☢ test - Í

U.S. 93, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (disapproving “of evaluating the civil nature of an Act by reference to the effect that Act has on a single individual”) and Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (holding that Kansas statute patterned on the Washington statute here was civil, not criminal). “We hold that respondent cannot obtain release through an ‘as-applied’ challenge to the Washington Act on double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds. We agree with petitioner [commitment center superintendent] that an ‘as-applied’ analysis would prove unworkable. Such an analysis would never conclusively resolve whether a particular scheme is punitive and would thereby prevent a final determination of the scheme's validity under the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses. … The civil nature of a confinement scheme cannot be altered based merely on vagaries in the implementation of the authorizing statute.” As explained in Hendricks , “the question whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature is initially one of statutory construction. 521 U.S., at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986)). A court must ascertain whether the legislature intended the statute to establish civil proceedings. A court will reject the legislature's manifest intent only where a party challenging the Act provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive in either purpose or effect as to negate the State's intention. 521 U.S., at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)). We concluded that the confined individual in that case had failed to satisfy his burden with respect to the Kansas Act. We noted several factors: The Act did not implicate retribution or deterrence; prior criminal convictions were used as evidence in the commitment proceedings, but were not a prerequisite to confinement; the Act required no finding of scienter to commit a person; the Act was not intended to function as a deterrent; and although the procedural safeguards were similar to those in the criminal context, they did not alter the character of the scheme. 521 U.S., at 361-365, 117 S.Ct. 2072.” Proper to consider “the conditions of confinement provided by the Act,” but where the statute has already been determined to be civil, not proper to consider actual conditions of confinement “as applied”; remedy for actual conditions at variance with those provided by the Act is through civil action. Undecided: whether it would be appropriate to consider actual conditions of confinement in making the initial civil/criminal determination. Scalia, Souter and Thomas concur, would not look to actual conditions of confinement in first instance, either. Stevens dissents. H. COMMUNITY SERVICE Jones v. State, 308 Ga.App. 99, 706 S.E.2d 593 (February 24, 2011). Conviction and sentence for speeding and related offenses affirmed, but community service imposed exceeded that statutorily authorized. “Jones argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him to 400 hours of community service. We agree. OCGA § 42-8-72(a)(1) provides that ‘[c]ommunity service may be considered as a condition of probation’ for traffic violations. The statute further provides, however, that the sentencing court may order ‘[n]ot less than 20 hours nor more than 250 hours in cases involving traffic or ordinance violations or misdemeanors....’ OCGA § 42-8-72(b)(1).” Contrary to State’s position, statute doesn’t authorize 250 hours community service per charge. “The 250-hour maximum limit for community service hours set forth in OCGA § 42-8-72(b)(1) specifically applies to ‘ cases involving traffic ... violations,’ (emphasis supplied), not to each traffic violation or charge as suggested by the State [fn]. Thus, the trial court erred by ordering Jones to perform 400 hours of community service as a condition of his probation.” I. COMPUTATION OF SENTENCE/GOOD TIME CREDIT In re: L.R. III, 316 Ga.App. 374, 729 S.E.2d 520 (June 25, 2012). Following adjudication as designated felon, juvenile court erred in restrictive custody commitment order by “expressly declin[ing] to give him credit for the time he served in pre-disposition detention.” “[T]he juvenile court's commitment order on its face violates the plain language of OCGA § 15–11–63(e)(1)(B) to the extent that the statute mandates that a juvenile's pre-disposition detainment must be credited to the time set for confinement.” Cochran v. State, 315 Ga.App. 488, 727 S.E.2d 125 (January 31, 2012). Following defendant’s guilty plea to burglary and related charges, trial court erred by denying his motion to correct clerical error in sentence; notation on sentence that defendant should get “credit pursuant to jailers affidavit” for time already served apparently misled State Department of Corrections (DOC) into believing that defendant shouldn’t get credit for the seven months he had already served in the state system. “The State is correct that under OCGA § 17–10–12, the amount of credit for time spent in confinement while awaiting trial is to be computed by the convict's pre-sentence custodian, and the DOC has the duty to award the credit for time served based upon that calculation. Anderson v. State, 290 Ga.App. 890, 891 (660 S.E.2d 876) (2008). Because trial courts are not involved in such calculations, a defendant ‘aggrieved by the calculations in awarding credit’ generally must seek relief from the DOC. Id. And ‘[t]he remedy for dissatisfaction with that relief would be in a mandamus or injunction action against the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. An exception exists, however, ‘where the trial court in its written sentencing order gives