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(on remand, the possession conviction being reversed, the prior conviction “remains available to support Wyche’s enhanced sentencing under the recidivist statute.”). Both Allen and Wyche disapproved on this point, Harris v. State , 322 Ga.App. 87, 744 S.E.2d 82 (May 30, 2013); see also Hillman (June 29, 2015), above. 10. PRIOR PLEAS – VOLUNTARINESS See PLEAS – VOLUNTARINESS, above B. AGREEMENT WITH STATE See subheading SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION/ AGREEMENT WITH STATE, below C. ALLOCUTION See subheading PRE-SENTENCE HEARING/PRE-SENTENCE REPORT, below D. ATTORNEY FEE RESTITUTION Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga.App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333 (January 12, 2012). Hit and run and related convictions affirmed; no error in sentencing defendant to “payment of $1,000 restitution to the circuit defender” in each of two jury trials. “[T]he amount awarded as restitution was reasonable in light of the fact that appellant's trial counsel spent roughly 25 hours in preparation on this case and the companion case.” State v. Pless, 282 Ga. 58, 646 S.E.2d 202 (June 4, 2007). Reverses Pless v. State , 279 Ga.App. 798, 633 S.E.2d 340 (May 10, 2006); upon defendant’s convictions for county ordinance (animal restraint) violations, trial court properly ordered reimbursement of costs of indigent defense. Court of Appeals erred in holding that Georgia Indigent Defense Act of 2003, by striking former OCGA § 17-12-10(c), took away trial courts’ power to order attorney fee restitution in sentencing defendants with appointed counsel. Supreme Court finds that power inherent in OCGA § 42-8-35, which “vests the sentencing court with the general power to impose reasonable conditions of probation. While that Code section sets forth certain enumerated conditions, those provisions are not exclusive and ‘the court has authority to impose restrictions not specifically listed therein.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Kellam v. State , 271 Ga.App. 125, 126, 608 S.E.2d 729 (2004). Granted that the reimbursement provision was not included in the Indigent Defense Act, we have not been directed to any express authority which would preclude the trial court from ordering restitution of attorney fees as a reasonable condition of probation under OCGA § 42-8-35.” (italics in original) Chief Justice Sears dissents, would find that reimbursement of attorney fees is not a “reasonable condition of probation” because it is not “‘reasonably related to the goals of rehabilitation, deterrence, protection of the public, and training or treatment.’ [Cit.]” Note that express statutory authority to order attorney fee restitution was re-enacted effective July 1, 2006, by Ga. L. 2006, p. 710, OCGA § 17-12-51. Pless applies to judgments entered between January 1, 2004 and July 1, 2006. Accord, Mezick v. State , 291 Ga.App. 257, 661 S.E.2d 635 (April 23, 2008). Burns v. State, 251 Ga.App. 889, 555 S.E.2d 209 (October 11, 2001). Conviction for violating duty upon striking unattended vehicle affirmed, but trial court erred in sentencing defendant to reimburse costs of indigent defense without making a factual determination on the record that defendant was able to do so. That factual determination should include “the amount of [defendant]’s assets, expenses, income, or outstanding obligations.” E. BANISHMENT Regent v. State, 333 Ga.App. 350, 774 S.E.2d 213 (July 9, 2015). Convictions for aggravated assault and related offenses affirmed, but trial court erred in sentencing by banishing defendant from all of Georgia except Toombs County. “The legislature has expressly provided that banishment is a valid term and condition of probation. See OCGA § 42–8– 35(a)(6)(A). The trial court, however, cannot banish a probationer to any area within the state that does not consist of at least one entire judicial circuit. See id. Since Toombs County is part of the five-county Middle Judicial Circuit, which also includes Emanuel, Jefferson, Washington, and Candler Counties, the trial court was not statutorily authorized to banish Regent from the entire state, except for Toombs County. See OCGA §§ 15–6–1(24) and 42–8–35(a)(6)(A). Banishment from the entire state, except for the five-county Middle Judicial Circuit was presumably an appropriate special probation condition.” Reversed on a different issue, S15G1829, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 3145124 (June 6, 2016). Tyson v. State, 301 Ga.App. 295, 687 S.E.2d 284 (November 23, 2009). 1. No improper increase of defendant’s burglary sentence where trial court amended sentence to banish defendant from victims’ neighborhood. “[T]he Georgia Legislature has expressly authorized a trial court ‘to revoke any or all of the probated sentence, rescind any or all of the sentence, or, in any manner deemed advisable by the judge, modify or change the probated sentence ... at any time during the period of time prescribed for the probated sentence to run.’ OCGA § 42-8-34(g); Taylor v. State, 181 Ga.App. 199(1) (351 S.E.2d 723) (1986) (‘Although a trial court's authority to reconsider, vacate or modify a sentence ends with the conclusion of the