☢ test - Í

Ga. 277, 279–280(2) (587 S.E.2d 596) (2003).” Accord, Deleon-Alvarez v. State , 324 Ga.App. 694, 751 S.E.2d 497 (November 14, 2013); Maldonado v. State , 325 Ga.App. 41, 752 S.E.2d 112 (November 20, 2013); Perera v. State , 295 Ga. 880, 763 S.E.2d 687 (September 22, 2014); Summerville v. State , 332 Ga.App. 617, 774 S.E.2d 190 (June 26, 2015). Hargrove v. State, 291 Ga. 879, 734 S.E.2d 34 (November 5, 2012). Malice murder conviction affirmed; 1. no ineffective assistance in strategic decision not to object to references to defendant’s involvement with drugs. “Trial counsels' decision not to object to the admission of this testimony in order to use the drug culture surrounding this case to appellant's advantage was clearly strategic. See Welbon v. State, 278 Ga. 312, 313, 602 S.E.2d 610 (2004); Rayshad v. State, 295 Ga.App. 29, 36, 670 S.E.2d 849 (2008).” 2. No ineffective assistance in failing to object to use of defendant’s un Mirandized custodial statement , as “record reflects that trial counsel made a strategic decision not to challenge the admissibility of appellant's statement. During opening statement, counsel informed the jury that evidence would show that appellant did not ‘clam up’ when arrested; that appellant's statement would explain his whereabouts on the night in question and show he could not have killed the victim; and that the statement served as corroboration of appellant's alibi defense.” Poole v. State, 291 Ga. 848, 734 S.E.2d 1 (November 5, 2012). Convictions for murder and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to object to prosecutor’s closing argument. Prosecutor demonstrated “the difficulty one would have in committing suicide by shooting oneself with a Remington rifle just above one's left eye,” as defendant contended victim here had done. “Inasmuch as the State has broad latitude to demonstrate and illustrate that which is authorized by the evidence ( Perry v. State, 274 Ga. 236(3), 552 S.E.2d 798 (2001); see also Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631(7), 651 S.E.2d 718 (2007)), we cannot say trial counsel performed deficiently when he did not object to the closing-argument demonstration that was authorized by the evidence.” Powell v. State, 291 Ga. 743, 733 S.E.2d 294 (October 15, 2012). Murder and related convictions affirmed; prosecutor’s closing argument was improper, but no basis for reversal. 1. Argument was improper. Prosecutor improperly argued that “prosecutors do not seek the indictment of persons whom they believe to be innocent” when she said, “[w]e don’t bring it to indictment if we think the person is innocent, if there is not enough evidence.” “See DaNamur v. State, 156 Ga.App. 270, 270(1), 274 S.E.2d 673 (1980) (improper for prosecutor to ask in closing argument ‘[w]ho wants to prosecute innocent people?’). Courts have correctly chastised prosecutors ‘for arguing or even suggesting that “the government only prosecutes guilty people.” This line of argument is forbidden because it implies that the prosecutor reached the determination that the defendant is guilty before trial and that the jury should weigh this fact in making its determination.’ United States v. Stefan, 784 F.2d 1093, 1100 (11 th Cir., 1986).” 2. Error was waived by failure to object. “‘In the appeal of a non-capital case, the defendant's failure to object to the State's closing argument waives his right to rely on the alleged impropriety of that argument as a basis for reversal.’ Scott v. State, 290 Ga. 883, 885(2), 725 S.E.2d 305 (2012) (citations and punctuation omitted). And a trial judge has no obligation under OCGA § 17–8–75 to rebuke a prosecuting attorney or give a curative instruction in the absence of a timely objection. See id.; Simmons v. State, 281 Ga. 437, 438(4), 637 S.E.2d 709 (2006).” 3. No ineffective assistance in failure to object, because improper comments were invited by defense counsel’s own improper argument, “speculating about the reasons for the prosecuting attorney having sought to indict Powell. When the time came for the prosecuting attorney to give her closing argument, she understandably attempted to respond to the earlier speculation about why Powell had been indicted.” In this context, defense counsel’s decision not to object was strategic and not unreasonable. “While Powell's lawyer could have objected to the improper remarks of the prosecuting attorney, he was ‘obviously vulnerable’ to an unfavorable result. [ United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 13(III), 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)]. If he had objected, the trial judge would have rebuked the prosecuting attorney, but the judge might also have properly rebuked Powell's lawyer for his earlier speculation about the motives of the prosecuting attorney that invited her improper remarks in the first place. In these circumstances, a defense lawyer might reasonably conclude that little would be gained by an objection.” This doesn’t make prosecutor’s argument proper, but “under the ‘invited response’ or ‘invited reply’ doctrine, inappropriate prosecutorial comments ordinarily do not amount to prejudicial error if, taken in context, they were ‘invited’ by ‘defense counsel's opening salvo’ and ‘did no more than respond substantially in order to “right the scale.”’ Id. at 12–13(III) (footnote omitted).” Green v. State, 291 Ga. 579, 731 S.E.2d 359 (September 10, 2012). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where trial counsel strategically chose not to object to hearsay. “At the hearing on appellant's motion for new trial, trial counsel, an experienced criminal defense attorney, explained that he did not object when the eyewitness' hearsay statements were introduced at trial because he knew she would be testifying herself in the course of the trial and he wanted to be able to show inconsistencies in her statements. With regard to statements made to the victim's