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gratuitous misdirection to the correctional custodians’ because a trial judge has no authority to interfere with the administrative duties of the correctional custodians and the DOC to determine and award credit for time served. (Citation omitted.) Cutter v. State, 275 Ga.App. 888, 890–891(2) (622 S.E.2d 96) (2005). See also Sanford v. State, 251 Ga.App. 190, 191 (553 S.E.2d 854) (2001). The remedy in such a case is to ‘remand the case to the trial court to strike the offending language from the sentencing order.’ (Citation omitted.) Cutter v. State, 275 Ga.App. at 891. See also Johnson v. State, 248 Ga.App. at 455(3). Because the DOC appears to have relied upon the trial court's handwritten notation in calculating Cochran's sentencing credit, we find that the notation was a gratuitous misdirection that had the effect of improperly taking credit away from him. Johnson v. State, 248 Ga.App. at 455(3) (trial court has no authority to take sentencing credit away). … Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's denial of Cochran's motion and remand the case with direction to strike the words ‘credit pursuant to jailers aff.’ from Cochran's sentence.” Accord, Watts v. State , 321 Ga.App. 289, 739 S.E.2d 129 (March 21, 2013) (good time credit calculated by pre-sentence custodian). Barnes v. State, 303 Ga.App. 903, 695 S.E.2d 339 (May 6, 2010). Defendant’s twenty-year sentence for burglary was entered with “the first 10 years of this sentence be served in confinement, and that following the Defendant's release from confinement the remainder of the sentence herein imposed be served by the Defendant on probation.” After his release on parole, State brought a petition to revoke probation based on new offenses, and the trial court “ordered him to serve the balance of his 20-year sentence in confinement (13 years, 3 months and one day).” Held, “[w]e agree that the trial court erred by revoking Barnes's probation for a period that exceeded the ten year probationary period in its initial sentence. … Because the balance of Barnes's probation period was ten years, this lesser amount of time was therefore the maximum amount the trial court could revoke under OCGA § 42-8-34.1(d). See Gibson v. State, 279 Ga.App. 838, 840 (632 S.E.2d 740) (2006) (trial court erred by revoking term of probation greater than that authorized by OCGA § 42-8-34.1(d)).” Kirk v. State, 303 Ga.App. 568, 694 S.E.2d 166 (April 7, 2010). Sixteen months after return of remittitur from Court of Appeals affirming defendant’s vehicular homicide conviction, trial court properly granted State’s motion to order defendant to begin serving sentence. OCGA § 17-10-9 provides, in pertinent part, ‘[i]n cases which are appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals or the Georgia Supreme Court for reversal of the conviction, [a criminal] sentence shall be computed from the date the remittitur of the appellate court is made the judgment of the court in which the conviction is had, provided the defendant is not at liberty under bond but is incarcerated or in custody of the sheriff of the county where convicted.’ When the defendant is ‘at large’ when the remittitur is made the judgment of the sentencing court, on the other hand, the defendant ‘shall not receive credit for any time before entering upon [his or her] incarceration or other penalty. ’ Huff v. McLarty, 241 Ga. 442, 445, 246 S.E.2d 302 (1978). In Huff v. McLarty, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that, when a defendant remains at liberty but not under bond during the appeal of a probated sentence, the probationary period does not automatically begin to run on the date the remittitur of the appellate court is made the judgment of the trial court. 241 Ga. at 445-446, 246 S.E.2d 302. Rather, the running of the probationary period ‘must await some act which would cause it to begin.’ Id. at 446, 246 S.E.2d 302. The act that causes a probationary period to run in such a case may be an act of the State or an act of the defendant. Id. ‘A sentence is not voided because of the [ S]tate's delay in attempting to enforce it[,] ... Where the [ S]tate makes no move to initiate the sentence, the defendant must offer himself up if he wishes the term to begin to run.’ (Citations omitted.) Id. Even when the State's delay in attempting to enforce a sentence is unreasonable, such delay will be deemed to prevent later enforcement of the sentence only if the defendant has offered to begin serving his sentence. Cronan v. State, 282 Ga.App. 408, 410(b), 638 S.E.2d 827 (2006).” Defendant here took no action to “offer himself up” to serve his sentence. Shook v. State, 300 Ga.App. 59, 684 S.E.2d 129 (September 10, 2009). Where defendant’s probation was revoked based on new charge, trial court was not required to give defendant credit for time served on probation revocation when sentencing on new charge. Reese v. State, 296 Ga.App. 186, 674 S.E.2d 68 (February 18, 2009). “‘The amount of credit [for time served] is to be computed by the convict's pre-sentence custodian, and the duty to award the credit for time served prior to trial is upon the Department of Corrections. ’ Edwards v. State, 283 Ga.App. 305, 306 (641 S.E.2d 193) (2007). The trial court should not involve itself in the matter on remand. Id. To the extent that Reese is dissatisfied with the result reached, relief can be had only by means of ‘a mandamus or injunction action against the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections.’ Id.” Accord, Caldwell v. State , 327 Ga.App. 471, 758 S.E.2d 325 (May 2, 2014) (Physical precedent only on this point) (where trial court’s probation revocation order reflects court’s intention that defendant receive credit for time served, calculation of time remaining on sentence lies with Department of Corrections).