☢ test - Í

shifts to the defendant to show any alleged irregularities. Id. Defendant argues that the State should have the additional burden of proving that the right to counsel was waived knowingly and voluntarily. However, the presumption of regularity which final judgments enjoy under Nash necessitates that the State only be required to show evidence of waiver. Id. Thus, upon the State’s showing that a defendant waived his right to counsel, the court may presume the defendant waived that right knowingly and intelligently and that the plea would not have been accepted otherwise. Id. See also State v. Deville , 879 So.2d 689, 691-692 (La., 2004). “[T]he State introduced a document showing that defendant had waived his right to counsel. [fn: The document, “Findings of Fact on Guilty Plea,” was signed by the trial judge who presided at the guilty plea hearing. It reads, in pertinent part: “The court now finds that . . . defendant is pleading guilty freely and voluntarily and . . . that there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver and relinquishment of: the right to counsel.” ] That document was sufficient to meet the State’s burden, shift the burden to defendant to prove that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, and, because defendant did not satisfy his burden, enable the trial court to rely on the guilty plea for the purpose of sentencing defendant as a recidivist. Nash, supra .” Accord, Mikell v. State , 309 Ga.App. 608, 710 S.E.2d 824 (May 17, 2011) (presumption of regularity in prior counseled guilty pleas); Bell v. State , 328 Ga.App. 813, 762 S.E.2d 827 (August 13, 2014). Hampton v State, 287 Ga.App. 896, 652 S.E.2d 915 (October 23, 2007). Trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant’s prior uncounseled guilty pleas in aggravation of sentence, where State showed waiver of right to counsel at those pleas. Applies Nash presumption of regularity to the uncounseled pleas, where waiver of counsel shown. “‘[T]he burden of production is on the recidivism defendant rather than the State when the defendant seeks under Boykin v. Alabama, [395 U.S. 238 (89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274) (1969)] to challenge the validity of a prior guilty plea used to enhance a sentence.’” Quoting Nash v. State , 271 Ga. 281, 284 (519 S.E.2d 893) (1999). “The State need only show the existence of the prior guilty plea and that the defendant was represented by counsel. Id. If the defendant was not represented, the State must show a waiver of counsel. Id. ‘Upon such a showing, the presumption of regularity is then applied and the burden shifts to the defendant to produce some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea.’ Id. at 285.” Moorer v. State, 286 Ga.App. 395, 649 S.E.2d 537 (July 6, 2007). “‘When introducing evidence of prior convictions based on guilty pleas, the ... State must initially prove only the existence of the prior guilty plea and that defendant was represented by counsel in all felony cases and all misdemeanor cases resulting in imprisonment. The burden then shifts to the defendant to produce some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity when the plea was taken.’ (Citations omitted.) White v. State, 245 Ga.App. 725, 727(4) (538 S.E.2d 797) (2000). The State met that burden by presenting to the trial court a certified copy of a guilty plea for armed robbery that was signed and initialed by Moorer’s defense counsel, and a copy of the transcript from the plea hearing. Moorer then had the burden of ‘produc[ing] some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea,’ Nash v. State, 271 Ga. 281, 285 (519 S.E.2d 893) (1999), but presented no such evidence.” Simmons v. State, 278 Ga.App. 372, 629 S.E.2d 86 (March 23, 2006). Trial court erred in considering defendant’s prior misdemeanor shoplifting convictions in aggravation of sentence, absent a showing by the State that defendant was represented by counsel in those proceedings. Logical extension of Nash v. State , 271 Ga. 281, 519 S.E.2d 893 (1999) in light of Alabama v. Shelton , 535 U.S. 654, 122 S.Ct. 1764, 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002). But see Smith (July 25, 2005), below, as to alternative showing of waiver of counsel. Smith v. State, 275 Ga.App. 60, 619 S.E.2d 694 (July 27, 2005). Trial court properly imposed recidivist (felony) shoplifting sentencing based, in part, on defendant’s prior pro se guilty plea; State was able to show valid waiver of right to counsel on the prior plea. “‘[T]he burden of production is on the recidivism defendant rather than the State when the defendant seeks under Boykin v. Alabama [cit.] to challenge the validity of a prior guilty plea used to enhance a sentence,’ quoting Nash v. State, 271 Ga. 281, 284 (519 S.E.2d 893) (1999). “The State need only show the existence of the prior guilty plea and that the defendant was represented by counsel. Id . If the defendant was not represented, the State must show a waiver of counsel. Id. ‘Upon such a showing, the presumption of regularity is then applied and the burden shifts to the defendant to produce some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea.’ Id. at 285.” Accord, Woodall v. State , 291 Ga.App. 484, 662 S.E.2d 549 (May 12, 2008) (remanded for sentencing; State made no showing of counsel or valid waiver in prior convictions used in aggravation of sentence). Johnson v. State, 268 Ga.App. 1, 601 S.E.2d 392 (June 17, 2004). Rape and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly imposed recidivist sentence. “When the state seeks recidivist punishment in a case not involving the death