☢ test - Í

Dunham v. State, 315 Ga.App. 901, 729 S.E.2d 45 (May 17, 2012). Aggravated battery conviction affirmed; trial court properly sentenced defendant as recidivist. “Dunham contends that his 1977 felony conviction should not have been used to sentence him as a three-strike recidivist under OCGA § 17–10–7(c) because the State did not show that the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. ‘In recidivist sentencing, the State bears the burden of showing both the existence of the prior guilty pleas and that the defendant was represented by counsel when he entered the pleas.’ Beck v. State, 283 Ga. 352, 353(2) (658 S.E.2d 577) (2008). See Nash v. State, 271 Ga. 281 (519 S.E.2d 893) (1999). The State met that burden in this case by introducing during sentencing a certified copy of Dunham's 1977 counseled plea of guilty to a felony charge of theft by taking, along with two other felony convictions for selling cocaine in 1992 and 1995. Dunham argues that there is no ‘presumption of regularity’ in his 1977 sentencing because the Uniform Superior Court Rules had not yet become effective, and therefore the State should have the burden of showing that he entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily. The ‘presumption of regularity’ discussed by the Georgia Supreme Court in Beck and Nash does not rely solely upon the application of the Uniform Superior Court Rules, however, but ‘on the presumption, long recognized in Georgia, in favor of the regularity and legality of all proceedings in the courts below.’ Nash, 271 Ga. at 284. Once the State introduces evidence that the defendant entered a guilty plea and had been represented by counsel, the presumption of regularity attaches, and the burden shifts to the defendant to show any alleged irregularities. Beck, 283 Ga. at 354(2).” Willis v. State, 309 Ga.App. 414, 710 S.E.2d 616 (April 26, 2011). Armed robbery convictions affirmed; prior conviction was properly used in aggravation of sentence where State showed that defendant validly waived right to counsel and self-represented at trial. “[T]he State offered evidence that that case was tried before a jury, that Willis exercised his constitutional right to represent himself, and that appointed standby counsel was available to assist him at trial. [Cit.] Because the record does not support Willis's assertion that the conviction was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to counsel, this argument lacks merit.” Brinkley v. State, 301 Ga.App. 827, 689 S.E.2d 116 (December 31, 2009). State provided sufficient proof that defendant was represented by counsel in prior plea: “It is true that the Maryland ADA who handled Brinkley's case did not testify specifically about Brinkley's guilty plea hearing. But the ADA testified that the customary practice in homicide cases that he prosecuted was for the defendant to be represented by an attorney who participated in the plea hearing. The ADA further testified that he had no recollection of any homicide cases he had personally handled where the defendant who pled guilty went unrepresented. This testimony was sufficient to prove that Brinkley was represented by counsel in the Maryland case. See Bazemore v. State, 273 Ga. 160, 162(1) (535 S.E.2d 760) (2000) (“Certainly, evidence of a routine or standard practice or procedure can be used in demonstrating compliance with constitutional standards .”); Allison v. State, 288 Ga.App. 482, 486(2) (654 S.E.2d 628) (2007) (the state can rely upon testimony concerning routine or standard practices to establish that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights).” Accord, Rudolph v. State , 313 Ga.App. 411, 721 S.E.2d 625 (December 19, 2011) (“evidence of standard practice or procedure can be used in demonstrating compliance with constitutional standards.”); Williams v. State , 334 Ga.App. 311, 779 S.E.2d 91 (November 2, 2015) (same). Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 687 S.E.2d 438 (November 9, 2009). At defendant’s capital murder trial, trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior convictions for two family violence battery charges where defendant objected on grounds that the guilty pleas were involuntary and uncounseled; the convictions shouldn’t have been admitted without requiring the State to prove their validity. No error, however, as State had available the victim in those cases “and likely would, have put Seps on the stand in rebuttal to testify about the underlying conduct that led to the convictions had the trial court sustained Arrington's objection to the State's questions to him about his convictions for those batteries. See McMichen v. State, 265 Ga. 598, 607(12) (458 S.E.2d 833) (1995) (stating that evidence of a defendant's character is admissible in the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial).” Victim, in fact, testified for defendant at sentencing phase and testified that defendant only hit her twice. Beck v. State, 283 Ga. 352, 658 S.E.2d 577 (March 10, 2008). Trial court properly considered defendant’s prior guilty pleas in recidivist sentencing, where State showed waiver of counsel at prior plea. “In recidivist sentencing, the State bears the burden of showing both the existence of the prior guilty pleas and that the defendant was represented by counsel when he entered the pleas. Nash [ v. State , 271 Ga. 281, 285 (519 S.E.2d 893) (1999)]. If the defendant was not represented by counsel, the State can meet its burden by showing that the defendant waived this right. The State can do this by introducing a transcript of the plea hearing, a docket entry or another document affirmatively showing that the right to counsel was waived. Id. Once the State has shown that the defendant either was represented by counsel or waived the right to representation, a ‘presumption of regularity’ attaches to the plea proceedings and the burden