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conviction, but would be in a mandamus or injunction action against the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections. Id. (citations and punctuation omitted). We would consider Smashey’s claim in a direct appeal from the original conviction if the trial court in its written sentencing order had given gratuitous misdirection to the correctional custodians. Id. at 890-891. Here, the trial court’s order stated that Smashey was to be given credit for any time served in this case, which clearly meant the case in which the robbery and obstruction sentences were issued. The language of which Smashey complains did not misdirect his correctional custodians. Cf. Johnson v. State, 248 Ga.App. 454, 455- 456(3) (546 S.E.2d 562) (2001).” Accord, Edwards v. State , 283 Ga.App. 305, 641 S.E.2d 193 (January 4, 2007) (Defendant’s “motion for credit for time served” was “not properly before … the trial court” but should instead have been directed to the Department of Corrections); Anderson v. State , 290 Ga.App. 890, 660 S.E.2d 876 (April 9, 2008) (same); Williams v. State , 300 Ga.App. 319, 684 S.E.2d 432 (October 6, 2009). Sanford v. State, 251 Ga.App. 190, 553 S.E.2d 854 (August 13, 2001). Trial court’s order revoking probation and stating “No Early Release” improper as authority to say what good-time or extra good-time allowance a prisoner shall be given is vested in the Board of Corrections or in the custodian of the prisoners. Wilson v. State, 273 Ga. 97, 538 S.E.2d 429 (October 30, 2000). “‘[T]he provisions in OCGA §§ 17-10-9; 17-10-11 for crediting prison sentences with time spent in confinement applies only to persons who would not be confined but for the charges which give rise to the sentence for which credit is sought.’ OCGA § 17-10-11 specifically grants credit only for time served ‘in connection with ... the criminal proceedings for which sentence was imposed.’” Accord, Scott v. State , 315 Ga.App. 786, 727 S.E.2d 518 (April 19, 2012) (defendant wasn’t entitled to credit for time served while awaiting trial because defendant “was already in jail in [another county] on charges from unrelated crimes.”). Diaz v. State, 245 Ga.App. 380, 537 S.E.2d 784 (July 27, 2000). DUI and related convictions affirmed; trial court had no duty to address credit for time previously served. “Diaz is correct that ‘each person convicted of a crime in this state shall be given full credit for each day spent in confinement awaiting trial and the credit or credits shall be applied toward the convicted person's sentence.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Addo v. State, 212 Ga.App. 163(1), 441 S.E.2d 486 (1994) (physical precedent only). But the amount of credit given for time served is computed by the pre-sentence custodian, and it is awarded by the post-sentence custodian. Id. The trial court is therefore not involved in this matter. And here, although the trial court did comment that she would not give Diaz credit for time served, that is not reflected on the conviction and sentence entered. Even if Addo had precedential value, this situation is unlike Addo; no conflict exists for Diaz's post-trial custodian between enforcing Diaz's sentence and complying with OCGA § 17–10– 11(a).” Allen v. State , 244 Ga.App. 377, 535 S.E.2d 347 (June 8, 2000). Sentence for harassing phone calls vacated and remanded; trial court erred by refusing to give defendant credit for time served on bench warrant following failure to appear for court. “The court agreed to give Allen full credit for the initial 34 days he had spent in custody, but refused to give him credit for the 41 days served after the bench warrant arrest. Instead, the court gave Allen credit for only 45 days served and ordered him to serve another 45 days in custody, followed by 33 months on probation. … The trial court agreed with the state's reasoning that Allen should not get credit under OCGA § 17-10-11(a) for his 41 days in confinement because that confinement was not due to his pending charges, but was due to the bench warrant issued after he failed to appear for his arraignment. This reasoning is incorrect. ‘The primary purpose of the bench warrant is to secure the presence of the defendant in court. Once the defendant appears in court, the bench warrant is no longer necessary, and has no force and effect.’ State v. Stringer, 258 Ga. 605, 372 S.E.2d 426 (1988). So once Allen appeared in court pursuant to the bench warrant, that warrant became unnecessary and had no further force or effect. Allen therefore did not remain in custody for 41 days under the force of the bench warrant, but stayed in custody because he was unable to pay the increased bail amount of $1,200.” Hutchins v. State , 243 Ga.App. 261, 533 S.E.2d 107 (March 29, 2000). In DUI conviction, trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to terminate sentence; trial court couldn’t order that good time credit awarded by sheriff be added to probation time. Defendant here was given a twelve month sentence, with 180 days in confinement. Defendant was released from confinement with 60 days’ good time credit. Based on Johns v. State , 160 Ga.App. 535, 287 S.E.2d 617 (1981). “ Johns explained that a sentence of confinement is fully served at the time the custodian releases the prisoner. Id. ‘Any attempt by a court to impose its will over the Executive Department as to what constitutes service of a period of confinement would be a nullity and constitute an exercise of power granted exclusively to the Executive. [Cits.]’ Id.; see Stephens v. State, 207 Ga.App. 645, 647-648(2), 428 S.E.2d 661 (1993). Beyond violating the Georgia Constitution, Johns held that imposing additional probation as a result of an early release date contravened the intent of the statutory