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penalty, it bears the burden of proving (1) the existence of prior guilty pleas and (2) that the defendant was represented by counsel in connection with those pleas. [Cit.] If the state offers such proof, ‘the presumption of regularity’ attaches and the burden shifts to the defendant to produce some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea. [Cit.] In this case, the state produced copies of an indictment and a ‘Case Action Summary’ showing Johnson’s 1998 guilty plea to theft of an automobile in violation of Alabama law. The summary sheet lists ‘Alison W. Burns’ as Johnson’s attorney, and it contains a statement signed by the judge indicating that Johnson appeared in court represented by competent counsel and understood the implications of his guilty plea. Thus, contrary to Johnson’s assertion, the state met its initial burden of proving that he had made a prior, counseled guilty plea.” Accord, Williams (July 16, 2013), above. Allen v. State, 267 Ga.App. 85, 598 S.E.2d 832 (April 14, 2004). Full court decision; nine member majority. Defendant contends that trial court could not rely on his prior nolo plea to DUI in aggravation of sentence on his new DUI because the record in the previous case does not establish the voluntariness of his plea. Defendant’s argument is barred by OCGA § 40-13-33(a), which “provides that ‘[a]ny challenge to a misdemeanor conviction of any of the traffic laws of this state or to the traffic laws of any county or municipal government which may be brought pursuant to Chapter 14 of Title 9 must be filed within 180 days of the date the conviction becomes final.’ As stated in Earp v. Brown, 260 Ga. 215 (391 S.E.2d 396) (1990), ‘[t]his statute creates a limited and procedural exception to the general rule of law codified at OCGA § 17-9-4 that a defendant can collaterally attack void judgments at any time. It limits such attacks to within the first 180 days after the conviction has been finally adjudicated, even if a habeas petition could be brought and would be successful.’ Id. at 216. The 180-day limitation period contained in OCGA § 40-13-33(a) does not apply ‘only to attacks by petition for habeas relief.’ Brown v. Earp, 261 Ga. 522 (407 S.E.2d 737) (1991). Rather, it ‘applies to any challenge which could be brought by means of a petition for habeas corpus, regardless of whether the challenge was actually made by that procedure.’ Id. at 523.” Three judges dissent. Replaces prior opinion issued February 2, 2004. Questionable validity in light of Simmons (March 23, 2006), above. Thompson v. State, 276 Ga. 701, 583 S.E.2d 14 (June 30, 2003). Trial court erroneously considered defendant’s prior habitual violator (HV) convictions where prosecutor admitted they could not be used in aggravation of sentence because defendant had no attorney when pleas were entered. Reverses Thompson v. State , 256 Ga.App. 776(9), 569 S.E.2d 884 (2002). Accord, Parham v. State , 320 Ga.App. 676, 739 S.E.2d 135 (March 22, 2013). Compare Smith (July 27, 2005), and Willis (April 26, 2011), both above (prior conviction was properly used in aggravation of sentence where State showed that defendant validly waived right to counsel and self-represented at trial). Collins v. State, 258 Ga.App. 400, 574 S.E.2d 423 (November 15, 2002). “(T)he burden is on the State to prove both the existence of the prior guilty pleas and that the defendant was represented by counsel in all felony cases.... Upon such a showing, the presumption of [the] regularity [of a final judgment] is then applied and the burden shifts to the defendant to produce some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea. Defendant can attempt to meet his burden of production with a transcript, with testimony regarding the taking of the plea, or with other affirmative evidence. A silent record or the mere naked assertion by an accused that his prior counseled plea was not made knowingly and intelligently is insufficient. If the defendant is able to present evidence that a constitutional infirmity exists, then the burden of proving the constitutionality of the plea shifts to the State .” Accord, Rucker v. State , 304 Ga.App. 184, 695 S.E.2d 711 (May 25, 2010) (after State proved existence of prior counseled pleas, defendant failed to carry his burden “to affirmatively show ‘an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of his plea,’” quoting Nash ). Nash v. State, 271 Ga. 281, 519 S.E.2d 893 (July 6, 1999). Defendant challenges use of his prior guilty pleas at sentencing, contending that burden is on State to prove regularity of the prior plea. Overruling Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195(17), 345 S.E.2d 831 (1986), Supreme Court holds that “ the burden in non-death penalty cases is on the recidivism defendant rather than the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a previous guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. ” Based on Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992), which held that it’s not unconstitutional for states to place this burden on defendants where the regularity of a prior plea is collaterally attacked. Note that on direct appeal, the burden remains on the State to prove the validity of the plea, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). Surveying the practices of other states, the Supreme Court adopts the “middle position”: “that the burden is on the State to prove both the existence of the prior guilty pleas and that the defendant was represented by counsel in all felony cases and those misdemeanor proceedings where imprisonment resulted. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994); [cits.]. Upon such a showing, the presumption of regularity is then applied and the burden shifts to the defendant