(1), 489 S.E.2d 364 (1997).” 7. PRIOR CONVICTIONS – PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY See subheading PRIOR

CONVICTIONS – RIGHT TO COUNSEL/WAIVER, below 8. PRIOR CONVICTIONS – RIGHT TO COUNSEL/WAIVER