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imposition of those sentences does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.’ State v. Hairston, 888 N.E.2d 1073, 1077-1078 (Ohio 2008).” Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (January 14, 2009). Reversing ruling of Oregon Supreme Court, 5-4 majority finds no application of Apprendi where state law requires trial court to make specific findings of fact before sentencing to consecutive (rather than concurrent) terms. “[T]win considerations – historical practice and respect for state sovereignty – counsel against extending Apprendi 's rule to the imposition of sentences for discrete crimes. The decision to impose sentences consecutively is not within the jury function that ‘extends down centuries into the common law.’ Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 477, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Instead, specification of the regime for administering multiple sentences has long been considered the prerogative of state legislatures. The historical record demonstrates that the jury played no role in the decision to impose sentences consecutively or concurrently. Rather, the choice rested exclusively with the judge.” “There is no encroachment here by the judge upon facts historically found by the jury, nor any threat to the jury's domain as a bulwark at trial between the State and the accused. Instead, the defendant – who historically may have faced consecutive sentences by default – has been granted by some modern legislatures statutory protections meant to temper the harshness of the historical practice.” “As we have described, the scope of the constitutional jury right must be informed by the historical role of the jury at common law. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 98-100, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970). It is therefore not the case that, as Ice suggests, the federal constitutional right attaches to every contemporary state-law ‘entitlement’ to predicate findings.” Scalia, writing for Roberts, Souter, and Thomas, dissents. Hooks v. State, 284 Ga. 531, 668 S.E.2d 718 (October 27, 2008). “Where, as here, a defendant is charged with the homicide of separate victims ‘in different counts and is found guilty on each count, he may be sentenced separately on each count to run consecutively for the reason that the killing of different persons constitutes separate crimes....’ Cox v. State, 243 Ga.App. 668, 669 (533 S.E.2d 435) (2000). See also Brown v. State, 129 Ga.App. 743, 746(5) (201 S.E.2d 14) (1973).” Busch v. State, 271 Ga. 591, 523 S.E.2d 21 (November 1, 1999). Sentence reversed; trial court erroneously believed it couldn’t run sentences for multiple counts of possession of a firearm in commission of a crime concurrently, and so ran them consecutively. “OCGA § 16-11-106(b) sets forth the elements of the crime of being in possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and further provides that ‘upon conviction thereof, [the defendant] shall be punished by confinement for a period of five years, such sentence to run consecutively to any other sentence which the person has received.’” “We conclude that the most logical interpretation, and the one most in keeping with the purpose of § 16-11- 106, is to require that the five-year sentence of subsection (b) run consecutively only to the underlying felony to the possession of a firearm offense.” Hunstein, Carley and Thompson dissent, would find that the firearm sentence is required to run consecutive to any other sentence. See also Lewis (June 25, 2012), above (Busch requires firearms charge to be immediately consecutive to underlying felony, not separated by other charges) . L. COOPERATION WITH STATE Eidman v. State, 295 Ga.App. 304, 671 S.E.2d 292 (September 26, 2008). Defendant’s sentence for cocaine trafficking affirmed; contrary to defendant’s assertion, he was not entitled to a reduced sentence due to assistance rendered the State. “OCGA § 16-13-31(g)(2) ‘does not by its terms require the judge to impose a reduced or suspended sentence in the event a defendant has rendered such assistance[,] but instead merely authorizes him to do so.’ (Emphasis added.) Lastohkein v. State, 199 Ga.App. 555(2) (405 S.E.2d 554) (1991). See generally Brugman v. State, 255 Ga. 407, 414(5)(c) (339 S.E.2d 244) (1986). Here, the trial court exercised its discretion and concluded, based on the evidence presented at the sentence hearing, that Eidman's actions did not constitute ‘substantial assistance’ sufficient to justify a reduced sentence below the mandatory minimum. See Lastohkein, supra.” Distinguishing State v. Carden , 281 Ga.App. 886, 637 S.E.2d 493 (2006) ( reduction in sentence for cooperation was authorized; Carden does not purport to require reduction). M. CORRECTION See also PROBATION – MODIFICATION OF PROBATION, above and subheadings MODIFICATION and RESENTENCING, below 1. FIRST OFFENDER State v. Stulb, 296 Ga.App. 510, 675 S.E.2d 253 (March 9, 2009). Trial court erred when, several years after defendant’s conviction, court “granted Stulb's motion to rescind his full sentence under OCGA § 42-8-34(g) and then resentenced him as a first offender.” “By the plain terms of [OCGA § 42-8-60(a)], ‘a trial court is only authorized to grant first offender treatment before a defendant has been adjudicated guilty and sentenced.’ (Emphasis in original.)