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State v. Slaughter, 289 Ga. 344, 711 S.E.2d 651 (June 13, 2011). Reversing 304 Ga.App. 209, 695 S.E.2d 743 (May 27, 2010). Trial court properly considered prior felonies in sentencing under OCGA § 17-10-7(c), although those same felonies were used as basis for defendant’s conviction for felon in possession of firearm. Approves the reasoning of King v. State, 169 Ga.App. 444 (313 S.E.2d 144) (1984), which held that the same felony couldn’t be used both to prove the defendant’s status as a felon, and to aggravate a sentence under OCGA § 17-10-7(a); but disapproves the Court of Appeals’ extension of King to OCGA § 17-10-7(c), saying the same reasoning doesn’t apply. In King , the Court of Appeals properly reasoned as follows: felon in possession of a firearm carries a sentence of one to five years; but under OCGA § 17-10-7(a), a prior felony requires that the defendant be sentenced to the maximum possible sentence. Thus, “the Court of Appeals reasoned ‘[i]f the General Assembly intended that repeat offender punishment [pursuant to OCGA § 17– 10–7(a)] be applied to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, then every conviction for that offense could result in a minimum punishment of five years, thus rendering the authorized punishment for the offense of one to five years meaningless.’ King, supra, 169 Ga. at 144.” By contrast, “[t]he application of subsection (c) to a conviction under OCGA § 16–11–131means only that the sentence imposed of ‘not less than one nor more than five years’ will have to be served without the possibility of parole. Since the sentencing range in OCGA § 16–11–131is not eviscerated by the application of OCGA § 17–10–7(c), there is no basis to extend the holding in King to that subsection. [fn] Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.” Also disapproves/overrules contrary holdings in Campbell v. State, 279 Ga.App. 331 (631 S.E.2d 388) (2006) and Morrison v. State, 272 Ga.App. 34(7) (611 S.E.2d 720) (2005). Accord, Washington v. State , 311 Ga.App. 518, 716 S.E.2d 576 (August 25, 2011) ( King doesn’t apply to convictions under OCGA § 16-11-133, which “imposes a fixed term of incarceration upon convicted felons who use a firearm in the commission of a crime.”); Harris v. State , 322 Ga.App. 87, 744 S.E.2d 82 (May 30, 2013) (whole court opinion); Hillman (June 29, 2015), above. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. 273, 687 S.E.2d 417 (November 9, 2009). Raises the question but doesn’t answer it: when a prior conviction is used to prove that the defendant is a convicted felon, raising the offense of escape to a felony, can the prior conviction also be used to impose recidivist sentencing? Defendant argues that it can’t, analogizing to cases dealing with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, “ King v. State, 169 Ga.App. 444 (313 S.E.2d 144) (1984) and its progeny. ‘ King and its progeny stand for the limited proposition that the felony used to convict a defendant of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon cannot also be used to enhance the defendant's punishment as a repeat offender under OCGA § 17-10-7(a).’ Walker v. Hale, 283 Ga. 131(1) (657 S.E.2d 227) (2008).” Implies that the same reasoning might apply here, but not reached because defendant here had at least one prior felony not used to prove his felon status. Analysis of King disapproved, see Hillman (June 29, 2015), above. Marshall v. State, 294 Ga.App. 282, 668 S.E.2d 892 (October 29, 2008). “It is true that the state may not both rely upon a defendant's prior felony conviction to prove the defendant's guilt of a convicted felon in possession of a firearm charge and also use that prior conviction in aggravation of punishment. See Arkwright v. State, 275 Ga.App. 375, 376-378(1) (620 S.E.2d 618) (2005) (the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant as a recidivist based upon a prior felony conviction that the state had already used in the guilt-innocence phase to prove the convicted felon in possession of a firearm charge). Here, however, Marshall's prior firearm conviction was not used to determine his guilt of the burglary and arson charges, but rather was properly used post-verdict to consider his recidivist sentencing. See Copeland v. State, 269 Ga.App. 424, 425(2) (604 S.E.2d 223) (2004). Compare Arkwright, 275 Ga.App. at 376-378(1).” Accord, Ray v. State , 317 Ga.App. 197, 729 S.E.2d 610 (June 28, 2012). Copeland v. State, 269 Ga.App. 424, 604 S.E.2d 223 (August 17, 2004). Prior convictions could be used in aggravation of sentence although they had been used in an earlier prosecution as the basis for charge of possession of firearm by a convicted felon. Rejects defendant’s contention that convictions, once used in a later prosecution, are forever “used up.” See also Marshall (October 29, 2008), above. Allen v. State, 268 Ga.App. 519, 602 S.E.2d 250 (July 15, 2004). “‘Where the State proves a defendant’s prior felony convictions for the purpose of convicting him of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, it may not also use those prior convictions in aggravation of punishment.’ Caver v. State, 215 Ga.App. 711 (452 S.E.2d 515) (1994). And this Court has previously determined that the legislature did not intend that the allegation and evidence of a prior felony necessary for a conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon could also be used to punish the defendant as a repeat offender under OCGA § 17-10-7. King v. State, 169 Ga.App. 444, 445 (313 S.E.2d 144) (1984). Thus, the state must elect whether it intends to use such evidence to support a conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon or for recidivist sentencing. See Caver v. State, 215 Ga.App. at 713(4); State v. Freeman, 198 Ga.App. 553, 555-556(2) (402 S.E.2d 529) (1991).” Accord, Wyche v. State , 291 Ga.App. 165, 661 S.E.2d 226 (April 14, 2008)