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performing sex acts either alone or with his wife. At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that her decision not to object to the admission of these materials was strategic in nature. She explained that the evidence included ‘some information that we needed in our case in chief . ... And I felt like it [this evidence] spoke directly to our defense, which was that he was a swinger ... .’ Additionally, the trial transcript shows that trial counsel made use of this evidence to show that while Castaneira was a sexually active adult, there was no evidence that he was a pedophile. Trial counsel emphasized, both in her examination of witnesses and in her opening and closing arguments, that none of the pornographic images found on Castaneira's computer contained pictures of children or adolescents.” Defendant failed to show that counsel’s strategy was “‘so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen it.’ (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Mantooth v. State , 303 Ga. App. 330, 336 (1) (b) (693 S.E.2d 587) (2010).” Williams v. State, 319 Ga.App. 888, 739 S.E.2d 4 (February 25, 2013). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; counsel not ineffective in failing to object to recording of polygraph examination, including examiner’s assertions that defendant wasn’t being truthful. “After Hagan administered the tests, he informed Williams that the results showed that he was deceptive. Hagan then repeatedly accused Williams of lying, stating that the victim was telling the truth and that Hagan knew that Williams had touched her. Williams countered each of Hagan's accusations with consistent denials that he had touched the girl inappropriately.” Because defendant didn’t call trial counsel to testify on motion for new trial, his decisions were presumed strategic. “Although we have no testimony, the record reflects that Williams' trial counsel cross-examined Hagan about the extent and purpose of his questions before and after the test. He also relied on Hagan's behavior on the videotape in closing argument to suggest that Hagan engaged in ‘a back and forth argument’ with Williams before the test to get him upset and thus affect his performance. He also cited to Hagan's continuing argument with Williams after the test to underscore that Williams was consistent in saying that he was telling the truth. Although other attorneys may not have used this evidence in quite the same way, Williams failed to carry his burden of overcoming the presumption that the failure to object was reasonable trial strategy by his trial counsel.” Accord, Hyman v. State , 320 Ga.App. 106, 739 S.E.2d 395 (March 5, 2013) (decision to cross-examine rather than object not ineffective assistance); Hall v. State , 292 Ga. 701, 743 S.E.2d 6 (March 25, 2013); Payne v. State , 329 Ga.App. 625, 765 S.E.2d 770 (November 14, 2014) (decision to cross-examine rather than object not ineffective). Young v. State, 292 Ga. 443, 738 S.E.2d 575 (February 18, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure to make hearsay objection when another witness read letter from jailhouse informant. “Young's trial lawyer said that he knew that the jailhouse informant was going to testify at trial, and he wanted to have the contents of the letter introduced early so that he would ‘have a chance to defuse [the informant's claims] on more than one occasion....’ Consistent with this approach, Young's lawyer later cross-examined the jailhouse informant about his motivations in providing information on confessions he had allegedly heard and his ability ‘to get a lot of confessions out of people while [he was] in the jail.’ This was a reasonable trial strategy, and the lawyer was not deficient for pursuing it. See Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 57, 62(4)(a) (673 S.E.2d 249) (2009).” Ellis v. State, 292 Ga. 276, 736 S.E.2d 412 (January 7, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure to object “when the prosecuting attorney referred in the presence of the jury to his pretrial motion to suppress his alleged inculpatory statements. … A reasonable lawyer might have concluded that an objection would be unlikely to succeed and would only serve to draw attention to the reference to the motion to suppress.” Defendant here contends that jury might infer that the trial court had found defendant’s statement to be voluntary. Distinguishing Chumley v. State, 282 Ga. 855, 857–858(2) (655 S.E.2d 813) (2008) (trial court told jury that defendant’s statement was voluntary). “In this case, the trial court made no expression of such an opinion, and the prosecutor did not refer to either the fact or substance of the ruling of the court on the motion to suppress.” Mickens v. State, 318 Ga.App. 601, 734 S.E.2d 438 (November 16, 2012). Aggravated assault and rape convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to object to juror’s questions to witness. “The juror's questions were essentially cumulative of prior testimony, and not wanting to object to a juror's questions is a reasonable trial strategy in light of the trial court's intervention and the risk that objecting would put counsel in a role adverse to the juror.” Pate v. State, 318 Ga.App. 526, 734 S.E.2d 255 (November 15, 2012). Conviction for selling cocaine affirmed. No ineffective assistance in counsel’s failure to raise Confrontation Clause objections to forensic testimony prior to Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming . “We need not decide the Confrontation Clause issue based on the facts presented, but we note that ‘in making litigation decisions, there is no general duty on the part of defense counsel to anticipate changes in the law, and that only in a rare case would it be ineffective assistance by a trial attorney not to make an objection that would be overruled under prevailing law.’ (Footnotes and punctuation omitted.) Rickman v. State, 277