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language directing that ‘earned time’ credit be deducted from a prisoner's sentence. Johns , supra, 160 Ga.App. at 537, 287 S.E.2d 617; see Davis v. State, 181 Ga.App. 498(1), 353 S.E.2d 7 (1987) (court could not withhold good-time credit on grounds fines were unpaid). OCGA § 42-4-7(b)(3) employs almost identical language: ‘An inmate sentenced to confinement as a county inmate shall be released at the expiration of his or her sentence less the time deducted for good- time allowances.’ OCGA § 42-4-7(b)(1) expressly authorizes a county sheriff to award good-time allowances based on institutional behavior. Based on Johns, we hold that this language prohibits a judge from imposing probation on any time by which confinement is shortened due to good-time credit. The legal consequence of that credit is that the related portion of the original sentence has been served. Because our holding is based on this statute, the State's attempt to distinguish the separation of powers clause of the Georgia Constitution is moot. Cf. Bldg. Auth. of Fulton County v. State of Ga., 253 Ga. 242, 247(5), 321 S.E.2d 97 (1984) (separation of powers clause applies to state and not counties); see generally Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III.” Smith and Andrews dissent. Johnson v. State, 241 Ga.App. 369, 526 S.E.2d 882 (December 8, 1999). Conviction for armed robbery affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for jail time credit. “Johnson was not entitled to jail time credit under the circumstances. The record shows that Johnson was confined in Bartow County for crimes in their jurisdiction and that a hold was placed on him to face [this] charge in Whitfield County. The Supreme Court has clearly held that the provision for crediting prison sentences with time spent in confinement applies only to persons who would not be confined but for the charges which give rise to the sentence for which credit is sought. Spann v. Whitworth, 262 Ga. 21, 23-24(2), 413 S.E.2d 713 (1992); Tucker v. Stynchcombe, 239 Ga. 356, 357, 236 S.E.2d 623 (1977). In the present case, Johnson was not being held in Bartow County on the Whitfield County charges, but on an unrelated Bartow County charge. The Whitfield County court did not err in denying Johnson's request for jail time credit.” Serpentfoot v. State, 241 Ga.App. 35, 524 S.E.2d 516 (November 3, 1999). Revocation of defendant’s suspended sentence affirmed; defendant wasn’t entitled to credit for time when her case was on appeal. “Serpentfoot argues that OCGA § 5-6-45(a) controls the issue raised by this appeal, contending that ‘the filing of a notice of appeal serves as a supersedeas only in cases where the death penalty has been imposed or where the defendant is admitted to bail.’ … This argument ignores, however, the language of OCGA § 17-10-9, which provides that a sentence must be computed from the date of the appellate court's remittitur, unless the defendant is incarcerated pending his or her appeal. If the defendant is incarcerated, the time of the original imposition of sentence until the time the remittitur is issued ‘shall be counted as time spent under sentence for all purposes.’ OCGA § 17-10-9. But as stated in Huff v. McLarty, 241 Ga. 442, 246 S.E.2d 302 (1978), defendants who remain at large receive no ‘credit for any time before entering upon their incarceration or other penalty. [Cits.]’ (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 445, 246 S.E.2d 302. Clearly, the import of OCGA § 17-10-9 is to give a defendant credit for time served. Here, during the time period between the date of her notice of appeal and the date of the remittitur issued by this court, Serpentfoot remained ‘at large’ due to the nature of her sentence-a suspended one.” Penney v. State, 236 Ga.App. 442, 511 S.E.2d 275 (February 1, 1999). After serving part of a 10-year prison sentence, defendant was granted habeas relief from his guilty plea. Remanded to trial court, defendant again pled guilty. “Penney agreed to accept a sentence of five years on intensive probation with no credit for time served instead of pleading to the original ten years imprisonment. The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced Penney accordingly. Penney did not appeal this conviction nor did he file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.” Two years later, defendant moved to “correct” his sentence, contending that it was void because it did not give him credit for the time previously served. Held, trial court properly denied the motion to correct the sentence. “[I]t was abundantly clear from the record that Penney knowingly and voluntarily exchanged the time he served on his previous ten year sentence for a five year probated sentence. Credit for time served is a personal benefit Penney was authorized to waive by his decision to enter a plea and accept a negotiated sentence. See Powell v. State, 229 Ga.App. 52, 53(2), 494 S.E.2d 200 (1997).” J. CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE See subheading FIRST OFFENDER/CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE, below K. CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES Lewis v. State, 291 Ga. 273, 731 S.E.2d 51 (June 25, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed, but sentence, as to accompanying firearms charge, vacated and remanded. Sentence was improper to the extent that sentence for possession of firearm during commission of a felony wasn’t immediately consecutive to the sentence for the underlying felony. Firearms charge was instead made consecutive to the underlying felony and a second, unrelated charge. “OCGA § 16–11–106(b) specifies that one who is convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony