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term of court in which the sentence was entered, under O.C.G.A. § 42-8-34(g), a sentencing judge is empowered to modify or change a probated sentence at any time during the term of probation.’) (citation omitted). See also Edwards v. State, 216 Ga.App. 740(1) (456 S.E.2d 213) (1995). Tyson's assertion that the statutory authority set forth in OCGA § 42- 8-34(g) permits the modification of a probated sentence only after the terms of probation have been violated contravenes both the plain language of the statute as well as precedent from our appellate courts. See id. It follows that the trial court retained jurisdiction to modify the terms of Tyson's probation.” 2. “The banishment provision, however, was reasonable, narrow in scope, and included only the subdivision in which the victims resided.” Shook v. State, 300 Ga.App. 59, 684 S.E.2d 129 (September 10, 2009). No abuse of discretion where trial court banished defendant “from all areas of Georgia north of Interstate 20.” “Shook bears the burden of demonstrating that his sentence of banishment is unreasonable. Massey v. State, 229 Ga.App. 123, 124 (493 S.E.2d 255) (1997); Presha v. State, 220 Ga.App. 124, 125 (469 S.E.2d 293) (1996). In denying Shook's motion to modify/reduce sentence, the trial court stated that it could ‘banish an individual from a place so that he may receive rehabilitation services so that he will therefore not be involved with individuals with whom he has been criminally associated.’ Shook counters that he could obtain rehabilitative services north of I-20, that he had no co-defendant and thus no known criminal associates, and that he will be separated from his family under the banishment order. But the record establishes that Shook had a twenty-year criminal history of drug and alcohol-related convictions in at least five counties situated north of I-20 and, in fact, had been arrested again for drug possession in one of those counties after he failed to appear at the first scheduled trial in this case. The trial judge's sentence of banishment allows for Shook to receive rehabilitative services while at the same time removing him from an area where he committed his prior crimes and presumably had access to illegal drugs. Accordingly, we find that Shook has failed to carry his burden of establishing that the banishment in this case was ‘unreasonable or otherwise fail[ed] to bear a logical relationship to the rehabilitative scheme of the sentence pronounced.’ See Terry v. Hamrick, 284 Ga. at 26-27(3) (upholding banishment from all but one county in state where not unreasonably related to rehabilitative scheme of sentence); State v. Collett, 232 Ga. 668, 671 (208 S.E.2d 472) (1974) (same for banishment from seven-county area).” Accord, Mallory v. State , 335 Ga.App. 852, 783 S.E.2d 370 (February 26, 2016) (defendant’s burden to show that banishment is unreasonable). Terry v. Hamrick, 284 Ga. 24, 663 S.E.2d 256 (June 30, 2008). Sentence of banishment from 158 counties did not violate constitutional prohibition against banishment “beyond the limits of the state, and it is that which the Constitution forbids. Banishment from various counties of this State is not prohibited by the Constitution or by statute, [fn] and ‘[i]n the absence of express authority to the contrary, we see no logical reason why any reasonable condition imposed for probation or suspension of a sentence by a trial court should not be approved.’ [ State v. Collett, 232 Ga. 668 (208 S.E.2d 472) (1974).] However, banishment conditions are not unlimited: such conditions must not be ‘“unreasonable or otherwise fail[ ] to bear a logical relationship to the rehabilitative scheme of the sentence pronounced.... ’ Id. at 671.” Sentence here meets this requirement: “the trial court imposed the condition because of ‘the trial court’s concern with the Petitioner’s continued obsession with his ex-wife.’ And, there was more than ample basis for the trial court to have such concern. To commit his crimes, Terry violated a protective order regarding his ex-wife, and entered her home to await her arrival; he was psychologically evaluated as obsessed with her; he was ‘fixated on winning his family back;’ and he was contemplating suicide at the time he committed the crimes, which included placing his ex- wife under his control.” “The record clearly authorized the trial court to conclude that Terry had demonstrated a propensity for violence toward the victim that fully justified the court’s concern for her safety, even after Terry’s release from incarceration. See Parrish v. State, 182 Ga.App. 247, 248(2) (355 S.E.2d 682) (1987). The trial court has broad discretion in fashioning probation conditions. Collett, supra. The rehabilitative scheme devised promoted the victim’s protection; it was Terry whose movements had to be curtailed, not hers, and a scheme that allowed her to move freely about most of the state without fear of Terry was appropriate. The requirement that Terry remain in Toombs County is properly protective of the victim, and logically related to the rehabilitative scheme. Terry contends that the trial court could have fashioned probation conditions leaving him more freedom, and notes that the trial court has ‘the ability to protect the victim with appropriate orders of restraint.’ However, the very facts of this case show the inefficacy of such orders as applied to Terry; a restraining order was in place when he committed his crimes. Also, the habeas court determined that the ten-year period of time during which the banishment provision was effective was not unreasonable, and, given the evidence of Terry’s obsession with his ex-wife, this was not error. See Adams v. State, 241 Ga.App. 810 (527 S.E.2d 911) (2000).” Benham dissents: “I believe banishing Terry from 158 of 159 counties is unreasonable, not logically related to the rehabilitative scheme of his sentence, and in fact results in de facto banishment from our state which is unconstitutional.” “A reasonable person in Terry’s situation faced with being relegated for ten years to a single county to which he has no ties or access to services and resources would surely be compelled to leave the state.” Accord, Mallory v. State , 335 Ga.App. 852, 783 S.E.2d 370 (February 26, 2016) (“banishment conditions are not