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receive a sentence of five years in prison ‘to run consecutively to any other sentence which the person has received,’ which this Court has construed as meaning that the sentence for possession of a firearm ‘be served consecutively only to the underlying felony for that offense.’ Busch v. State, 271 Ga. 591, 594, 523 S.E.2d 21 (1999).” Holsey v. State, 316 Ga.App. 801, 729 S.E.2d 465 (June 21, 2012). Terroristic threats and related convictions affirmed; consecutive sentences thereon weren’t improper. “‘There is no constitutionally cognizable right to concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences. Under Georgia law, whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences for multiple offenses is within the trial court's discretion, so long as the sentence for each offense is within the statutory limits.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Simpson v. State, 310 Ga.App. 63, 64, n. 4, 715 S.E.2d 675 (2011).” Accord, Osborne v. State , 318 Ga.App. 339, 734 S.E.2d 59 (November 5, 2012); Adams v. State , 293 Ga. 506, 748 S.E.2d 459 (September 9, 2013). Colson v. State, 310 Ga.App. 221, 712 S.E.2d 520 (June 2, 2011). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to vacate his sentence for escape; contrary to defendant’s argument, sentence of five years to serve, concurrent with another sentence, followed by five years probation consecutive “to any sentence now serving,” was not void. “[Defendant] contends that OCGA § 17–10–10 provides for a sentence to be concurrent or consecutive, but not both, and from this he argues that his sentence is not one which the law allows and is therefore void. But the Code section does not say what Colson contends it says. OCGA § 17–10–10(b) provides: ‘Where a person is convicted on more than one indictment or accusation at separate terms of court, or in different courts, and sentenced to imprisonment, the sentences shall be served concurrently, one with the other, unless otherwise expressly provided therein. ’ (Emphasis supplied.) Here, the sentence expressly provides for both a concurrent and a consecutive portion of the term to be served. Moreover, ‘[t]he (b) section of Code Ann. § 27–2510 [now OCGA § 17–10–10] properly is to be construed as being applicable to groups of offenses committed in a single crime spree, where convictions for such offenses have been obtained in separate courts or terms of court. That section does not constitute a limitation upon the discretion of the trial court, derived from the common law, to set sentences imposed as a result of convictions for a new group of offenses that are separate and distinct from previous sentences to commence at the termination of all sentences previously imposed.’ (Citation omitted.) Amerson v. Zant, 243 Ga. 509, 510 (255 S.E.2d 34) (1979).” Rooney v. State, 287 Ga. 1, 690 S.E.2d 804 (March 1, 2010). OCGA § 17-10-10 is not unconstitutional for any of the numerous reasons advanced by defendant. Code section provides “[w]here at one term of court a person is convicted on more than one indictment or accusation, or on more than one count thereof, and sentenced to imprisonment, the sentences shall be served concurrently unless otherwise expressly provided therein.” 1. Not void for vagueness . “‘Courts have generally recognized that statutes which afford discretion to a sentencing court to impose consecutive sentences do not violate due process. [Cits.]’ State v. Jacobs, 644 N.W.2d 695, 699(IV) (Iowa 2001).” 2. Does not violate rule of lenity. “[T]hat rule cannot itself render any statute unconstitutional. See Lurie v. Wittner, 228 F.3d 113, 126 (2 nd Cir., 2000). To the contrary, its application may render a statute constitutional. … It is a rule of construction which ‘“applies only when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous statute.”’ Banta v. State, 281 Ga. 615, 618(2) (642 S.E.2d 51) (2007). Nothing in either the sentences imposed in this case ‘or the language of OCGA § 17-10-10 implicates the rule of lenity. Neither the statute nor the [sentences are] ambiguous; the trial court had discretion to impose consecutive sentences, which it exercised here.’ Dowling v. State, 278 Ga.App. 903, 904 (630 S.E.2d 143) (2006).” 3. Does not violate Apprendi . “Citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435) (2000) and its progeny, Rooney urges that OCGA § 17-10-10(a) violates the Sixth Amendment requirement that any fact exposing a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury and not by a judge. ‘These decisions do not, however, speak to a trial court's authority to cumulate sentences when that authority is provided by statute and is not based upon discrete fact-finding, but is wholly discretionary.’ Barrow v. State, [207 S.W.3d 377, 379 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006)]. Apprendi does not apply here because ‘[t]he imposition of consecutive sentences did not depend on the finding of a statutorily prescribed fact. [Cit.]’ State v. Jacobs, supra. Moreover, even if OCGA § 17-10-10(a) did require such factfinding, the Sixth Amendment would not ‘mandate jury determination of any fact declared necessary to the imposition of consecutive, in lieu of concurrent, sentences[.]’ Oregon v. Ice, [555 U.S. 160, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (January 14, 2009)].” 4. Consecutive sentences are not cruel and unusual. “‘Eighth amendment analysis focuses on the sentence imposed for each specific crime, not on the cumulative sentence.’ [Cits.] ... Several ... states have reached similar conclusions.... ‘[I]f a proportionality review were to consider the cumulative effect of all the sentences imposed, the result would be the possibility that a defendant could generate an Eighth Amendment disproportionality claim simply because that defendant had engaged in repeated criminal activity.’ [Cits.] ... In accordance with this analysis, we conclude that for purposes of the Eighth Amendment ..., proportionality review should focus on individual sentences rather than on the cumulative impact of multiple sentences imposed consecutively. Where none of the individual sentences imposed on an offender are grossly disproportionate to their respective offenses, an aggregate prison term resulting from consecutive